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Abstract
Low altitude wind shear is the leading weather-related cause of fatal aviation
accidents in the United States. Localized intense downdrafts known as microbursts are
the most dangerous form of wind shear, and pose a serious hazard to aircraft during
takeoff or approach. New developments in microburst sensing, ground-air digital data
transmission, and electronic cockpit instrumentation are providing a variety of
capabilities and options for development of an effective microburst alerting system. In
this work, a user-centered approach was applied to identify and analyze critical system
design issues in a series of multidisciplinary studies. This approach is designed to
optimize the decision-making performance of the end user, and thereby optimize the
operational efficiency of the microburst alerting system.
The primary end users of microburst alerts are flight crews, so the initial task was
to determine which information is required by the crew for effective microburst alerting
and the most effective presentation techniques for this information. This was done with a
pilot survey and with two piloted part-task simulator experiments. Iconic graphical alerts
were found to be significantly more useful than verbal or text communications, and
several format and procedural issues for implementation of graphical alerts were
examined. These studies included development of a part-task flight simulator, based on
an advanced workstation with powerful graphics and rapid prototyping capabilities,
which was found to be an exceptionally useful tool for preliminary evaluation of
advanced cockpit information systems. Next, the issue of producing the required alert
information - the alert generation task - was addressed. Possible hazard metrics for
microburst intensity were compared, and an effective one selected based on a batch flight
simulation technique. The energy-based "F-factor" criterion averaged over 3000 ft of
aircraft flight path was found to be a much better indicator of aircraft hazard than the
"delta-V" (total headwind-to-tailwind change) criterion currently used by the Terminal
Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) microburst detection system and the Low Level
Windshear Alert System (LLWAS). A method was then developed for establishing a
multi-level microburst alerting structure, using threshold values of a hazard metric based
on measureable airmass parameters. The method was applied to determine three-level
alerting thresholds for jet transports on approach to landing. Alert generation requires
estimates of microburst characteristics; a model-based data assimilation technique for
estimating microburst characteristics from multi-sensor measurements was therefore
developed. The extended Kalman filter-based technique incorporates elementary fluid
mechanics and statistical characteristics of microbursts to improve estimation accuracy,
and to allow estimation of quantities which cannot be directly measured. The model-
based approach which was developed is quite general and may have applications for other
multi-sensor measurement problems. Finally, the implications of the these studies for
current, near-term, and possible future microburst alerting systems were examined.
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Nomenclature
In the following list, symbols defined specifically for this work are followed by
the parenthesized chapter number in which they are first defined. Symbols with multiple
meanings are similarly identified by chapter number or appendix letter. Boldface
lowercase symbols indicate vector quantities and boldface uppercase symbols indicate
matrices.
A microburst dynamic model, state dynamics matrix (7)
AD approach degradation (6)
B microburst dynamic model, deterministic input matrix (7)
CD aircraft drag coefficient
CL aircraft lift coefficient
d glideslope altitude deviation (6)
D aircraft drag
e vector of wind modeling errors (7)
E aircraft total energy (2)
F F-factor (2, 5, 6, 7) or objective function (D)
Fav F-factor averaged over 1 km of aircraft flight path (6)
g gravitational acceleration
g gradient of objective function (D)
h altitude
hp potential altitude (2)
h .vector of equations relating state variables to measurements (7)
H linearized measurement matrix (7)
I identity matrix
J Jacobean matrix (D)
K Kalman filter gain matrix (7)
L aircraft lift
L microburst dynamic model, process noise input matrix (7)
Mextent Microburst extent estimation figure-of-merit (7)
MIap microburst impact parameter for approach to landing (6)
MIto microburst impact parameter for takeoff (6)
m aircraft mass
p search direction for minimization (D)
P estimation error covariance matrix (7)
Q process noise covariance matrix (7)
r radial distance (C)
Rp OBV model, microburst core radius (6, 7, C)
R measurement noise covariance matrix
s Laplace transform frequency variable
S aircraft wing reference area
t time
tk time of measurements (7)
T aircraft thrust
TD takeoff degradation (6)
u deterministic input vector (7)
Uo modified OBV model, eastward ambient wind speed (7, C)
Uh modified OBV model, eastward ambient wind altitude gradient (7, C)
Um OBV model, maximum outflow speed (6, 7, C)
v measurement noise vector (7)
V airspeed
Vo modified OBV model, northward ambient wind speed (7, C)
Vh modified OBV model, northward ambient wind altitude gradient (7, C)
w process noise vector (7)
W aircraft weight
W vector of wind measurements (7)
Wr horizontal wind velocity, radially outward from sensor (C)
Wx horizontal wind velocity along aircraft heading (tailwind positive)
WxE eastward wind velocity (Earth-referenced)
WyE northward wind velocity (Earth-referenced)
Wh vertical wind velocity (updraft positive)
x eastward distance (7, C)
xo OBV model, east microburst core location (7, C)
x vector of microburst model parameters (7, C)
£ estimated microburst model parameter vector (7)
y northward distance (7, C)
Yo OBV model, north microburst core location (7, C)
z wind measurement vector (7)
Zm OBV model, altitude of maximum outflow speed (6, 7, C)
a aircraft angle of attack (6) or OBV model radial shaping parameter (C)
or linear search step (D)
ass stick shaker angle-of-attack
8 f aircraft flap deflection
Ya aircraft air-mass relative flight path angle
Yi aircraft inertial flight path angle
""1 angular glideslope displacement (6)
X OBV model scale factor (C)
coefficient of dynamic friction (B) or linear search convergence
parameter (D)
0 aircraft pitch angle (6) or sensor elevation angle (C)
p air density
Mi sensor azimuth angle (C)
to linear search gain reduction multiplier (D)
(') time derivative of ()
()i () at the ith update iteration (7)
() jth component of vector ( )
()k ( ) at measurement time, tk (7)
)-() prior to measurement update (7)
() ( ) after measurement update (7)
Acronyms
ABDR Airborne Doppler Radar
ACARS ARINC Communications Addressing and Reporting System
AGL Above Ground Level (altitude)
ARINC Aeronautical Radio, Inc.
ASL Aeronautical Systems Laboratory
ASR Airport Surveillance Radar
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATIS Automatic Terminal Information Service
CDU Control Display Unit
CRT Cathode Ray Tube
DEN Denver-Stapleton International Airport
DFW Dallas-Fort Worth Airport
EADI Electronic Attitude Director Indicator
EFIS Electronic Flight Instrumentation System
EHSI Electronic Horizontal Situation Indicator
EKF Extended Kalman Filter
ELM Extended Length Message (Mode-S)
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FLOPS Floating Point Operations
FMC Flight Management Computer
GSD Geographical Situation Display
IEKF Iterated Extended Kalman Filter
INS Inertial Navigation System
IR Infrared
KIAS Knots, Indicated Airspeed
LCD Liquid Crystal Display
LIDAR Light Detection and Ranging
LLWAS Low-Level Windshear Alert System
LNAV Lateral Navigation (FMC)
MCP Mode Control Panel
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NCAR National Committee for Atmospheric Research
OBV Oseguera-Bowles-Vicroy (microburst model)
PFD Primary Flight Display
PIREP Pilot Report
RADAR Radio Detection and Ranging
TASS Terminal Area Simulation System
TDWR Terminal Doppler Weather Radar
VHF Very High Frequency
VOR VHF Omnidirectional Ranging
VNAV Vertical Navigation (FMC)
WTA Windshear Training Aid
1. Introduction
Low altitude wind shear is the leading weather-related cause of fatal aviation
accidents in the U.S. Since 1964, there have been 26 accidents attributed to wind shear
resulting in over 500 fatalities [National Research Council, 1983; Wolfson, 1988]. The
localized intense downdrafts known as microbursts are the most dangerous form of wind
shear, and pose a serious hazard to aircraft during takeoff or approach. For this reason
development of sensors for wind shear detection has been a very active research area. In
addition, recent developments in ground-to-air digital datalinks and electronic cockpit
instrumentation have provided new options for dissemination and presentation of ground-
measured microburst alerts. Integration of these new technologies to provide effective
microburst detection and alerting constitutes a complex multidisciplinary system
engineering problem.
A microburst detection and alerting system needs to perform a series of separate
but connected subtasks, illustrated in Figure 1.1. First, data from one or several sensors is
processed to detect, locate, and measure characteristics of microbursts. Next, the
microburst hazard is evaluated based on the sensor data and the current operational
situation. Alerts are then formulated and disseminated to Air Traffic Control (ATC) and
affected aircraft. Finally, alerts are presented to the flight crew to best aid in avoiding or
escaping the microburst. In the course of this research, several issues critical to the
performance of these subtasks were isolated and addressed. These include:
(1) Selection of effective microburst alert information content and cockpit
presentation format
(2) Generation of microburst alerts based on the evaluated hazard
(3) Evaluation of the microburst hazard to aircraft based on measureable
microburst characteristics
(4) Assimilation of data from several wind shear sensor systems into a combined
hazard assessment ("data fusion")
Alert
Application Present to User
Format + Disseminate
Alert
Information
Alert Alert Production
Generation
Hazard Assessment
Estimated Microburst
Characteristics
Data Assimilation
Measurement
Data Collection
Figure 1.1. Microburst Alerting Task Breakdown
This report documents the analyses and experiments done to address each of the
above issues, and discusses their implications for overall microburst alerting system
design. Chapter 2 provides a background review including a summary of microburst
meteorology and a review of current microburst detection, alert dissemination, and
cockpit presentation technologies. Chapter 3 outlines the user-centered, top-down design
approach used in this work and presents an overview of the specific studies which were
done. The user requirements definition phase included a pilot opinion survey on wind
shear (Chapter 4) and two piloted part-task simulator studies of candidate microburst alert
formats (Chapter 5). Chapter 6 presents a batch flight simulation study of metrics for
microburst hazard assessment. A technique for establishing multi-level alert hazard
thresholds is also developed. An algorithm for multi-sensor estimation of microburst
characteristics is described in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 discusses the implications of these
studies for current and future microburst alerting systems. Finally, the major results and
contributions of this work are summarized in Chapter 9.
2. Background
2.1. The Microburst Threat
2.1.1. Meteorology
The existence of "downbursts" as an aviation hazard was first hypothesized by
Fujita and Byers [1977] to explain the crash of Eastern Flight 66 on 24 June 1975 at New
York's John F. Kennedy airport. A downburst is a descending column of air which
strikes the ground and spreads out in a radial pattern, similar to that formed by a jet of
fluid striking a solid wall. The outflowing winds can also form a horizontal ring vortex
(Figure 2.1). Downbursts have been observed to cause tornado-like damage such as
flattened trees and buildings due to the high wind speeds which can occur. Downbursts
have been classified into "macrobursts" and "microbursts" according to the size of the
high wind region. Microbursts are defined to have a horizontal extent of less than 4 km,
and macrobursts of larger than 4 km. The majority of wind shear related fatal aviation
accidents have been attributed to microbursts, which have produced measured wind
speeds of as much as 75 m/s (168 mph) [Fujita, 1985].
Cloud Base -
- Outflow- .-
Figure 2.1. Cross-sectional view of a microburst. Viewed from above, the outflow region would appear
roughly circular or elliptical. Reproduced from the Windshear Training Aid [FAA, 1987].
Observational studies have indicated that several different weather patterns can
produce microbursts [Wolfson, 1988]. Isolated cumulonumbus clouds, also known as
"air mass thunderstorms," can produce strong microbursts accompanied by heavy rain.
These storms typically occur on hot, humid summer afternoons, and are common in many
parts of the United States. The "wet" microbursts resulting from these storms are
particularly hazardous to aircraft, since they can have very strong outflows and are often
accompanied by heavy rain.
Wet downbursts, both microbursts and microbursts, can also be produced by
larger scale storm complexes or frontal storms. This type of microburst-producing storm
typically exhibits high radar reflectivity (at least 50 dbZ) and is easily recognized as an
aviation hazard. In addition, these storms are long-lived and follow fairly predictable
paths. Therefore, the associated microbursts are normally avoided by standard
thunderstorm avoidance procedures.
The microburst forms discussed above have been termed "wet" microbursts since
they are associated with significant rainfall. "Dry" microbursts, in which little or no rain
reaches the surface, have also been observed to occur. These microbursts are typically
produced by shallow, high-based cumulonumbus clouds. Dry microbursts have
principally been observed in the high plains regions east of the Rocky Mountains during
summer afternoons. They occur when precipitation falling from a high cloud base
evaporates, cooling the air and producing an associated downdraft. The evaporating
precipitation appears as hazy shafts below the cloud base. These "virga" are the primary
visual evidence of a dry microburst.
Single microbursts typically have lifetimes on the order of 15 minutes. This short
lifespan and correspondingly short development time adds to the microburst hazard, due
to the difficulty of detection and alerting in the little time available. Dry microbursts can
also occur in roughly linear groups known as "microburst lines." Since microburst lines
typically last about 1 hour and propagate very slowly (mean speed 1.3 m/s), they can
have a strong impact on airport operations. These same characteristics imply that they
can be more easily detected than single microbursts. Wet microbursts have also been
observed to occur in groups, but do not typically organize into long-lived microburst
lines.
2.1.2. Effect on Aircraft
The aviation hazard posed by microbursts has two major components. An aircraft
entering a microburst first encounters a performance-increasing headwind. This is
followed by a downdraft and a rapid transition from headwind to tailwind, both of which
tend to drive the aircraft below glideslope and reduce airspeed (Figure 2.2). These effects
are aggravated if the pilot or autopilot is unaware of the microburst, and reduces thrust
during the headwind portion of the event to prevent the aircraft from rising above the
glideslope.
Fflght
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Figure 2.2. Microburst encounter on approach.
A quantitative measure of the impact of microbursts on aircraft has been
developed by researchers at the NASA Langley Research Center [Bowles, 1990; Hinton,
1990]. This measure, called F-factor, is based on analysis of the total energy of an
aircraft and how it is affected by the local windfield. The energy state of an aircraft can
be quantified by summing the air-relative kinetic energy and the ground-relative potential
energy. The air-relative kinetic energy is used since the air-relative velocity (airspeed)
rather than the inertial speed impacts the immediate climb capability of the aircraft.
Similarly, the altitude above ground-level (AGL) is more relevant to aircraft recovery
than barometric altitude. This energy sum per unit weight (specific energy), also referred
to as "potential altitude" or "aircraft energy height," is:
h-E _V 2 +h (2.1)
W 2g
where V is aircraft airspeed, h is AGL altitude, and g is sea level gravitational
acceleration. Assuming that airspeed can be converted to climb rate with no energy
losses, the time rate of change of this quantity is equivalent to the potential rate of climb
of the airplane:
lip = V + li (2.2)
Combining this definition with point-mass longitudinal equations of motion for
flight in a non-uniform atmosphere, the potential rate of climb becomes:
fP=V {T-D) [_gx COS Y + Wh sin ya. _-_ (2.3)lip = V - cos a + sin - (2.3)
where Wx is the tailwind-positive horizontal wind component, Wh is the updraft-positive
vertical wind component, T is engine thrust, D is aircraft drag, and 'a is flight-path angle
relative to the airmass. Note that Wx is the time derivative of the horizontal wind in the
aircraft frame. The bracketed term in the above expression contains the effect of wind
shear on potential rate of climb. Assuming small flight-path angles, the term in brackets
becomes:
F = Wx Wh (2.4)
g V
and is denoted "F-factor." The expression for potential climb rate then reduces to:
ip = V TD -F) (2.5)
Equation 2.5 indicates that F is a direct measure of the loss in available climb rate
(for a constant airspeed trajectory) or, equivalently, the loss in available excess thrust-to-
weight ratio (T - D)/W due to the local windfield. Positive values of F indicate a
performance-decreasing situation with loss of climb capability, and negative values
indicate performance-enhancing winds. If F exceeds the excess thrust-to-weight ratio for
a particular aircraft, that aircraft will be unable to maintain altitude and must descend.
This constitutes a hazardous situation during takeoff and landing operations. For this
reason, F is often referred to as "hazard factor" and is an instantaneous measure of the
hazard posed by the immediate windfield.
F is a non-dimensional quantity, and a function purely of the local winds and
airspeed. It contains two components, one due to head-to-tailwind shear and one due to
downdraft. At lower altitudes, the shear term dominates due to high microburst outflow
velocities; at higher altitudes, the downdraft term dominates due to the descending cool
air in the microburst core. The use of F as a hazard criterion and for alert thresholds will
be discussed in ensuing chapters.
Another component of the aviation hazard is due to short-scale phenomena such
as vortices and severe turbulence (both of which have been associated with microbursts).
These short-scale events can destabilize the aircraft and degrade performance. F-factor
does not take these effects into account since it is based on point-mass aircraft motion
equations and does not include short time scale aircraft dynamics. The crash of Delta 191
at Dallas-Fort Worth Airport in 1985 provides an illustrative historical case [Fujita,
1986]. The microburst windfield during this event included several strong vortices on the
scale of the aircraft length and wingspan. Flight recorder data indicates that the aircraft
experienced large rolling motions (up to 200 from level) and large pitch angle excursions
(from +140 to -90). At the time of impact, the airspeed (approximately 165 KIAS) was
still well above stall and the aircraft had sufficient energy to avoid ground contact. The
short-scale vortex disturbances apparently made the aircraft difficult to control and
reduced the ability of the pilot to fly a recovery maneuver. Piloted simulations have been
performed with simulated winds from the DFW case and support this hypothesis.
[Hinton, 1989].
2.2. Microburst Sensing Systems
Both airborne and ground-based microburst detection systems are being
developed, based on a variety of sensor technologies. Ground-based systems are
generally more mature than airborne systems, and in some cases are already in the
deployment phase.
2.2.1 Ground-Based Systems
LLWAS. The Low Level Wind Shear Alert System (LLWAS), currently in
service at most major U.S. airports, is a system of anemometers (usually 5 or 6) designed
to measure shifts in surface wind speed and direction within the airport perimeter. New
measurements are received at 10 second intervals. LLWAS can detect macroscopic wind
shears such as gustfronts; however the anemometer spacing is larger than the
characteristic surface dimension of many microbursts, and thus the standard LLWAS is
fairly ineffective for microburst detection [National Research Council, 1983]. An
extended version of LLWAS including up to 16 anemometers with tighter spacing is
currently under development [Wilson and Gramzow, 1991]. The extended systems cover
approach/departure corridors in addition to the airport surface, and have been successful
in detecting a severe microburst and saving at least one approaching transport category
aircraft during a test at Denver's Stapleton Airport in 1989 [Wilson and Gramzow, 1990].
Advanced LLWAS systems are scheduled for installation at seven major airports in 1992,
and other existing systems have been slightly upgraded as an interim measure.
TDWR. The most effective ground-based system is Terminal Doppler Weather
Radar (TDWR). TDWR is a C-band, pencil-beam, pulsed Doppler weather radar, located
10-15 km from the airport, which measures winds over the airport and associated
approach/departure corridors. The Doppler radar measures wind components radial to the
radar beam. The radar emits pulses of microwave energy, of which some is reflected by
airborne particulates (precipitation, dust, insects, etc.) in the target volume. Wind
velocities are computed from the Doppler shift present in the reflected energy, assuming
that the airborne particles are traveling at the speed of the wind. Microbursts are detected
by isolating regions of radial shear in the measured radial velocity field [Merritt et. al.,
1989]. TDWR microburst measurements are available at 1 minute intervals.
Several years of TDWR operational evaluations have proven the ability to reliably
detect both wet and dry microbursts, especially strong ones. As shown in Table 2.1, a
98.5% probability of detection was achieved for microbursts with at least 20 m/s
horizontal velocity change [Campbell et. al. 1989]. This was accompanied by a false
alarm probability of only 5.2%.
Ground-based radars such as TDWR have greater microburst detection
capabilities than airborne radars due to the greater available power and reduced ground-
clutter problems due to upward look angles. A corresponding disadvantage is that a
single TDWR cannot be sited so as to look directly down the approach and departure
corridors of all an airport's runways. Since Doppler radars cannot measure winds
Table 2.1. TDWR microburst detection performance. AV is the maximum measured horizontal wind
change across the microburst. Huntsville microbursts are primarily "wet", Denver's are primarily "dry".
Number of Microburst Detection
Data Set Microbursts AV < 20 m/s AV 2 20m/s All
Huntsville, 1986 48 85.6% 100.0% 89.2%
Denver, 1987/88 78 83.7% 97.9% 87.8%
All Data 126 85.4% 98.5% 88.4%
perpendicular to the radar beam, this means that TDWR cannot always measure the winds
directly along the aircraft flight path (as airborne radars do).
The TDWR system also detects gustfronts and precipitation, and all TDWR
products are provided to the control tower on a graphical display for alerting and planning
purposes. Current plans call for 47 total TDWR installations in the U.S. [Evans, 1991;
Moore et. al. 1991]. Further plans include development of a microburst prediction
product, which could potentially give 5 minute warning of impending microbursts. The
prediction algorithm uses the ability of the TDWR to scan aloft for events which have
been observed to precede microburst formation [Campbell, 1991].
Airport Surveillance Radar. Airport surveillance radars, specifically the ASR-9,
have also demonstrated some capability for wind shear detection. The ASR-9 has a "fan
beam" antenna, which has a radiation pattern broad in elevation. This antenna has
significantly lower gain than a pencil-beam radar antenna (as with TDWR), limiting
achievable signal-to-noise ratios and hence detection capability. In addition, the ASR-9
experiences intense ground clutter at short ranges. Despite these limitations, testing has
indicated a probability of detection of 97% for microbursts with greater than 30 knot total
horizontal wind change, with a corresponding false alarm probability of 14% [Weber, et.
al. 1991]. Modification of an ASR to perform wind shear detection is a promising
alternative for locations which do not warrant TDWR installations.
2.2.2 Airborne Systems
Airborne systems include reactive sensors, which alert the crew upon penetration
of a microburst, and active and passive forward-look systems, which remotely sense
microbursts ahead of the aircraft.
Reactive Sensors. Reactive sensors provide real-time measurements of the
immediate windfield by differencing inertial measurements of aircraft state (linear
accelerations, angular rates) with air data system measurements (airspeed, vertical speed).
F-factor can be computed directly by reactive systems, since all relevant quantities (see
Eqn. 2.4) can be directly measured. However, these systems can only reliably detect a
microburst several seconds after the aircraft has entered it. If the microburst is severe
enough, this may be too late for a successful recovery maneuver even if initiated
immediately. Reactive wind shear alert systems are becoming standard equipment on
transport-category aircraft, and certification requirements for both reactive sensors and
microburst escape guidance systems have been set by the Federal Aviation
Administration [FAA, 1990].
Active Forward-Look Sensors. There are several airborne forward-look
microburst detection technologies in varying stages of development, but none of them
have been deployed in the field as of this writing. Active forward-looking sensors
include Doppler radar and Doppler lidar (laser radar) [Bowles, 1990]. These sensors
measure the Doppler shift from reflected microwave or laser radiation to determine wind
components radial to the sensor (usually aimed along the aircraft flight path). Since
aircraft are usually flying horizontally or at small flight path angles, only the horizontal
winds are measured, and the vertical winds ahead of the aircraft cannot be directly
measured. However, algorithms have been developed to estimate vertical winds from
horizontal wind shear and thereby allow estimation of F-factor for hazard assessment.
[Bowles, 1990; Vicroy, 1992]. Airborne Doppler systems must overcome problems of
rain attenuation (due to their relatively low transmission power) and ground clutter (due
to downward look angles) in order to become viable. During NASA flight tests
performed in the summer of 1991, it was demonstrated that airborne Doppler radars can
successfully detect microbursts without false alerts due to ground clutter [Bracalente,
1992]. Airborne Doppler radars with microburst detection capabilities are currently in
the certification phase. Preliminary testing of a Doppler lidar was done by NASA in the
summer of 1992, but results are not available as of this time.
Passive Forward-Look Sensors. Passive forward-looking sensors based on
infrared (IR) radiometry are also under development [Adamson, 1988]. IR systems
measure the temperature difference between the cool air descending in the microburst
core and the local air temperature at the aircraft's current position. The difference in
temperature has been correlated with peak F-factor in the microburst core through
computational microburst simulations [Proctor, 1988; 1989]. Initial testing has shown
some promise, but problems were encountered including false alerts caused by rain
contamination of sensor measurements [McKissick, 1992]. IR systems are currently still
in the development phase.
Although none of the forward-looking sensor systems are currently operational,
flight tests of prototype IR, Doppler radar, and Doppler lidar have been done by NASA
Langley Research Center in 1991 and 1992. Initial results are promising, but the analysis
of flight test data is not complete as of this writing [Lewis, 1993].
2.3. Technologies for Alert Dissemination
VHF Radio. The only communication link presently available between ATC and
aircraft for dissemination of wind shear alerts is standard VHF verbal radio
communications. Using voice channels for alerts is problematic for several reasons. The
high density of radio communications in busy terminal areas makes the addition of any
further transmissions, particularly time-critical ones, undesirable. In addition, requiring
controllers to disseminate microburst alerts may result in unacceptably high controller
workload levels. Also, the latency time due to controller involvement in the alert process
may be detrimental to successful microburst avoidance. A few seconds of delay can have
significant impact on the ability of aircraft to recover from microburst encounters
[Hinton, 1990]. One possible solution is to employ a digital ground-air datalink and
automate alert generation and delivery.
Mode-S Datalink. The FAA's Mode-S surveillance datalink is a promising
candidate for digital uplink of hazardous weather information in the terminal area due to
its ability to rapidly disseminate messages to individually selectable aircraft. Mode-S is
an extension of the altitude encoding Mode-C transponder in the ATC Radar Beacon
System allowing message delivery from ATC to individual aircraft. Each message can
carry 48 useful bits of information, and the time for the interrogation beam to scan the
entire coverage area ranges from 4 to 12 seconds. Messages can be also be linked in
groups of up to 4 frames or sent as a longer Extended Length Message (ELM) with less
urgency [Orlando, Drouhilet 1986]. Because ELMs can be delayed when the terminal
area is crowded, it would be desirable to send time-critical microburst alerts in the
standard 48-bit surveillance mode. This places a strong constraint on alert format length.
ACARS Datalink. The ARINC Communications Addressing and Reporting
System (ACARS), a privately-sponsored VHF bi-directional digital datalink, is currently
in use by many major airlines. It provides an alphanumeric datalink capability for flight
management information such as uplink of destination weather or arrival gate
information, or downlink of engine performance or winds aloft data. In addition,
ACARS can now be used at some airports to receive pre-departure clearances from ATC
and to program the aircraft's Fight Management Computer with the proposed route of
flight, winds aloft, and performance data [Midkiff and Hansman, 1992]. ACARS
provides another possible channel for microburst alert dissemination.
2.4. Technologies for Alert Presentation
As mentioned above, VHF voice channels are the only currently available method
for delivery of ground-generated microburst alerts. However, the advent of digital
datalink will allow electronic presentation of ground-generated alerts to the flight crew.
The Electronic Flight Instrumentation Systems (EFIS) in modem transport aircraft could
be used both for this purpose and to present alerts from onboard sensor systems. An
EFIS is a set of color cathode ray tube (CRT) displays or flat-screen liquid crystal
displays (LCD) used to graphically or textually present information. An EFIS typically
includes a Primary Flight Display (PFD) with the artificial horizon and altitude and
airspeed information), an Electronic Horizontal Situation Indicator (EHSI) which
provides a track-up "moving map" navigation display with programmed route and
destination airport, and an engine and auxiliary systems display to allow the crew to
monitor engine health and other onboard systems operation. In addition, weather radar
precipitation returns can often be displayed directly on the EHSI.
The most likely modes of operation for microburst alerts would be either a
graphical iconic display using the EHSI map display and/or a weather radar display, or a
textual display on either the EHSI or PFD. These could be accompanied by discrete alert
lamps and aural tones or recorded or synthetic voice. The use of these displays is subject
to many constraints, and formats must be carefully designed to minimize added crew
workload and maximize crew situational awareness. These topics will be further
discussed in Chapter 4.
2.5. Current Alert and Response Procedures
2.5.1. The Windshear Training Aid
Current operational procedures for microburst detection and alerting are based ori
the FAA's Windshear Training Aid [1987]. The Windshear Training Aid (WTA) was
written to inform pilots, controllers, and airline management about wind shear, and it
emphasizes early recognition and avoidance techniques. WTA microburst avoidance
procedures are predicated on the absence of an accurate quantitative microburst detection
capability such as TDWR which can reliably alert prior to microburst penetration. In
order to evaluate the need for avoidance, the probability of microburst presence is
evaluated from LLWAS alerts, weather reports, and visual clues as outlined in Table 2.2.
Wind shear clues from this table are to be considered cumulative, such that two
indications of MEDIUM probability should be taken to indicate a HIGH probability. It
should be noted that high pilot workload in the terminal area and the relative rarity of
hazardous wind shear makes it difficult for even well-trained crews to fully assimilate the
evidence of wind shear before penetration.
Table 2.2. Microburst Windshear Probability Guidelines. Redrawn from the Windshear Training Aid
[FAA, 1987].
Observation Probability of Windshear
PRESENCE OF CONVECTIVE WEATHER NEAR INTENDED FLIGHT PATH:
* With localized strong winds (Tower reports or observed blowing HIGH
dust, rings of dust, tornado like features, etc.
* With heavy precipitation (Observed or radar indications of contour, HIGH
red, or attenuation shadow)
* With rainshower MEDIUM
* With virga MEDIUM
* With moderate or greater turbulence (reported or radar indications) MEDIUM
* With temperature/dew point spread between 30OF and 50°F MEDIUM
ONBOARD WINDSHEAR DETECTION SYSTEM ALERT (Reported or observed) HIGH
PIREP OF AIRSPEED LOSS OR GAIN:
* 15 knots or greater HIGH
* Less than 15 knots MEDIUM
LLWAS ALERT/WIND VELOCITY CHANGE:
* 20 knots or greater HIGH
* Less than 20 knots MEDIUM
FORECAST OF CONVECTIVE WEATHER: LOW
NOTE: These guidelines apply to operations in the airport vicinity (within 3 miles of the point of
takeoff or landing along the intended flight path and below 1000 feet AGL). The clues
should be considered cumulative. If more than one is observed the probability weighting
should be increased. The hazard increases with proximity to the convective weather.
Weather assessment should be made continuously.
CAUTION: CURRENTLY NO QUANTITATIVE MEANS EXISTS FOR DETERMINING THE
PRESENCE OR INTENSITY OF MICROBURST WINDSHEAR. PILOTS ARE
URGED TO EXERCISE CAUTION IN DETERMINING A COURSE OF ACTION.
HIGH Probability indicates that critical attention need be given to this observation. A decision to avoid
(e.g. divert or delay) is appropriate. MEDIUM Probability indicates that consideration should be given to
avoiding. Precautions are appropriate. LOW probability indicates that consideration should be given to
this observation, but a decision to avoid is not generally indicated.
FOLLOW STANDARD
OPERATING TECHNIQUES
WINDSHEAR RECOVERY TECHNIQUE
I REPORT THE ENCOUNTER I
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Figure 2.3. Model of Flight Crew Actions. Redrawn from the Windshear Training Aid [FAA, 1987].
The WTA also provides a model of flight crew actions (Figure 2.3) to use with the
probability guidelines. This model is intended to simplify and expedite operational wind
shear decisions for the pilot. Although the general policy followed in the WTA is to
avoid areas of known wind shear, situations may arise where microburst penetration is
unavoidable and recovery maneuvers are required. The WTA outlines a recovery
procedure involving application of maximum thrust and maintenance of a constant pitch
angle (typically 150), and establishes conditions under which a recovery should be
initiated. The effectiveness of this procedure has been addressed by several investigators
including Hinton [1989, 1990] and Mulgund and Stengel [1992]. The technique yields
reasonable results given its simplicity. Hinton concluded that a difference of only 5
seconds in recovery maneuver initiation time has more impact on aircraft survival than
the difference between use of several candidate recovery techniques. This strongly
emphasized the need for rapid microburst recognition and forward-look microburst
detection.
The last item on the model of flight crew actions (Figure 2.3), "Report the
Encounter," is critical. Pilot reports (PIREPs) of wind shear may provide the only
conclusive advance warning of microburst presence given the current state of microburst
sensor system deployment. During a multiple-microburst event which occurred at
Denver Stapleton Airport on July 11, 1988 five aircraft made missed approaches due to
microbursts. None of them issued a PIREP or advised the tower of their reasons for
making the missed approach, because of high pilot workload. Therefore, this data was
not relayed to subsequent aircraft [Schlickenmaier, 1989]. A PIREP from one of the first
aircraft to abort would clearly have been useful for alerting subsequent aircraft, one of
which descended to less than 100 feet AGL approximately one mile short of the
touchdown zone. All of the flight crews involved had been trained using the Windshear
Training Aid.
2.52. The TDWR/LLWAS system
At airports with prototype TDWR installations, microburst alerting is more
formalized. TDWR generates new microburst products at one minute intervals, and these
products are presented in the control tower both as icons on a Geographical Situation
Display (GSD) (Figure 2.4) and as formal alerts on an alphanumeric display. These
procedures were developed during TDWR operational evaluations at Denver, Kansas
City, and Orlando over the past several years.
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Figure 2.4. Schematic View of TDWR Geographical Situation Display (GSD). The GSD is a colordisplay in the control tower. Microburst regions appear as solid red circles or bandaid shapes labeled with
the horizontal windspeed change. Gustfronts, LLWAS wind vectors, and six-level radar reflectivity can
also be displayed. Reproduced from [NCAR, 1988].
Surface microbursts are detected by identifying regions of velocity divergence; if
the detected wind component radial to the radar shows a steady rapid increase with range,
a surface outflow is present and a "shear segment" is scored. Definite groups of these
segments are "boxed" by the processing algorithm, subjected to tests for significant
strength and size, and identified as microburst regions. These regions are displayed as
red circles or "band-aid" shapes on the GSD, and labeled by the maximum measured
wind change within each shape [Merritt, et. al., 1989].
An initial alerting methodology based on these shapes was determined by a
TDWR/LLWAS User Working Group of pilots, air traffic controllers, FAA officials,
researchers, and others. [NCAR, 1988; Sand and Biter, 1989] The resulting criterion for
microburst alerts is illustrated in Figure 2.5, and applies to both TDWR and improved
LLWAS systems. The "wind shear warning boxes" in the figure were defined by the
Working Group based on the assumption that aircraft below 1000 ft AGL in landing or
take-off configuration are most susceptible to wind shear. The boxes are 1 nm squares
extending 3 nm from the runway landing threshold, 2 nm from the departure end of the
runway, and directly over the runway. A microburst event of measured horizontal wind
change greater than 30 knots which impacts any part of these boxes triggers a microburst
alert. Events of 20 to 30 knots wind change trigger a "wind shear with loss" alert. This
alert is radioed to the pilot as he contacts the tower for final approach, since the alert
displays are currently only available to the tower controller.
Departure Runway Approach
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The alert corresponding to the 40 knot microburst pictured above might be:"United two two six,
Denver tower, threshold wind one six zero at six, expect a four zero knot loss on three mile final."
Figure 2.5. TDWR/LLWAS microburst alerting corridor
The verbal message to be relayed from the controller to the pilot is presented on
an alphanumeric "ribbon" display in the control tower (Figure 2.6). The display includes
one line for each approach and departure runway and the corresponding wind shear
status. The source of the information (TDWR, LLWAS, or both) is transparent to the
controller and the alerting procedure is identical in all cases.
The July 11, 1988 microburst event mentioned above was the first major
microburst event to endanger aircraft which occurred under documented TDWR
coverage. As such, it provided invaluable information on potential problems with the
proposed ground-based microburst alert strategy. For example, the TDWR microburst
alerts were given verbally by the tower controller embedded in a standard "cleared to
land" message. As a result, four of five aircraft to whom the alert was issued elected to
Type of Runway Threshold Wind shear
wind shear winds Headwind change (kts) Location
CF 190 16 G 25
MBA 35 LD 160 22 50- RWY
MBA 35 RD 180 5 25- RWY
MBA 35 LA 030 23 55- 1 MF
35 RA 180 10 60- 3 MF
MBA 17 LA 180 5 25- RWY
MBA 17 RA 160 22 55- RWY
17 LD 180 10 60- RWY
MBA 17 RD 030 23 55- RWY
Figure 2.6. Example of alphanumeric ribbon display for TDWR and LLWAS alerts. For an aircraft
arriving on Runway 35 Left (35 LA) the message is "United two-two-six, microburst alert, threshold wind
zero-three-zero at two-three, five-five knot loss, one mile final, centerfield wind one-nine-zero at one-six,
gust two-five." Redrawn from [NCAR, 1988].
continue the approach and did in fact encounter dangerous wind shear conditions. This
event has been extensively documented by Schlickenmaier [1989] and its implications for
alerting procedures were discussed by Wanke and Hansman [1989; 1990].
The TDWR operational evaluations also provided valuable data on the importance
of issuing accurate warnings. During the 1988 TDWR Operational Evaluation, data was
collected from 111 pilots who landed or took off during alert periods. Of this group, 34%
indicated that nothing was encountered, and 31% reported that nothing much was
encountered. These cases have been termed "nuisance alerts" since the TDWR did in fact
report an actual microburst, but it simply did not affect the alerted aircraft. A nuisance
alarm rate this high can unnecessarily disrupt airport operations and damage pilot
confidence in the alerting system.
The reasons for this high nuisance alert rate have been studied by Wanke and
Hansman [1990]. One reason is that a microburst which impinges on the edge of the
alerting corridor is called out in the same way as a microburst located directly on the
approach/takeoff path (Figure 2.7). Due to the localized nature of microbursts, a
microburst which is laterally offset in this way may have little or no effect on an
approaching or departing aircraft. This was demonstrated using computationally-
modeled microburst windfields by Wanke and Hansman [1990]. A correction technique
for this deficiency is being developed and has undergone testing in recent TDWR
operational evaluations [get a reference on shear integration].
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Figure 2.7. Lateral displacement example. The two microbursts A and B shown in this example would
generate the same alert: "... expect a four zero knot loss on two mile final."
Another contributing factor to overwarning is that measured maximum velocity
change is used to quantify microburst strength. The alert format implies that this velocity
change should be interpreted as the airspeed loss which would be experienced by an
aircraft penetrating the microburst. In reality, the aircraft would experience an initial
airspeed gain followed by a (greater) airspeed loss. In addition, the amplitude of the
airspeed disturbance is highly dependent on the aircraft dynamics and the control strategy
which is used by the pilot or autopilot. Further discussion of these and several other
possible causes of overwarning is given by Wanke and Hansman [1990; 1992b].
2.6. Future Microburst Alerting Systems
In the early 1990's, ground-based doppler radars, along with existing and
improved LLWAS installations, will be the primary sources of advance microburst alert
data. This data will be supplemented by onboard reactive wind shear alert systems,
PIREPs, and eventually airborne forward-look sensors when they are certified and
deployed. Digital datalink systems, in particular Mode-S, are nearing the operational
stage and will provide new channels for microburst alert dissemination. Also, the
availability of digital datalink may make "automated PIREPs" possible. Data from
airborne reactive and/or forward-look sensors could be transmitted directly to the ground
without need for pilot intervention. Finally, the deployment of EFIS on transport-
category aircraft provides numerous options for effective presentation of microburst alerts
to the flight crew.
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Figure 2.8. Advanced microburst detection and alerting system options.
This rapid technological expansion, illustrated in Figure 2.8, clearly has strong
potential for reducing the microburst threat. Effective use of this potential requires
significant study, and is the basis for work which follows. In the next chapter, the
integrated microburst alert system design task is discussed.
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3. Microburst Alerting System Design Issues
3.1 Problem Definition
The mission of a microburst alerting system is to detect, locate, and evaluate the
hazard to aviation from microbursts in order to: (1) allow aircraft to avoid hazardous
microbursts where possible, and (2) aid in recovery from unavoidable microburst
encounters. This mission should be accomplished while minimizing to the extent
possible: (1) additional pilot and controller workload, (2) detrimental impact on airport
operational efficiency, and (3) cost. The work presented in this report is principally
concerned with near-term systems, thus limiting the available resources for system
development to those discussed in Chapter 2.
3.2 Alerting Task Breakdown
3.2.1 High-Level Task Breakdown
Figure 3.1 illustrates a high-level breakdown of the overall microburst alerting
process. There are three primary tasks: Measurement, Alert generation, and Alert
application. The Measurement task begins with collection of data from one or several
possible ground-based and airborne sources. These measurements are then assimilated to
detect microbursts and estimate important characteristics of detected microbursts. The
characteristics are passed to the Alert generation task, which has two parts. The first is to
evaluate the aviation hazard posed by the microburst. The second part is to produce alerts
based on the results of the hazard evaluation and on the current operational situation.
Finally, in the Alert application task, alerts are formatted, disseminated and presented to
end users, who take appropriate action based on a set of specified procedures. In the
following sections, these tasks are addressed in more detail, and examples of each task
are given in the context of current and near-term microburst alerting systems.
Alert
Application
Alert
Generation
Measurement
User Action
Present to User
Estimated Microburst
Characteristics
Data Assimilation
Data Collection
Figure 3.1. Microburst Alerting Task Breakdown
3.2.2 Measurement
The microburst measurement task is complex, since there is a wide array of
microburst sensors with differing measurement characteristics. Most importantly, the
measured quantity varies between sensors. For example, Doppler sensors measure radial
wind components over a large area, LLWAS measures two-dimenstional winds at
discrete points, and IR sensors measure ambient air temperature differences ahead of the
aircraft. Other varying sensor characteristics include range, resolution, coverage volume,
accuracy, and update frequency. An additional complication is that the sensors can be
located either on the ground or on one or more aircraft in the terminal area.
Figure 3.2 is a pictorial representation of possible measurement task elements and
information flow paths. In addition to atmospheric measurements, flight crew
observations and pilot reports (PIREPs) provide useful data. Data can either be
assimilated on the sensor platform itself (ground station or aircraft) or combined with
data from other sensor platforms prior to assimilation. The results of data assimilation
are estimated microburst characteristics. Possible microburst characteristics include
strength, location, spatial extent (radius), temperature drop in the core, and advection
speed. When multiple sensors are available, the assimilation process can in principle
"fuse" data from different sensor systems to produce improved estimates.
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Figure 3.2. Measurement and Assimilation Task
3.2.3 Alert Generation
The alert generation task begins with hazard assessment. The aviation hazard
posed by a microburst is evaluated from the estimated microburst characteristics using a
suitable "hazard criterion," which will be further discussed in Chapter 6. The resulting
hazard value is usually indicative of the aviation hazard for a worst-case scenario, in
which an approaching or departing aircraft penetrates the most threatening part of the
microburst.
Alerting criteria are then applied to determine if an alert is necessary and what
level of alert to issue. The alerting criteria typically consider the hazard value and the
microburst location relative to the runway or to the affected aircraft. Other operational
data such as aircraft performance capabilities and the current locations of affected aircraft
may also be considered.
3.2.4 Alert Application
The first part of the alert application task is to format and disseminate alerts to end
users, including ATC and/or flight crews of affected aircraft. If ground-air transmission
is required, either ATC voice channels (as in current practice) or digital datalinks may be
employed. The received alerts may be presented to flight crews and ATC in a variety of
ways including verbal messages, discrete panel lights, and electronic display of text or
graphical symbols. Finally, ATC and the affected flight crews decide on appropriate
actions to take. A fairly general decision tree for flight crew actions was given in Figure
2.3. For ATC, possible actions include runway reconfiguration or even airport closure.
Figure 3.3 illustrates several possible structures for the alert application process.
The current TDWR and LLWAS systems follow route A in the diagram, in which alerts
and PIREPs reach the aircraft via standard VHF radio communications. Future ground-
based systems may uplink alerts directly from the alert generation hardware to the aircraft
instrumentation for display (route B). Alerts generated by airborne systems are presented
directly to the flight crew (route C). This information could then reach ATC by one of
two routes: by a formal pilot report over VHF radio link as in current practice (route D),
or by digital datalink as an automated report (route E).
Airborne Elements
. M.. VHF voice0I
Ground- ATC Equipment
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Figure 3.3. Possible structures for the alert application task. The circled letters indicate the possible
routes of information flow described in the preceding paragraph.
3.3 Task Breakdown Examples
It is illustrative to examine the microburst task breakdown in the context of
current and near-term microburst alerting capabilities. The following example microburst
alert system implementations will be discussed:
Terminal Doppler Weather Radar. The prototype TDWR alerting system as it is
currently implemented for operational evaluations.
Unaided airborne alerting. Standard airborne alerting procedures in the absence
of a quantitative microburst detection capability, as discussed in the
Windshear Training Aid.
Airborne predictive alert system. An automated airborne alerting system using a
forward-look microburst sensor.
3.3.1 Terminal Doppler Weather Radar
Measurement. In the TDWR system, radial wind velocity measurements are
collected. This data is assimilated in two steps: (1) Regions of radial shear or "shear
segments" are identified, and (2) groups of shear segments are enclosed by shapes, which
are labeled by the maximum velocity change measured within the shape. An example of
a multi-sensor data assimilation process is the prototype TDWR-LLWAS integration
algorithm, in which TDWR shapes are combined with similar shapes generated from
LLWAS wind data to improve the estimated microburst characteristics [Cornman and
Mahoney, 1991].
Alert Generation. The prototype TDWR system uses maximum horizontal
velocity change ("delta-V") as a hazard criterion. Both the hazard level and the
microburst position are considered when producing alerts. As described in Chapter 2,
alerts are issued when microbursts impinge on "alerting boxes" associated with active
runways, and only to aircraft currently on final approach or preparing for takeoff. This
alert may be a "wind shear with loss" (20 knots 5 delta-V < 30 knots) or a "microburst
alert" (delta-V 
_ 30 knots).
Alert Application. TDWR alerts are disseminated and applied along route A in
Figure 3.3. Alerts are presented to air traffic controllers both graphically on the GSD
(Figure 2.4) and as text on a ribbon display (Figure 2.6). Information on the ribbon
display is verbally disseminated to approaching and departing aircraft via standard VHF
radio communications procedures. The pilot then decides either to avoid the microburst
(abort the approach, delay takeoff) or continue normal operations with suitable
precautions.
3.32 Unaided Airborne Alerting
Measurement. The standard airborne alerting measurement process is much
different than that used by TDWR. Flight crews collect visual information, onboard
sensor data (such as weather radar returns, airspeed variations, trim thrust setting), and
possibly PIREPs through the air traffic controller. The assimilation task, done by the
flight crew, is to detect evidence of microbursts in this data, and if detected to estimate
microburst position and strength.
Alert Generation. The hazard evaluation is conceptually achieved by a review of
the wind shear indicators described in Table 2.2, which can be viewed as a list of hazard
criteria. The hazard evaluation process is the identification of LOW, MEDIUM and
HIGH risk factors based on data assimilated by the crew. The final "alert" is produced '
when the flight crew combines this rating with knowledge of the current aircraft position
and configuration. Note that this procedure is internalized by the flight crew as a result of
training, and thus in practice actual "risk ratings" are subjective and are not necessarily
arrived at in the above formalized fashion.
Alert Application. For unaided airborne alerting, no dissemination or presentation
is required other than intra-cockpit communication among the flight crew. As when
receiving TDWR alerts, the crew decides either to continue normal operations or to
initiate microburst avoidance or recovery procedures. An avoidance or recovery
maneuver should be followed by a pilot report.
3.3.3 Airborne Predictive Alerting System
Measurement. In an airborne system based on a forward-looking (predictive)
sensor, atmospheric measurements ahead of the aircraft would be collected. These would
then be assimilated using an onboard computer which would identify potential microburst
regions based on shear measurements (for Doppler systems) or temperature changes (for
IR systems). All processing would be accomplished onboard the aircraft.
Alert Generation, In automated airborne forward-look systems, it is most likely
that averaged F-factor would be the hazard criterion. This will be further discussed in
Chapter 6. Approximate formulas have been developed to estimate F from shear and
temperature measurements [Bowles, 1990]. Alerts would be produced when a microburst
is detected which (1) surpasses a preset F-factor threshold, and (2) is on or very near to
the aircraft's projected flight path. Again, all processes would be accomplished onboard
the aircraft.
Alert Application, Alerts would be formatted, disseminated, and presented to the
flight crew by onboard avionics systems (route C, Figure 3.3). Alerts can be presented by
a variety of means, including aural tones, synthetic voice, discrete panel indicators, or on
the EFIS.
3.4 Research Overview
3.4.1 The User-Centered Design Approach
The Measurement, Alert Generation, and Alert Application tasks could be
accomplished in several different ways. Consequently, there are many important issues
and tradeoffs to be resolved in the development of advanced microburst alerting systems.
In this work a user-centered approach has been employed to isolate and address several of
the more critical system design issues. The user-centered approach led to a "top-down"
analysis technique, beginning with alert application issues. The results of each study
established the requirements for the next, and the process propagated downward until the
measurement task was addressed.
For microburst alerting, the primary end user is the flight crew. Therefore, the
initial step was to attempt to determine the information required for effective microburst
alerting and the most effective presentation techniques for this information. In addition,
the effect of new microburst alert formats on recommended crew actions was studied.
These issues relate to the alert application task, and were approached under the
assumption that accurate, timely alerts could be produced.
Next, the issue of producing the required alert information - the alert generation
task - was addressed, assuming that microbursts could be detected and their
characteristics accurately estimated. This work centered on the selection of an
appropriate microburst hazard criterion and use of this criterion to establish an effective
multi-level alert structure.
Once the requirements for effective multi-level alerting were established, the
problem of accurately estimating microburst characteristics was investigated. This study
was predicated on a multi-sensor measurement environment such as the one illustrated in
Figure 3.2.
3.4.2 Overview of Design Studies
The specific studies which were undertaken are introduced below, categorized by
the three major microburst alerting tasks illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Alert application issues were addressed in three separate studies.
* Terminal Area Wind Shear Survey. This survey was conducted to obtain pilot
input on (1) the usefulness of currently available data for wind shear avoidance,
and (2) requirements for new wind shear alerting systems.
* Comparison of Cockpit Presentation Modes. When digital datalinks become
operational, it will be possible for ground-generated microburst alerts to be
disseminated over voice channels, displayed as an alphanumeric (text) message,
and/or depicted graphically on electronic flight instrumentation systems (EFIS).
A piloted part-task flight simulator experiment was conducted to compare the
relative efficiency of these verbal, textual, and graphical presentation modes.
* Evaluation of Candidate Graphical Microburst Alerting Displays. A piloted part-
task simulator experiment was conducted to address issues specifically related to
the graphical display of microburst alerts on electronic cockpit instrumentation.
The microburst alert generation task was addressed through two studies.
Comparison of Possible Hazard Criteria. A methodology for evaluating
microburst hazard criteria was developed based on batch flight simulation. It was
used to compare several candidate hazard criteria for jet transports on final
approach and takeoff.
Selection of Hazard Thresholds for Alert Generation, A technique was developed
for determination of hazard threshold values to be used for generating multi-level
microburst alerts. The technique was applied to a three-level alert strategy for jet
transports on final approach.
Measurement data assimilation in a multi-sensor environment was also addressed.
A Model-Based Algorithm for Multi-Sensor Estimation of Microburst
Characteristics, A technique was developed and tested which can improve
estimates of microburst characteristics using one or several data sources without
incurring prohibitively large computational or data transmission requirements. A
simple analytical microburst model is used to approximate the actual windfield,
and a "best" set of model parameters are estimated from measured winds using an
extended Kalman filtering technique.
4. Terminal Area Wind Shear Survey
4.1. Objectives
A pilot opinion survey (included in Appendix A) was developed to obtain input
on the usefulness of currently available data for wind shear avoidance, and on desirable
characteristics of new wind shear alerting systems. More specifically, the survey
addressed the following areas:
1) User assessment of current wind shear alerting procedures.
2) User confidence in currently available wind shear alerting information.
3) Desired information content of advanced wind shear alerts.
4) Desired presentation and timing of advanced wind shear alerts.
4.2 Survey Respondents
The survey was distributed in 1988 to 250 active United Airlines (UAL) pilots of
Boeing 757, 767, 747-400, and 737-300 aircraft. Each of these aircraft types is equipped
with an Electronic Flight Instrumentation System (EFIS) and a Flight Management
Computer (FMC). 51 of the pilots responded. The important survey results are presented
below; the results are presented in full detail in [Wanke, 1990].
Of the respondents, 51% have had what they considered to be a hazardous wind
shear encounter. This percentage is higher than expected, since microburst encounters
are quite rare. Based on statistics from microburst field studies, Stratton [1992] estimated
that the probability of encountering hazardous wind shear in the U.S. was one encounter
per 22,000 terminal operations. However, most of the encounters described by the survey
respondents occurred at Denver-Stapleton airport, a UAL hub and an area noted for heavy
microburst activity during the summer months. In addition, pilots who have had a
hazardous wind shear encounter may have been more likely to respond to the survey, so
there may be some bias in the results.
4.3. Currently Available Wind Shear Alert Information
The first section of the survey was designed to examine general attitudes about
microbursts and currently available wind shear alert information. The following findings
were obtained:
* Most of the pilots (90%) agreed that "Microbursts pose a major safety hazard to
transport category aircraft."
* Only 15% of the respondents agreed that "Currently available wind shear alert data
is sufficient for safe operation in the terminal area," while 44% disagreed.
* All but one (98%) of the pilots felt that "a system to provide aircrews with better
and more timely wind shear alerts is necessary."
These responses clearly indicate that pilots are dissatisfied with current wind
shear alert data and would be receptive to improvements. The pilots were asked to rank
the usefulness of four currently available wind shear data sources (Figure 4.1). Both pilot
reports (PIREPs) and visual clues were found to be more useful for wind shear avoidance
than the Low Level Windshear Alert System (LLWAS). However, neither PIREPs or
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Figure 4.1. Mean pilot ranking of wind shear information sources
visual information are always available. These results illustrate the need for improved
wind shear detection and alerting systems.
The importance of good PIREP collection and distribution was stressed by pilot
comments:
"The best real time data comes from pilot reports to tower controllers
(ATC) to subsequent flights. The biggest drawback to this system is the
workload on the controllers and more radio traffic."
"Info is available at times, but is not provided to the stream of aircraft that
is segmented on separate frequencies. Too many times an early encounter
is not passed on to following aircraft in a timely manner."
4.4. Future Wind Shear Alerting Systems
The second section of the survey focussed on options for future wind shear alert
system implementation. Pilots were asked to rank five possible cockpit presentation
modes for ground-generated microburst alerts from most preferable to least preferable.
Figure 4.2 presents the mean rankings, inverted so that 5 indicates most preferable while
1 indicates least preferable. Responses indicated that pilots are receptive to graphic
displays. The specific suggestion of integrating wind shear information with an EFIS
moving map display was strongly supported with a mean ranking of 4.3. Also of interest
was the high preference for alerts issued verbally by ATC (mean ranking of 3.9), which is
likely a result of familiarity with current standard radio procedures. Display of wind
shear alerts on an alternate graphical display was also ranked above alphanumeric
displays and ATIS*. Comments indicated that the low ranking of ATIS was primarily
due to the long time between updates. The ATIS system would need to be changed
significantly to achieve the timeliness required for microburst alerts.
* The ATIS (Automatic Terminal Information Service) is a continuous radio broadcast of airport weather conditions
and other non-control information in selected terminal areas.
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Figure 4.2, Mean pilot rankings of possible relay/presentation modes for ground-generated alerts
Pilots were also asked to rank six possible microburst alert information elements.
Since the length of digital datalink messages is limited, identification of the most
important information elements is necessary. The responses (Figure 4.3) indicated that
location and intensity of microbursts are clearly the most important information items.
Size, microburst movement, and intensity trends are of secondary importance, and shape
data is generally felt to be least important. Ranking of this information is useful for
design of alerts which fit within message length constraints and still retain enough
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Figure 4.3. Mean pilot rankings of microburst information by importance
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information to be useful. In this case, the data indicates that the message should include
at a minimum location and intensity, and that movement, size, and intensity trend
information may also be useful.
4.5. Summary of Survey Results
The survey results which were directly applicable to microburst alert system
design are summarized below.
1) Pilots believe that currently available microburst alert information is inadequate for
safe operation in the terminal area.
2) PIREPS of wind shear are valued highly, and considered the best currently available
source of wind shear warnings. PIREP collection and distribution needs to be
considered carefully in future system development.
3) Pilots are receptive to graphically-presented alerts, but showed little enthusiasm for
alphanumerically-presented alerts.
4) Pilots identified microburst location and intensity as the primary alert information
elements. Microburst movement, size, and intensity trends were considered less
important.
Points 3 and 4 were explored further in the part-task simulation studies described
in the next chapter.
5. Piloted Part-Task Simulator Studies
5.1. Overview
The terminal area wind shear survey provided initial user input for alert design.
Additional user input under more controlled conditions was obtained through piloted
simulation. This work focused on the effect of microburst alert format and presentation
on the pilot's decision-making process. Since the primary area of interest was pilot
decision-making (the "outer loop") rather than flying performance (the "inner loop"), a
part-task simulation approach was chosen.
A part-task advanced cockpit simulation facility was developed for this purpose,
and two experiments were performed. The first was a Comparative Study of Cockpit
Presentation Modes, in which it was found that the graphically presented microburst
alerts had important advantages over textually or verbally presented alerts.
Consequently, an Experimental Evaluation of Graphical Microburst Alert Displays was
done, in which specific graphical alert format issues were addressed and procedural
implications of using a graphical alert presentation were identified.
The part-task simulation approach was found to be very useful, and has been used
to study several other cockpit display and information transfer issues in addition to
microburst alerting. Therefore, Section 5.2 gives a detailed description of the design and
capabilities of the simulation facility. Section 5.3 describes the presentation mode
comparison experiment, and Section 5.4 documents the graphical microburst alert format
experiment.
5.2. The MIT Advanced Cockpit Simulator
5.2.1 Motivation
The implementation of advanced technology has significantly changed the cockpit
environment in current "glass cockpit" aircraft. Recent developments in display
technology, on-board processing, data storage, and datalinked communications are likely
to further alter the environment in second and third generation "glass cockpit" aircraft. It
is important that these technologies be implemented in a manner which will enhance both
human and aircraft performances, in terms of both safety and efficiency. Because many
of the changes in cockpit technology center around information management, proper
design of advanced cockpit systems requires careful consideration of the human
performance issues, particularly in the cognitive domain.
The MIT Aeronautical Systems Lab (ASL) has developed a part-task flight
simulator specifically to study these issues. The simulator, based on a high-performance
graphics workstation, replicates the Electronic Flight Instrumentation System (EFIS),
Flight Management Computer (FMC), and primary autoflight systems of a modem
"glass-cockpit" aircraft such as the Boeing 757/767 or 747-400. The simulator was
initially developed to study cockpit presentation of microburst alerts, but has been used to
study other topics including terrain awareness and alerting displays, datalink of ATC
clearance amendments, and electronic approach plates.
5.22 Functional Requirements
To evaluate human cognitive performance issues, the autoflight systems and
primary flight displays which affect decision-making needed to be simulated as exactly as
possible. In addition, the need to test many different prototype displays demanded rapid
reconfigurability. These requirements were achieved by simulating the graphical displays
on a commercially-available workstation with high-performance graphical capabilities.
The simulation software was written in a modular fashion so that different displays could
be implemented by recoding or replacing the appropriate modules.
A further requirement was simplicity. Since only outer-loop, cognitive-level
issues were to be evaluated, it was assumed that all aircraft control would be performed
using autoflight systems. Therefore, the autoflight and flight management systems
needed to be simulated, but the direct flying controls (stick, rudder, throttles, etc.) could
be omitted. For this reason no special hardware was required beyond general-purpose
computers and some simple control panels, greatly reducing development and simulator
set-up times.
5.2.3 Simulator Elements
Overview. As shown schematically in Figure 5.1, the full MIT ASL Advanced
Cockpit Simulator facility utilizes three computers and several control panels to emulate
EHSI Display Landing Gear/FlapMode Control Panel (MCP) Controls Controls
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Figure 5.1. MIT ASL Advanced Cockpit Simulator. The simulator includes three computers and some
auxiliary control panels, connected by standard RS-232 serial links.
cockpit displays, autoflight systems, and Air Traffic Control (ATC). A Silicon Graphics
IRIS 4D-25G graphics workstation is used to display the cockpit instruments (Figure 5.2)
and compute flight dynamics. The Control Display Unit (CDU) is emulated by an IBM-
XT computer, and a Silicon Graphics 2400T workstation is used as an Air Traffic Control
workstation (Figure 5.3). The portable version of the simulator omits the ATC
workstation. Pilot input through the control panels is detected by the IBM-XT through a
data acquisition unit. All three computers exchange data through standard RS-232 serial
communication links.
Instrumentation. The simulator's cockpit displays are based on current "glass-
cockpit" aircraft such as the Boeing 757/767 and 747-400. The IRIS screen depicts two
IRIS 4D25-G Workstation Display
Figure 5.2. Primary Flight Instrumentation. This is a schematic view of the IRIS 4D-25G display in a
typical configuration. Note that the electronic displays are actually in color on the simulator.
major cockpit displays, the Primary Flight Display (PFD) and Electronic Horizontal
Situation Indicator (EHSI), along with several secondary displays. Additional displays
can be rapidly prototyped and added to the simulator for evaluation. The nominal flight
displays may then be rearranged or modified to accommodate the new displays as needed.
Airspeed, altitude, and vertical speed are indicated on the PFD using moving tape
displays similar to those found on the B747-400. An Electronic Attitude Director
Indicator (EADI) displays the artificial horizon, ground speed, radio altitude, and
Instrument Landing System (ILS) localizer and glideslope deviations.
The EHSI is located below the PFD, as in the B757 or 767. The EHSI is the
primary navigational instrument, and the simulator version is based on the map mode
used in the B757/767. It includes information such as aircraft heading, ground track,
FMC-programmed route, nearby airports and navaids, and wind information. Weather
radar returns can also be displayed. A control panel is provided for setting the EHS1
display range (10 to 320 nm) and for suppressing weather radar returns or off-track
intersections, navaids, or airports.
Flap, gear, and marker beacon light displays are provided to the left of the EHSI.
Controls allow the pilot to set the flaps and lower or raise the landing gear during the
approach. Additional controls such as a manual pressurization valve can be added to the
simulation if a side task is necessary to increase the ambient crew workload.
A simple perspective out-the-window view is provided as a means by which to
cue the pilot that the aircraft has descended below the cloud deck. While in instrument
conditions, the display appears gray. Below the cloud deck, a perspective view of the
airport appears.
Autoflight and Flight Management Systems. The entry of flight path information
into the Flight Management Computer (FMC) is accomplished through a Control Display
Unit (CDU) which is simulated with an IBM-XT computer. Several screen displays, or
"pages," can be selected: The "Route" page to select a destination; the "Legs" page to
select waypoints and vertical path constraints; and the "Direct-To" page to change the
immediate waypoint. The CDU is linked to the EFIS so that active and modified routes
are displayed both textually, on the CDU, and graphically, on the EHSI. At first, the
CDU interface used a standard computer keyboard and monochrome monitor. At this
time, a replica of the Boeing 757/767 CDU display and keyboard is being integrated into
the system to enhance realism.
Non-FMC control of the aircraft is performed through an autopilot Mode Control
Panel (MCP), similar to that used on the Boeing 757/767. A standard set of autothrottle
and autoflight modes are available, including LNAV/VNAV flight (following FMC-
programmed lateral and vertical flight paths) and the various capture ("select") and hold
modes fbr airspeed, heading, vertical speed, and altitude. It is also possible to engage
localizer and glideslope capture modes and a go-around mode for missed approaches.
Aircraft Dynamics. The basic aircraft flight dynamics are based on longitudinal
point-mass equations of motion in wind axes, and simple decoupled first-order roll angle
dynamics. The aircraft data used (provided by NASA Langley Research Center, and used
by Hinton [1990]) is for a Boeing 737-100 aircraft, and includes non-linear curve fits for
CL and CD as functions of angle-of-attack, flap position, and gear position. The
multivariable inner-loop controller designed for this model took the form of a fully-
coupled proportional-plus-integral cascade compensator and allows the aircraft to follow
airspeed, flight path angle, and heading commands from the autoflight systems.
The autoflight systems provide outer loop control inputs and can operate in
several different modes, ranging from simple altitude or heading holds up to full lateral
and vertical path guidance (LNAV and VNAV) based on the FMC programmed route.
Localizer and glideslope tracking modes can be engaged for final approach. Because
outer-loop controllers for the various autoflight modes are based on approximate
frequencies and damping ratios for the Boeing 767 aircraft control system [Nadkarni,
1988], the aircraft responds like a 767 when being controlled through the autoflight
systems.
For the microburst alerting experiments, a microburst wind model is available
including both constant wind components and simulated microburst winds from an
analytical model [Oseguera and Bowles, 1988].
ATC/Experiment Control Workstation. The ATC workstation (Figure 4.6) is used
to monitor the progress of the aircraft's flight and, in some experiments, to issue ATC
clearance amendments by a simulated datalink. A mouse-based graphical user interface
provides the ability to select and deselect navigational information, determine the aircraft
location relative to a scenario reference point, and select and specify content and format
of the scripted ATC messages. The controller is in contact with the pilot through a
wireless headset simulating a standard VHF radio link. Simulated datalink messages are
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Figure 53. ATC/Experimental Control Workstation Display. The Geographic Situation display
provides a airport-centered view of the scenario region, including the position of the simulator aircraft.
It can be panned and rescaled by the simulation controller.
transmitted from the ATC workstation to the simulation computer via a serial
communications link. It should be noted that this display was not intended to reproduce
any actual or proposed advanced ATC workstation; it was designed only for simulation
control.
Rapid Prototyping Capabilities. The flight displays were created using software
written in the C programming language with IRIS Graphics Library primitives. This
method of implementation allows flight displays to be rapidly reconfigured or redesigned
to meet the varying demands of experimental studies. Typically, new displays may be
created and added to the simulator in a matter of days. Commercially available display
prototyping software was not used because of the excessive computational overhead
associated with these systems.
Two additional programs were written to aid in developing displays common to
several experiments. First, a software package was developed for the IRIS which
facilitated the flexible, rapid creation of new chart display formats [Kuchar, 1990]. The
program, called Map, allows the user to interactively create and modify electronic charts.
Information may be grouped together in object-oriented layers which are then selectable
by the pilot when flying the simulator. Also, a program called WxrEdit was developed to
draw simulated weather radar reflectivity returns.
Scenarios can be set up and rapidly changed via English-language input files,
which are read by the simulator software upon startup. These files define the starting
aircraft position and state, pre-programmed FMC information, and scripted events to take
place during a run. Scenario files also indicate Map and WxrEdit files to be loaded at
start and during the runs.
5.3. Comparative Study of Cockpit Presentation Modes
5.3.1 Objectives
The analysis of the wind shear survey data in Chapter 4 indicated the requirement
for better terminal area wind shear alerts, including possible use of digital datalinks for
dissemination of ground-measured wind shear alerts. However, if wind shear alerts are
uplinked electronically, there are several options for how they could be presented to the
pilot. A part-task simulator experiment was therefore conducted to evaluate the
advantages and disadvantages of Alphanumeric (Textual) and Graphical presentation
modes in comparison to conventional Verbal communications for microburst alerts.
The microburst alert experiment was done in conjunction with a parallel study on
presentation modes for ATC clearance amendments. The results presented below are
primarily from the microburst alerting portion of the experiment. Complete results from
the ATC portion of the experiment are available in [Chandra, 1989] and [Wanke, et. al.,
1990].
5.3.2 Experimental Design
Overview, In this experiment, active airline pilots flew nine descent and approach
scenarios into the Denver-Stapleton airport under potential microburst conditions.
During these scenarios, ATC clearance amendments and microburst alerts were issued to
the pilot in three different presentation modes: Verbal, Alphanumeric (Textual), and
Graphical. Pilot decision-making performance was observed. Subjective data was
obtained from post-experiment interviews and from a simple workload evaluation
technique.
Presentation Modes: ATC Clearances. Verbal clearance amendments were given
by the simulation controller in a manner consistent with current ATC operating
procedures. Textual clearance amendments contained the same wording as the verbal
alerts. These amendments were triggered remotely by the controller, and the text of the
message appeared on the CDU screen when called up by the pilot. In the Graphical
mode, clearance amendments appeared on the EHSI as an alternate route indicated by a
dashed white line. The arrival of both textual and graphical amendments was signaled by
an aural tone, and both types of amendments were accepted or rejected with a single CDU
keystroke. Pilots were not required to read back text or graphical amendments, but did
read back verbal amendments as per standard procedures.
Presentation Modes: Microburst Alerts. In order to ensure that all presentation
modes had the same information content, and to measure the pilot's ability to discriminate
between threatening and non-threatening situations, microburst alerts always contained
warnings for all possible approach runways. It should be noted that this is not the
standard TDWR/LLWAS procedure in which verbal alerts are only issued for the runway
being used by the aircraft. Initial audio cues were given in all three presentation modes,
so that the method and time of initial notification was kept constant.
Verbal microburst alerts were issued as radio messages from the controller.
Textual microburst alerts appeared in an alphanumeric window just below the EHSI
display. The content of the verbal and text alerts was modeled after TDWR alerts. A
sample verbal alert: "IRIS three-five-four, Microburst Alert. Expect four-zero knot loss,
2 mile final approach runway one-seven-left." Graphical microburst alerts appeared on
the EHSI as flashing solid white circles with the intensity (headwind-to-tailwind change
in knots) drawn inside them in red numerals. The circles encompassed the microburst
outflow region, and were typically 1 to 1.5 nm in diameter. An example is shown in
Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4. Schematic View of Graphical Microburst Alert Format. The microburst icon is a filled
white circle or "band-aid" shape with a red border and red text indicating the measured max wind change.
Scenario Design. All nine scenarios were set in the Denver terminal area for two
reasons: (1) The high incidence of microburst activity made microburst alerts credible,
and (2) a large number of descent profile and landing runway combinations were
possible. Both ATC amendments and microburst alerts occurred in each scenario. This
made it more difficult for the pilot to anticipate microburst alerts.
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Each scenario was divided into two phases. The aircraft started at the outer limit
of the terminal area with an initial flight plan pre-programmed into the FMC. During
descent, three amendments which required reprogramming of the FMC were given.
The microburst alerting phase of the scenario began when the aircraft was
vectored towards the final approach course. There were three independent variables in
the microburst alerting phase:
1) Presentation mode: Verbal, Textual, or Graphical
2) Situation: Threatening or Non-Threatening
3) Time of alert: On final approach (at the outer marker) or Early (once at 20nm
and once at 10nm from the airport)
In a "threatening" situation, a microburst occurred directly on the final approach
path of the runway being used. In a "non-threatening" situation, a microburst occurred on
the approach or departure end of a different runway, well outside the TDWR alerting
boxes for the active runway. Note that these definitions are slightly ambiguous, in that
occurrence of a microburst anywhere near the airport can be considered somewhat
threatening.
The time of alert was also varied. In six of the scenarios, the alerts were given
when the aircraft reached the outer marker (6 to 9 nm from touchdown). In the other
three, the first alert was given earlier when the aircraft was 20 nm from the Denver VOR,
follwed by a second alert 10 nm from the VOR. In all cases, the microburst position and
intensity did not change once an alert was issued. The test matrix is given in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1. Scenario Characteristic Matrix
Block ID Run # Scenario Type Time of Alert
1 Non-Threatening On Final
A 2 Threatening Early
3 Threatening On Final
4 Threatening Early
B 5 Threatening On Final
6 Non-Threatening On Final
7 Threatening On Final
C 8 Non-Threatening On Final
9 Threatening Early
The matrix was divided into three blocks. All ATC amendments and microburst
alerts in a block were given in the same mode, and the mode was rotated between blocks.
Over the subjects tested, all scenario blocks were tested in all three modes, and the order
in which the subject encountered the modes was rotated. This was done to
counterbalance learning and scenario-dependent effects.
Subjects. With the support of the Air Line Pilots' Association, eight active
757/767 line pilots volunteered for the experiment. All subjects were male; five were
captains, and three were first officers. The pilots ranged in age from 30 to 59 years, with
a mean of 47 years. In addition, several other pilots of varying experience assisted in the
development of the simulator and the scenarios.
Experimental Procedure. At the start of the session, the pilot was asked to
complete the first stage of a NASA-designed workload evaluation [Hart and Staveland,
1986] which asked him to prioritize the different types of workload for the specific task
of flying a 757/767 aircraft. Next, the features of the simulator were demonstrated. A
sample scenario was used to demonstrate all of the' three modes for both phases of flight.
When the subject became comfortable with the operation of the simulator, the test
scenarios began. The pilot was requested to fly the simulator with the same level of
responsibility as he would use in an actual aircraft.
At the start of each scenario, the pilot was given an initial clearance into Denver-
Stapleton and provided with the charts necessary to make the approach. Each scenario
lasted from 20 to 35 minutes. During the flights, one experimenter served as the ATC
controller and one remained in the cockpit with the pilot to answer questions about
physical operation of the simulator. After each scenario the pilot completed a separate
subjective workload evaluation sheet for the descent phase (the clearance amendment
task) and for the approach phase (when microburst alerts were given). After the complete
session there was a debriefing in which the pilot's impressions of the simulator and the
presentation modes were solicited. The cockpit was videotaped during the experiment to
record ATC and intra-cockpit communications and actions. In addition, the simulator
software recorded all flight data and pilot control inputs during the run.
5.3.3 Results and Discussion
Quantitative data for the clearance amendment delivery task included time
performance data and a record of detection of unacceptable clearances [see Chandra,
1989; Wanke, et. al., 1990]. For microburst alerts, pilot decision-making performance
was measured. Subjective workload ratings were taken for both tasks at the end of each
scenario. Although statistical significance was not achieved for the majority of
quantitative measures due to the small number of subjects, the convergence of evidence
from several measures permits reasonable confidence in the trends that were obtained.
Performance Data. The measure of pilot performance for the microburst alerts
was the percentage of "correct decisions" made in each presentation mode. An incorrect
decision was scored for either (1) avoidance action taken during a "non-threatening"
scenario, or (2) no avoidance action taken in a "threatening" scenario. The data (Figure
4.8) show that the fewest errors were made with graphical microburst alerts, and that the
most were made with text alerts. This implies that text alerts may actually degrade
performance relative to verbal alerts, although the difference was not statistically
significant.
An additional observation was that the positional information contained in the
graphical mode actually led several pilots to request and program non-standard missed
approach procedures in advance in order to avoid the wind shear areas completely. When
the pilots were given the same information in the other modes, this was generally not
observed.
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Figure 5.5. Pilot decision-making performance for microburst alerts by presentation mode
Workload Ratings. The NASA Task Load Index [Hart and Staveland, 1986] was
selected to assess workload for both tasks in each of the modes. This scale divides
workload into six components: mental demand, physical demand, temporal demand,
effort, frustration and performance. The ratings were made along a continuous scale from
"very low" to "very high". Weightings for each of the six factors given above are
obtained individually for each subject through a paired comparison task during subject
orientation. The weights are simply the number of times a particular component was
chosen to be a more important contributor to workload.
The overall workload ratings for each mode are plotted in Figure 5.6. For both
tasks, the average workload rating for the graphical mode was lower than the rating for
the verbal and textual modes. The six sub-scale ratings all showed a similar trend. The
appearance of greater workload induced by the textual condition is not a significant
effect.
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Figure 5.6. Mean pilot subjective workload ratings by presentation mode
Pilot Preferences. Pilot comments and subjective evaluations of the presentation
modes were obtained through loosely structured post-experiment interviews. In their
evaluation of the modes, pilots overwhelmingly preferred the graphical mode of
presentation (Figure 5.7) for both types of messages. For microburst alerts, the text mode
was consistently rated less desirable than the verbal mode. Pilots indicated that textual
information was undesirable during final approach due to the additional head-down time
required to read it. For clearance amendments, the text and verbal modes seemed to be
equally desirable from the averaged ratings. However, some pilots greatly preferred the
text mode over the verbal, while others preferred the exact opposite (hence the mid-range
average value). All pilots indicated that they were comfortable with current verbal
procedures, and they did not feel that the advantages of the text mode were significant.
The pilots were also asked about the usefulness of "party-line" information, which
is implicit information acquired by listening to communications between ATC and other
aircraft in the terminal area. Digital datalink messages, if directed to specific aircraft,
would effectively eliminate "party-line" information. Some pilots stated that this
information gave them a better understanding of the overall situation and enabled them to
be better prepared when an alert arrived. Other pilots indicated that they could do
without the information. This is an important consideration for datalink use, and has
been addressed by other MIT investigators [Midkiff and Hansman, 1992].
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Figure 5.7. Pilot preference ratings by presentation mode
5.3.4 Conclusions
The consistency between the survey and simulation results allows the following
conclusions to be drawn. Pilots are generally receptive to the idea of automated ground-
to-air information transfer and electronic cockpit presentation. From the survey results,
the post-simulation interviews (pilot preferences), and the simulation results (workload,
performance) it appears that graphical presentation of both microburst alerts and
clearance amendments offers important advantages over verbal communications. To
obtain this benefit, the format of graphical microburst alerts must be designed to clearly
convey only the necessary information without clutter or data overload. Pilots identified
this minimum presentation to be a simple symbol showing microburst location,
approximate extent, and intensity.
Information received over a digital datalink may also be presented as
alphanumeric (textual) messages. Again, the survey results were consistent with the
experimental results. For microburst alerts, the textual mode of presentation was
universally rated poorly, while the ratings were mixed for ATC amendments. In both
cases, the textual mode did not appear to reduce workload or improve performance. For
ATC amendments, comments indicated that the familiarity of operational pilots with
verbal communications outweighed any advantages of textual presentation. For
microburst alerts, which occur during final approach, pilots disliked the additional head-
down time required to read textual information.
5.4. Experimental Evaluation of Graphical Microburst Alert Displays
5.4.1 Objectives
The experiment discussed in Section 5.3 demonstrated that graphical alerts have
benefits in terms of faster comprehension time, reduced crew workload, and increased
crew situational awareness. Based on these results, a second simulator experiment was
designed to evaluate specific format and implementation issues associated with graphical
microburst alerts displayed on an Electronic Horizontal Situation Indicator (EHSI). The
issues addressed are summarized below:
1) Is it possible to add microburst alerts to the EHSI display during normal flight
operation without creating visual "clutter"?
2) Should multiple levels of microburst intensity be displayed, or is one level
("hazardous") sufficient?
3) Should measurements from all of the available sensors be combined to form a
single "fused" alert, or should alerts from different sources be
independently displayed?
4) Does lack of correlation between weather radar reflectivity and microburst
alerts affect pilot confidence in the alerts?
5) What are the procedural implications of displaying graphical alerts.
5.4.2 Experimental Design
Overview. In this experiment, active airline pilots flew a series of descent and
final approach scenarios, under weather conditions conducive to wind shear, in the MIT
Advanced Cockpit simulator. Similar situations were flown with several different display
formats in order to evaluate the issues listed above. After the flight segment of the
experiment, the pilots were asked to complete an exit questionnaire in order to obtain
their opinions of the different display options. Additional data was obtained from
observations and measurements made during the flight scenarios as well as from short
debriefing sessions which took place between the scenarios.
Microburst Display Formats. Three prototype microburst alert formats were
designed with several different features related to the issues listed above. Pilots flew
similar scenarios with the three displays, and were then asked in the exit questionnaire to
comparatively rate the displays both as a whole and by specific display feature.
Schematic views of the three display formats are shown in Figures 5.8, 5.9, and 5.10.
Note that an analytical microburst model was incorporated in the simulator software to
generate realistic microburst winds, so the icons and associated intensity levels for the
three display formats did actually correspond to winds experienced by the simulated
aircraft.
Figure 5.8. Example of Display A on the EHSI.
Display A was the simplest display. Only "hazardous" microburst regions were
shown, and data from all available sensors was assumed to be combined or "fused" to
provide a single alert. Alerts were displayed as flashing solid red circles on the EHSI.
The hazard threshold was based on the "F-factor" microburst hazard criterion (Section
2.1.2) averaged over one-half mile. When this value exceeded 0.1, an alert was issued.
The advantages of using the F-factor criterion, rather than maximum horizontal wind
change (as used in the TDWR system and in Section 5.3), to set alert thresholds will be
addressed in Chapter 6.
Figure 5.9. Example of Display B on the EHSI.
Display B was designed to evaluate the need for intensity information. It was a
three-level display, also based on F-factor averaged over one-half nautical mile. A
description of the level structure is given in Table 5.2. A level 1 microburst alert was
displayed as a flashing hollow red circle, a level 2 alert was displayed as a flashing solid
red circle, and a level 3 alert was displayed as a flashing magenta/red striped circle. In
addition, the F-factor values were overlaid in white numerals, in order to generate pilot
commentary about the use of numerical data on the display. Note that level 1 alerts as
defined for this display would not be shown at all on displays A or C, since the hazard
value range falls below the "hazardous microburst" threshold (F > 0.1).
Table 5.2. Alert intensity levels for Display B
Alert Level F-Factor Range Description
1 0.05 < F < 0.1 "low intensity"
2 0.1 9 F < 0.15 "hazardous"
3 F 2 0.15 "critically hazardous"
The explanation of the F-factor hazard criterion to the pilot was critically
important to this study. This was done with reference to the three-level display (B). It
was explained that F-factor measures the loss of effective thrust-to-weight ratio (and
hence available climb rate) due to the windfield, and that a typical jet transport-category
aircraft has an excess thrust-to-weight ratio of approximately 0.15 (varying with aircraft
type and weight). It was then explained that a level 1 alert would indicate a loss of one-
third to two-thirds of the aircraft's climb capability, a level 2 alert would indicate loss of
two-thirds to all of the aircraft's climb capability, and a level 3 alert would indicate a
microburst which would essentially compel the aircraft to descend.*
Display C was designed to evaluate the need for knowledge of the source of the
alerts, and specifically provided separate alert icons for ground-based and airborne
forward-look wind shear sensors. Ground-based alerts were issued for F > 0.1 and were
displayed as flashing solid red circles. Regions of hazardous wind shear detected by
airborne sensors (i.e. where F > 0.1) were displayed as red/yellow striped regions. The
airborne sensor was assumed to have a maximum range of 5 nm and to scan 200 to each
side of the aircraft's flight path. In all cases, the airborne alerts and ground-based alerts
were roughly consistent. The problem of receiving conflicting measurements from the
different sensors was therefore not addressed.
* This explanation of F-factor was suggested by Dr. Roland Bowles and David Hinton of the NASA Langley Research
Center.
Figure 5.10. Example of Display C on the EHSI.
Scenario Design. A total of 12 approach scenarios were flown by each pilot
subject. These were chosen to evaluate the reaction of the pilot under differing
conditions to the three displays, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and to stimulate
commentary for the exit questionnaire. There were 3 independent variables in the
experimental matrix:
1. Microburst display format: A, B, or C.
2. "Wet" or "dry" microburst conditions (Presence or absence of heavy
precipitation)
3. Threatening situation (hazardous microburst present on approach path) or
non-threatening situation (No hazardous microbursts within 1.5 nm of
approach).
The precipitation (radar reflectivity) patterns for the "wet" and "dry" cases were
chosen to be loosely representative of "typical" microburst events as described in the
literature [Wolfson, 1988; Fujita, 1985]. In the wet cases, thunderstorms were present in
close proximity to the airport, with microbursts occurring either in the center or on the
edge of high-reflectivity regions. In the dry cases, only light precipitation was present in
the area of microburst activity.
The "threatening" and "non-threatening" cases were chosen to stimulate
commentary on the operational use of the alerts. In the "threatening" case, hazardous
microburst alerts (level 2 or 3) appeared directly on the flight path, and in the "non-
threatening" case hazardous microburst alerts occurred at a lateral distance of 1.5 to 2 nm
from the flight path. "Non-threatening" in this case does not presuppose that the pilot
should make the approach if a microburst is present 1.5 nm laterally displaced from the
flight path; it only indicates that, under the current TDWR alert methodology, no alert
would be issued (Section 2.5.2). In both cases, alerts began to appear when the aircraft
approached to within 12-15 nm of the airport, and grew from level 1 to level 2 or 3 events
before the aircraft reached the outer marker.
The nominal test matrix is shown in Table 5.3. Note that the effect of high vs.
low precipitation was only tested using display A. Also, microbursts were present in only
8 of the 12 runs. In order to prevent anticipation, the microburst alert experiment was run
in conjunction with a graphical terrain display experiment. In the cases where no
microburst was present, terrain threats were present. The scenarios were carefully
designed to prevent interference between the two experiments, and appeared to be
effective in reducing pilot anticipation of both terrain and weather threats. The 12
scenarios were classified into three groups by display type, and the order of presentation
of the blocks was alternated between subjects to attenuate learning effects. In each
scenario, the aircaft was initially positioned between 25 and 50 nm from the airport, and
was then vectored to an ILS approach. The scenarios averaged 10 to 15 minutes in
length.
Table 5.3: Scenario Characteristics. The order of the four blocks shown below was rotated between
subjects to counterbalance learning effects.
Run # Display Type Wet/Dry Scenario Type
1 A Wet No Microbursts
2 A Dry Non-Threatening
3 A Wet Threatening
4 A Dry Threatening
5 A Dry No Microbursts
6 A Wet Non-Threatening
7 B Wet Non-Threatening
8 B Wet No Microbursts
9 B Wet Threatening
10 C Wet Threatening
11 C Wet Non-Threatening
12 C Wet No Microbursts
Experimental Procedure. The experiment began with an explanation to the
subject of the purpose of both the microburst alert and terrain depiction studies. This
included a brief discussion of the state-of-the-art in microburst detection and digital
datalink, as well as the explanation of F-factor described above. The three display types
were demonstrated and explained. Next, the pilot was given a practice run with the
simulator to familiarize himself with the autopilot system, displays, and display controls.
The 12 scenarios were then run in two groups of 6, with a break between the
groups. At the beginning of each run, the pilot was provided with an approach plate and
the ATIS* , and given as much time as needed to study them. During each run, one of the
experimenters acted as the air traffic controller, and communicated with the pilot via a
wireless headset. The controls and displays were videotaped, and the appropriate
numerical data was recorded by the simulation computer. After the 12 runs, an exit
questionnaire was conducted in order to obtain comments and numerical rankings of the
* The ATIS (Automatic Terminal Information Service) is a continuous radio broadcast of airport weather conditions
and other non-control information in selected terminal areas.
displays and their features. The experiment required approximately 3 hours per subject to
complete.
Subjects. All of the subjects were active line pilots currently flying EFIS/FMC-
equipped aircraft (Boeing 757-767, MD-88). Nine subjects participated, and all were
males between the ages of 36 and 51. Three of the pilots were captains, and six were first
officers. The subjects averaged 5890 hours of total flight experience, and averaged 1130
hours of flight experience on EFIS/FMC-equipped aircraft.
5.4.3 Results and Discussion
Visual Clarity of Alerts on EHSI. In the exit questionnaire, the pilots were asked
to rate the three displays individually for visual clarity on a scale from 1 ("very difficult
to read") to 4 ("very easy to read"). The results were similar for all three displays; all
were rated easy or very easy to read, with average ratings between 3.5 and 4. In the final
approach situation, the pilots were typically observed to set the EHSI to the minimum
available range (10 nm) with airports, navaids, and off-route waypoints suppressed, so the
microburst alerts were by far the most prominent features on the display.
Overall Display Ratings. The numerical preference rankings from the exit
questionnaire give the best idea of the general acceptability of the three display formats.
In this question, the subjects were asked to rank the three displays (A, B, and C) by order
of preference from 1 (most preferable) to 3 (least preferable). Display B, with three
intensity levels, was ranked highest on average, followed by the discrete Display C
second, and Display A last (Table 5.4). Although several of the pilots remarked on the
need for simple and easy to comprehend displays, display A was never ranked the best.
This may indicate that the single-level, fused-data icon representation did not contain
sufficient information. Several pilots contended that they would like to see a display with
Table 5.4 Mean pilot preference rankings for the three display types. A ranking of 1 indicated most
preferable, 3 indicated least preferable.
Display Number of Times Mean
Type Ranked First Ranking
A 0 2.67
B 5 1.56
C 4 1.78
both multiple intensity levels and information separated by source, although no
suggestions about how this would be implemented were offered.
Figure 5.11 shows the averaged responses to a question which asked the pilots to
rate the three formats individually from 1 to 4 in terms of how useful they are to
understanding the weather situation. A response of 1 indicated "not at all useful," while 4
indicated "very useful." The data indicates that display B was thought to be most useful,
followed by display C. This is consistent with the overall preference ranking discussed
above. It is also important that all of the mean ratings exceeded 3, which indicates that
all of the displays were considered generally useful.
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Figure 5.11. Mean pilot usefulness ratings for the three displays
Need Rating of Specific Display Features. The exit questionnaire included a
section concerned with specific features of the displays. The subjects were asked to rank
the need for three particular display features, from 1 ("unnecessary") to 4 ("essential").
The numerical results are summarized in Table 5.5. The ratings and associated subject
Table 5.5. Pilot rating of specific display features by need. The response scale ran from 1 (unnecessary)
to 4 (essential).
Display feature Mean need rating Standard deviation
3-level intensity information (Display B) 3.17 0.353
Numerical F-factor information (Display B) 2.22 1.20
Different sensors displayed separately (Display C) 2.44 1.21
comments are discussed below. Note that Display A, having none of the specific features
rated, served as a standard against which to evaluate the features.
Need Ratings: Three-level Intensity. The concept of displaying three levels of
intensity (as in display B) rather than the single level alert (as in display A) was strongly
supported, with an average rating of 3.17. All subjects rated three-level intensity
information between 3 and 4. Several pilots remarked that having multiple intensity
levels was important to their decision-making process, since it implicitly provided
intensity trend information. With respect to this point, it should be noted that in all
scenarios the microbursts increased in intensity during the approach. This is not
unrealistic, but tended to draw attention to the intensity trend issue. Another observation
was that microburst intensity level influenced how closely the pilot would approach the
microburst. Pilots indicated that they would give a wider berth to a level 3 microburst
than a level 2, even though both were above the "hazardous" intensity threshold. One of
the subjects also stated that having multiple intensity levels made the alerts more
compelling, and induced closer study of the situation (as compared to a single-level alert
format).
Need Ratings: Numerical F-factor Information. The numerical F-factor display
feature was rated lower than three-level intensity (2.22), and the large standard deviation
indicates the large spread of responses on this question. Four of the subjects ranked this
feature "unnecessary". One pilot indicated that the numbers would be distracting, and
that color-coded information is much easier to interpret. Another pilot stated that more
alert levels would be desirable, but that the F-factor numbers required too much thought.
He suggested a scale from 1 to 10. However, several did rate them highly in terms of
need, and one pilot actually preferred the numbers to the three-level intensity
arrangement due to the finer intensity resolution available. In general, the performance
implication of the F-factor numbers was understood and found to be a good justification
for the alert level thresholds, but no consensus was reached as to their usefulness in real-
time situations.
Need Ratings: Different Icons for Different Information Sources. Similarly
mixed responses were received for the need to know the source of the information
(display C). Again, the average was near middle scale (2.44), but the responses were
strongly split between the ends of the scale. Several pilots reacted positively to the
separated alerts since they found it useful to know when the airborne sensor confirmed
the ground-based report. One pilot stated he would not need verbal confirmation of the
alert from the tower if he saw that the airborne and ground-based sensors were reporting
approximately the same information. This was borne out by his actions when flying the
simulator. It is important to note that in the scenarios the ground-based and airborne
sensor alerts were never contradictory.
Other pilots indicated that different icons were not necessary, since if any sensor
reported a microburst on or near the flight path, there would be no question of complying
with the alert. Given this fact, they found knowledge of the alert source to be irrelevant.
One pilot stated in the exit debriefing "if I saw one or the other alone, I would still have
to assume that it was one hundred percent accurate."
Decision Distance. In the cases where a hazardous microburst was present
directly on the approach track, the point where the pilot initiated a missed approach was
observed. The distance from this decision point to the nearest microburst icon on the
flight path was defined as the "decision distance". It was tabulated for all 36 of the
"threatening" scenario runs. The mean decision distance was 4.26 nm with a relatively
low standard deviation of 1.15 nm. This result is potentially useful for helping define
crew response procedures for these alerts. It also emphasizes the importance of a reliable
ground-based detection and uplink capability, since most of the pilots made their decision
at the approximate design limit range of several of the airborne sensors currently under
development [Bowles, 1990].
Effect of Graphical Alerting on Missed Approach Planning., It was observed that
the pilots typically asked for a turn when requesting a missed approach. In several cases,
the pilot informed the tower well in advance (sometimes before the aircraft had reached
the outer marker) of which direction he would like to turn in the case of a missed
approach. Several subjects indicated that the positional information which allowed this
kind of missed approach planning was the best feature of a graphical presentation.
One pilot commented that, if the controller insisted on a straight ahead missed
approach which took the aircraft through the microburst alert, he (the pilot) would
exercise his authority to make an emergency deviation. In another case, a pilot requested
a turn to avoid a microburst which took the aircraft directly through a high reflectivity
thunderstorm precipitation core indicated in red by the weather radar. The aircraft at this
point was still several miles from the microburst. A straight ahead missed approach
would have taken the aircraft through the microburst region at about 2000 feet AGL with
a well-established positive climb rate. The hazard involved in the straight ahead missed
approach in this case was low, and probably less than that involved in making the turn
into the storm. In none of the cases did the pilots appear to consider a straight-ahead
missed approach as an option, even when the decision to abort the approach was made 5
to 10 nm from the microburst location.
Display of Low Intensity Alerts. A connected issue relates to display of low
intensity or less hazardous microburst alerts. Although none of the scenarios were
explicitly designed to test this issue, it was apparent from several of the pilots' comments
and actions that a graphical alert of any magnitude on or very near the approach was
grounds for a missed approach. Comments suggested that this was due to two possible
reasons: (1) microbursts were observed to change in intensity fairly quickly, and (2) if
anything is reported on the flight path, and the aircraft experiences any wind shear or
other atmospheric disturbance, then the pilot may appear negligent for proceeding with
the approach in the presence of an alert icon. In view of this latter possibility, it is
possible that any graphical alert no matter how low in intensity located on the approach or
departure track will induce the pilot to abort, if not for safety than for legal reasons. It is
apparent that the lowest alert threshold must be carefully set in order to balance safety vs.
operational efficiency.
It must also be considered that such behavior may have been an artifact of the
simulation environment. This high level of caution is in sharp contrast to the responses to
verbal alerts issued during recent TDWR operational evaluations. Low intensity "wind-
shear-with-loss" alerts do not require a missed approach to be made, and pilots have been
observed to continue approaches during microburst alerts of fairly high intensity
[Stevenson, 1989; McCarthy and Sand, 1990].
Acceptable Lateral Separation Distance. Since several scenarios forced the pilots
to make decisions about microbursts which occurred 1.5 to 2 nm from the approach, it
was possible to ask the question "how close can a hazardous microburst icon come to the
approach path before you will decide not to make the approach?" Six of the subjects
were able to give a quantitative distance, based on a "hazardous" microburst alert icon as
used in Display A. Responses ranged from 2 nm up to 15 nm, and four of the six pilots
who answered this question gave distances of 2 and 3 nm.
In contrast, the current TDWR alerting methodology only gives an alert if any
part of the microburst shape comes within 1 nm of the approach, and even with this
criterion "nuisance alerts" occur (see Section 2.5.2). This implies that the positional
information contained in graphical alerts could have a positive effect on pilot confidence
in the alerting system. If the pilot makes an approach when a microburst alert is given for
an event 1 or 2 nm from the approach path, and experiences no wind shear, the graphical
alert makes it visually apparent that the aircraft has not actually penetrated the center of
the microburst region. Under the current verbal alerting system, which gives no clear
indication of the position of the microburst core, the pilot perceives such a situation as a
false alarm.
Microburst Alerts During "Wet" and "Dry" Conditions, One of the issues
explicitly tested was the sensitivity of pilot decision-making to varying precipitation
levels. No significant differences in pilot response were observed between "wet" and
"dry" microburst situations. In one case, when microbursts appeared under very light
rain conditions, a pilot commented that "that shouldn't be there," but in no cases did a
pilot simply ignore an alert because of light precipitation. In reality, when "dry"
microbursts are present, other visual clues (virga, dust rings, etc.) would likely be present.
These were not simulated.
5.4.4 Conclusions
The following conclusions were reached with respect to the simulation objectives
stated in Section 5.4.1:
* Graphical microburst alerts on the EHSI were found to be clear and useful.
* Alerts with multiple intensity levels were preferred over single-level alerts.
Comments indicate that alert levels should be identified by different icon
colors or patterns rather than numbers.
* Pilot opinion was divided over the issue of whether to present "fused" or
"discrete" alerts. The primary tradeoff appears to be the improved
accuracy available through data fusion versus the added confidence gained
by the pilot when he is aware of reinforcing data from different sensors.
* The effect of precipitation (radar reflectivity) on the credibility of the
microburst alerts was found in this experiment to be negligible. The pilots
in all cases gave the microburst alerts 100% credence regardless of the
intensity or proximity of the precipitation present. However, the absence
of external visual cues in this experiment may have affected the results.
* The positional information inherent in the graphical alert formats was well
received by the pilots, allowing them to plan and request a missed
approach with lateral maneuvers to completely avoid the event.
* It was observed that the subjects made the decision to execute a missed
approach an average of 4.26 nm in advance of encountering a microburst
icon positioned on the final approach track.
* The pilots demonstrated a strong tendency to avoid the microburst icons at all
cost, even in cases where the icon would be overflown at safe altitudes and
airspeeds. This was true even for microburst icons with intensities below
the "hazardous" threshold.
The implications of these results for existing and future microburst alerting
systems are discussed in Chapter 8.
6. Microburst Alert Generation
6.1 Overview
As described in Chapter 3, the process of alert generation depends strongly on the
"hazard criterion" used to quantify the danger microbursts pose to aircraft. In this
chapter, results from two studies related to selection of a hazard criterion and its use for
alert generation are presented.
Evaluation of Microburst Hazard Criteria. The aviation hazard due to a
microburst is a function of both the windfield and pilot/aircraft system characteristics. As
such, the microburst aviation hazard is not a directly measureable quantity. A microburst
"hazard criterion," however, is a quantity which can be directly measured or inferred
from airmass measurements and provides an indication of the microburst aviation hazard.
An effective hazard criterion should correlate well with the impact of a microburst on an
aircraft trajectory. In the first study, this principle was used to compare several possible
criteria and identify effective ones.
Determination of Hazard Threshold Values. Once an acceptable hazard criterion
has been established, the question that remains is: what value of the hazard criterion
should trigger an alert? This question should be answered in the context of aircraft
performance. Each alert threshold value should represent a specific level of aircraft
trajectory degradation, and be related to recommended or required flight crew operational
procedures. Establishing thresholds, therefore, requires knowledge of the direct
relationship between hazard criterion values and aircraft trajectory degradation. This
relationship is dependent not only on the windfield, but on the aircraft and pilot
characteristics and the phase of flight. In the second study, this relationship was
established for the specific case of jet transport aircraft on final approach, and used to
develop an alert structure based directly on aircraft performance. The alert structure for
this study was based on the three-level iconic scheme preferred by pilots in the graphical
display format experiment (Section 5.4).
6.2 Evaluation of Microburst Hazard Criteria
6.2.1 Methodology
A batch aircraft simulation technique was developed to compare several possible
microburst hazard criteria. The major steps in the technique are outlined below, and
described fully in the following sections.
1) Define a nominal microburst encounter situation. This includes specification
of aircraft characteristics, pilot/autopilot characteristics, phase of flight, and
initial conditions.
2) Define a "microburst impact parameter." a quantity indicating the effect of
the microburst on the aircraft trajectory.
3) Select a set of possible microburst hazard criteria.
4) Establish a test ensemble of microburst windfields for use in evaluation.
5) Simulate the nominal microburst encounter for each windfield in the
ensemble.
6) Compute the hazard criteria for each windfield in the ensemble.
7) Compute the microburst imoact parameter for each simulation run.
8) Compute the linear correlation coefficient between each hazard criterion and
the microburst impact parameter for the complete set of simulation runs (one
run for each windfield in the ensemble).
The resulting linear correlation coefficients are indications of the "goodness" of
each of the candidate hazard criteria. Note that "correlate well" as used to evaluate the
effectiveness of hazard criteria has been specialized here to mean good linear correlation.
Linearity is a desirable characteristic for simplicity in applying the hazard criterion. If
the linear correlation coefficient is close to 1, the hazard criterion is closely related to the
aircraft trajectory degradation caused by the microburst. If it is close to zero, it is not
related.
The above procedure was accomplished for the two major types of hazardous
microburst encounter: (1) approach to landing, and (2) takeoff. Note that values for the
candidate hazard criteria were computed assuming that perfect measurements of
microburst characteristics were available. The measurement task itself will be addressed
in the following chapter.
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Figure 6.1. Aircraft on ILS Landing Approach. The angles in the figure are not to scale.
6.2.2 Microburst Impact on Landing Approach
For approach to landing, the aircraft was assumed to be executing an Instrument
Landing System (ILS) approach at a constant airspeed (Figure 6.1). For an aircraft on an
ILS approach, either descending below the glideslope or losing airspeed constitute
hazardous conditions. Therefore, an "Approach Degradation" (AD) parameter (similar in
concept to those used by McCarthy, et. al. [1979] and Turkel, et. al. [1981]) was defined
which combines both angular glideslope deviations (rl) and airspeed (V) changes:
ADa K5 + K2 Vref - V 2  (6.1)
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Vref is the reference (nominal) approach airspeed, and Vss is the "stick shaker"
airspeed*. To develop this measure, it was assumed that a critical situation develops if
either (1) the aircraft drops two "dots" (0.70) below the glideslope**, or (2) the aircraft's
airspeed drops to the "stick shaker" airspeed. Thus, either of these situations constitute a'
"unit hazard." The root-mean-square of the fractional hazards due to falling below the
glideslope or losing airspeed is a point measurement of the approach degradation. Note
that only deviations below glideslope or below reference airspeed are taken into account.
The angular error vs. glideslope measurement was chosen rather than altitude error to
emphasize the increased danger due to being below glideslope at lower altitudes.
Since the success of an ILS approach requires that the aircraft be established and
stabilized on the glideslope for several miles before landing, AD is integrated over the
entire approach to produce an overall "microburst impact parameter" MIap. The
simulations were halted when the aircraft would normally initiate a flare maneuver (at an
altitude of approximately 100 feet AGL).
tflare
MIap = [AD] dt (6.3)
Note that MIap is equivalent to the "J" parameter used in [Wanke and Hansman,
1991]. The initial time, to, was chosen well prior to microburst penetration such that
AD(to) = 0. The selection of to then does not affect the value of the integral.
* The "stick-shaker" warns the pilot of impending stall, and the stick-shaker airspeed is normally set to 5-10 knots
above the actual stall airspeed.
** Two "dots" of glideslope deviation means that the pilot's glideslope deviation indicator has reached full scale in the
low direction, which is the equivalent of falling 0.70 below the 3* glideslope as measured from the runway threshold.
6.2.3 Microburst Impact on Takeoff
For takeoff and climbout, the aircraft does not attempt to track a specific vertical
path. Rather, the goal is to maintain a safe airspeed (V) and climb rate (h). Therefore,
the following takeoff degradation (TD) parameter was defined:
TD = K linominal - 1 + K2 Vnomina ) - V (6.5)TD nominal Vnominal - V
where K 1, li < linominal K2 =11 V < Vnominal (6.6)
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The nominal values were computed from a takeoff simulation with no winds
present, and indexed as a function of altitude AGL. Again, TD is only non-zero when the
airspeed or climb rate are below the nominal values for a given altitude. As for the
approach case, TD was integrated over the trajectory, from the time of rotation (when the
aircraft first leaves the runway) until the time when the aircraft reaches an altitude of
2000 feet AGL:
th = 2000 ft AGL
MIto0  [TD] dt (6.7)
ftrotation
Since the aircraft is not attempting to stabilize on a specific trajectory, the
integrated TD is a less compelling measure of aircraft performance loss than integrated
AD is for approaches. During the climbout, it is a critical situation if the aircraft achieves
zero climb rate or approaches stall at any time. Therefore, the maximum value of TD
achieved was also tabulated as a second takeoff microburst impact parameter:
MIto2 - max [TD] for 0 < h < 2000 feet AGL (6.8)
6.2.4 Candidate Hazard Criteria
There are several possible microburst hazard criteria based on wind
measurements. The following were chosen for evaluation:
1) Maximum horizontal velocity change, AV or "delta-V" (headwind-to-tailwind
change across the event)
2) Mean shear, AV/AR, defined as total velocity change divided by the shear
distance, the distance between the headwind and tailwind peaks
3) Peak F-factor
4) Largest mean F-factor over a given distance (1500, 3000, 4500, 6000 foot
lengths were tested)
"Delta-V," as mentioned above, is the criterion currently used in TDWR
operational evaluations for both alert thresholds and intensity reporting. Mean shear is an
alternative criterion which could be easily computed from TDWR or Doppler sensor
measurements. It is obtained by dividing DV by the radial distance across which it is
measured. These two criteria are illustrated in Figure 6.2.
The F-factor criterion is based on the impact of a microburst windfield on the total
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Figure 6.2. Horizontal wind change (AV) and mean shear (AV/AR) criteria. This is a typical plot of
horizontal wind vs. ground track distance for a constant-altitude path through a microburst.
energy (kinetic plus potential) of the aircraft. It is a direct measure of the loss of potential
rate-of-climb (or loss of effective thrust-to-weight ratio) due to the immediate windfield.
It is dependent on the time rate of change in the aircraft frame of the horizontal (tailwind
positive) velocity W x , the vertical wind velocity Wh, and the aircraft airspeed V. F is
described in Section 2.1.2.
F - Wh (6.9)g V
F-factor is a natural measurement for reactive sensors based on inertial
instruments, since all of the parameters can be directly measured. Doppler sensors,
however, must infer F since the vertical winds cannot be directly measured. Forward-
looking infrared systems under development also infer F, estimating it from an empirical
relationship between F and the temperature gradient sensed along the aircraft flight path.
The "largest mean F-factor over a given distance" is computed by taking a
running average of F-factor over a specified distance along the aircraft trajectory. The
largest average value is selected as the hazard rating. Since F is an instantaneous
measurement, this effectively aggregates the total performance loss over the specified
distance. This was done for averaging windows of four different lengths.
6.2-5 Microburst Windfields
The microburst wind data used to test the criteria was generated by the Terminal
Area Simulation System (TASS) developed by Proctor [1987]. It is a detailed
computational model of a multiple microburst event which occurred at Denver-Stapelton
airport on July 11, 1988. This event caused one near accident and a total of five aircraft
to make missed approaches (see Section 2.5.2). Data from five specific times during this
event was available, and 12 paths through various parts of the windfield at different times
were selected for analysis. These paths all penetrate the approximate center of at least
one microburst, and vary in total horizontal velocity change (at 300ft AGL) from 42 to 70
knots. Shear distances, measured from peak headwind location to peak tailwind location,
vary from 6592 feet to 20000 feet. Figure 6.3 illustrates one of the horizontal velocity
fields from the TASS model and some of the paths used.
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Figure 63. TASS windfield for 7/11/88 at 2212.75 UTC. This is a vector plot of the horizontal winds at
271 feet AGL. The lines indicate three of the paths used in the simulation runs.
6.2.6 Aircraft Characteristics and Simulation
Equations of Motion. The aircraft/microburst interaction simulation was based on
longitudinal point-mass equations of motion in wind axes, which describe flight in a
vertical plane with no short-period pitching dynamics. The aircraft data used (provided
by NASA Langley Research Center, and used by Hinton [1990]) was for a Boeing 737-
100 aircraft, and included non-linear curve fits for CL and CD as functions of angle-of-
attack, flap position, and gear position. The equations of motion are:
S= cos o - D g sin a- W x cos -Wh sin (6.10)
Ya = sin a + - g cos a + Wx sin ya - ah cos ya] (6.11)
x = V cos a + W, (6.12)
fi = V sin ya + Wh (6.13)
a =0 - a (6.14)
CL =f(a, flaps, gear position) (6.15)
CD =f(a, flaps, gear position) (6.16)
Approach Modeling. The approach controller was a two-loop system (Figure
6.4). The inner-loop controller was designed to control airspeed and flight path angle,
and took the form of a fully coupled proportional-plus-integral cascade compensator.
Feedback gains were determined by an eigenstructure assignment technique. An outer
loop was then used to track the glideslope by commanding flight path angle. Two
versions of the outer loop (glideslope tracking) compensator were used, in order to
examine the effect of control strategy on the correlation results.
Controller A used simple gain feedback, and produced a fairly slow response.
Controller B used a dynamic compensator which produced a faster response, and tended
to weight glideslope deviations more heavily than airspeed deviations. The "slow"
controller (A) had a dominant mode natural frequency of approximately 0.1 rad/sec,
Figure 6.4. Simulation block diagram for approach
Table 6.1. Glideslope tracking autopilot characteristics.
while the "fast" controller had a dominant mode natural frequency of approximately 0.4
rad/sec (Table 6.1). Further details of these controllers and the 737-100 model data are
included in Appendix B.
Takeoff Modeling. The takeoff control laws were considerably simpler than the
approach control laws. The aircraft was initially positioned on the runway at rest. The
takeoff roll was executed at maximum rated thrust with a pitch angle of 80. A simple
model of tire/runway friction was included. When rotation speed Vr was reached, the
climbout pitch angle (typically 180-200) was commanded. This pitch angle was held for
the duration of the climbout phase, unless the stick shaker angle-or-attack was reached in
which case the pitch angle was lowered to prevent stall onset. The simulation terminated
when the aircraft reached an altitude of 2000 feet AGL. The climbout pitch angle was set
to trim the aircraft at an airspeed of Vr + 15 knots.
Initial Conditions: Approach. For each windfield, an approach was made such
that the aircraft penetrated the core of the microburst at a specified distance from the
desired touchdown point. Two distances were used: (1) 8000 feet from touchdown
(glideslope altitude of 420 feet) and (2) 15000 feet from touchdown (glideslope altitude
of 785 feet). The aircraft was trimmed for a 30 ILS approach at 148 knots with landing
gear extended and flaps set at 250. The available thrust was limited to approach
maximum, which results in a maximum thrust-to-weight ratio of approximately 0.17. As
stated above, it was assumed that the pilot or autopilot was unaware of the presence of the
microburst. Thus, no microburst escape maneuvers were executed.
Sample results from one of the approach simulation runs are shown in Figure 6.5.
The dashed lines on the altitude and airspeed charts represent the nominal approach
trajectory. Note that the aircraft first encounters a headwind and slight updraft. This
produces a slight airspeed increase, which causes the autopilot to command idle thrust (at
70 to 80 seconds). This is followed by a downdraft and a rapid transition from headwind
to tailwind as the aircraft passes through microburst core (80 to 110 seconds). During
this time the airspeed drops to 128 knots, and the aircraft drops considerably below
glideslope. The autopilot commands a high pitch angle and maximum available thrust is
response to these deviations. Finally, the tailwind drops off and the aircraft finishes the
run at high airspeed and well above the glideslope.
Initial Conditions: Takeoff. For the takeoff cases, the microburst core was
positioned 6000 feet from the takeoff roll initiation point. In this position, the aircraft
entered the hazardous wind shear region at approximately the rotation point. The aircraft
gross weight was set at the takeoff maximum of 97,000 lbs. Maximum rated thrust was
24,000 lb st., yielding a thrust-to-weight ratio of 0.247.
Sample histories from one of the takeoff runs are shown in Figure 6.6. Again, the
nominal altitude and airspeed curves are shown as dashed lines. Note that the headwind
is encountered during the takeoff roll, resulting in a slightly shorter takeoff roll than for
the nominal case. Immediately after takeoff, the airspeed starts to drop as the aircraft
passes through the shear region. The effect of the microburst is also visible in the climb
rate plot as a sharp drop-off at 50 to 70 seconds. At 70 seconds, the aircraft leaves the
core and the airspeed and climb rate rapidly recover to normal values.
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Figure 6.5. Sample results for an approach simulation run. In the above case, autopilot A was active.
The aircraft was initially positioned 5 nm from touchdown at an approach speed of 250 ft/sec (148 knots)
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Figure 6.6. Sample results for a takeoff simulation run.
60 80 100
(sec)
0 20 40 60 80 100
Time (sec)
-- - -- - -------- -- --
- -
I --------- --- 
---- ------- i------ ------- - --------
-- ----- -- ---------- ----
0 20 40 60 80 100
Time (sec)
----..---.-----..... -- ------- --
-- --- -- -- ----------- ----- ----- ----- -
1 ----c---- --------- L-------------
-------------- -- -- -- ---------
. . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .
---------------------------- - ----
-------- ---------------- ----- --------
------ ---------------------
-- ------- -------- --------
---------- ------ ------ ----- --------
I
-------------~~~------ - -  ----------
-------- ------------- ---- ------- ------
...- --------- --- ----.. . ....
i
-~--L -------- 1 - -------------
-------- --------- ------ ---------
... !..:...1.-!..
---------------- -------------- -- ---------
-------- - ---  - - -- ------
------- --------------- ----------- -- --
-----------; ------- ------ --------
I
r
Implementation. The simulations were run on a Sun 3/80 workstation using
MATRIXx SYSTEM_BUILD software by Integrated Systems, Inc. This package
allowed simulation of non-linear systems through a graphical user interface based on
block diagrams.
6.2.7 Results and Discussion
The primary result of each simulation run was the value of MI, the microburst
impact parameter. The hazard criteria were then applied to each windfield. AV and mean
shear were computed from a 300 foot AGL path through the windfield along the approach
path, to simulate a TDWR-like measurement. F-factor criteria were computed from the
F-factor history experienced by the simulated aircraft. A linear correlation analysis was
then performed for each of the hazard criteria vs. MI.
Approach Results. Four sets were run in total, varying the glideslope controller
(A, B) and the position of microburst core encounter (8000 feet and 15000 feet from
touchdown). Scatter plots of the microburst impact parameter vs. several of the hazard
criteria for one of the run sets are presented in Figure 6.7. The plot at upper left
illustrates the poor correlation between AV and the microburst impact parameter, with a
correlation coefficient of 0.484. Mean shear, however correlated quite well (upper right,
coefficient = 0.880) as did F-factor averaged over 3000 feet (lower right, coefficient =
0.752). The peak F results appear generally good, but two points lie fairly far off the
linear fit and produce a lower correlation coefficient (0.684).
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Figure 6.7. Approach cases: Microburst impact parameter vs. several hazard criteria. This set of runs used
autopilot A and the microburst core was encountered at 8000 feet before touchdown.
Table 6.2 summarizes the correlation results for all four sets of approach runs. As
shown above in the example plot, the delta-V criterion correlated poorly with the
microburst impact parameter, yielding coefficients between 0.47 and 0.59. Mean shear
correlated well, with coefficients as high an 0.88 for the 8000 ft runs. Peak F does not
correlate as well, and results are inconsistent between run sets. This is due to localized
high-F regions in the windfields which do not cause much performance degradation. F-
factor averages provided reasonably good correlation in all cases, and the results were not
strongly dependent on the averaging window length. The results for the low altitude
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Table 6.2. Approach cases -- Linear correlation coefficients between the microburst impact
parameter MIap and each of the candidate hazard criteria for 4 sets of runs. The heading of each
column indicates autopilot used (A or B) and distance of the microburst core from the runway threshold.
Hazard Linear Correlation Coefficient. p. with MIap
Criterion AP A, 8000 ft AP B, 8000 ft AP A,15000 ft AP B, 15000 ft
Delta-V 0.484 0.472 0.520 0.583
Mean Shear 0.880 0.883 0.812 0.762
Peak F-factor 0.684 0.820 0.413 0.453
Max F averaged over:
1500 feet 0.702 0.827 0.630 0.653
3000 feet 0.752 0.870 0.662 0.692
4500 feet 0.768 0.882 0.728 0.744
6000 feet 0.739 0.834 0.747 0.754
penetrations were slightly better than for the high altitude penetrations. Also, larger
window lengths appeared to do better in the higher altitude penetrations.
The fact that mean shear had higher correlation with microburst impact than delta-
V is not surprising, since the wind shear threat is due to loss of energy from both rapid
change in horizontal wind velocity and from vertical wind velocity (downdraft). Both the
magnitude of the headwind change and the time or distance over which it changes are
important, and mean shear indicates the average rate of headwind to tailwind change.
Also, due to mass continuity, the magnitude of the downdraft is related to the rate of
headwind change. Therefore, the mean shear value in some sense also accounts for the
downdraft hazard component.
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Figure 6.8. Microburst impact parameter MIap for each windfield, for the two glideslope controllers.
The microburst core is located 8000 feet before the touchdown point. Note that autopilot A was the low
bandwidth controller, and autopilot B was the high bandwidth controller.
The control strategy used did not have a strong impact on the correlation results,
which can be seen by comparing the autopilot A columns with the autopilot B columns in
Table 6.2. Correlations were slightly better with the higher bandwidth controller (B),
since the aircraft spent less time in thrust or angle-of-attack limit conditions. The faster
controller produced lower values of MIap for all of the approaches (Figure 6.8). These
results indicate that the final magnitude of MI (and hence the hazard) depends on the
control strategy employed, but hazard criteria which correlate well with the microburst
impact parameter for one control strategy will still correlate well for another strategy. A
similar effect would most likely be seen when comparing results for aircraft with
differing performance capabilities, although this was not tested.
Takeoff Results. For the takeoff runs, the microburst core was positioned 6000
feet from the takeoff roll initiation point. In this situation, the aircraft encountered the
shear region just after rotation. Scatter plots of MItal (integrated takeoff degradation) and
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MIto2 (peak TD) vs. several hazard criteria are included in Figures 6.9 and 6.10, and
Table 6.3 includes the correlation coefficients for both microburst impact criteria.
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Figure 6.9. Takeoff cases: Microburst impact parameter MItol vs. several hazard criteria. The
microburst core was encountered 6000 feet from the takeoff roll initiation point.
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Figure 6.10. Takeoff cases: Microburst impact parameter MIto2 vs. several hazard criteria. The
microburst core was encountered 6000 feet from the takeoff roll initiation point.
Table 6.3. Takeoff cases -- Linear correlation coefficients between the microburst impact parameters
MItol and MIto2 for each of the candidate hazard criteria.
Hazard Linear Correlation Coefficient, p, with:
Criterion MItoi (integrated TD) MIto2 (maximum TD)
Delta-V 0.493 0.329
Mean Shear 0.506 0.781
Peak F-factor 0.752 0.832
Max F averaged over:
1500 feet 0.772 0.855
3000 feet 0.758 0.861
4500 feet 0.801 0.895
6000 feet 0.850 0.938
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As for the approach cases, delta-V correlated poorly and the F-factor criteria
correlated fairly well. Once again, the F-factor averaging window size did not
appreciably affect the results. Mean shear, however, did not correlate very well with the
integrated TD parameter (MItol). It did correlate better with the peak TD parameter
(MIto2). Note that mean shear was evaluated from a constant-altitude path through the
entire windfield. During climbout, the aircraft is changing altitude much more rapidly
than during landing approach, and the mean shear through the windfield changes
significantly with altitude. Also, F-factor, since it includes both horizontal shear and
downdraft components, does not vary strongly with altitude. This altitude effect may
account for the poor correlation of mean shear with integrated TD.
6.2.8 Analysis Limitations
Before drawing conclusions from the above analysis, some limitations should be
discussed. The most important is that all the microburst windfields analyzed came from a
single day (in fact, all within 10 minutes) due to the limited amount of high-resolution
windfield model data available. Although a fairly well distributed set of microburst
intensities and sizes were available in this data set, the results may be biased by some
feature of the TASS model or by characteristics particular to the meteorological
conditions on the day simulated.
A further limitation is that a single aircraft model of a fairly small transport
aircraft was used. Use of a different transport aircraft model or a different pilot or
autopilot model would clearly result in different values of the microburst impact
parameter. The higher-bandwidth glideslope tracking strategy, for example, lowered the
final MIap value for all approach runs. This did not, however, significantly alter the
correlation results, since the difference in approach tracking due to the different control
strategy was roughly the same for all microburst encounters. Using a different transport
aircraft model would probably have a similar effect. It is interesting to note that the
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major control tradeoff available from an energy standpoint is whether airspeed deviations
or altitude deviations are weighted more heavily. The microburst impact parameters
include both of these deviations.
Also, perfect measurement of the windfield was assumed, and the evaluation of
the hazard criteria did not include any measurement limitations. For example, the
measurement of delta-V and mean shear at 300 feet AGL was done to "simulate" a
ground-based radar like TDWR, but did not account for measurement details such as
averaging across the radar beamwidth. Similarly, F was taken from the aircraft state and
wind history after the simulation run, and not from a simulation of an actual airborne
sensing system.
Finally, it should be noted that in some past wind shear related accidents (the
crash of Delta 191 at DFW in 1985, for example [Fujita, 1985]) there were short-scale
pitching and rolling motions of large enough amplitudes to considerably affect the
controllability and performance of the aircraft. These disturbances are not considered by
any of the hazard criteria, and were not present in the modeled windfields.
6.2.9 Conclusion
A methodology for evaluating microburst hazard criteria has been developed,
based on batch flight simulations of aircraft on approach or takeoff through microburst
windfields. Measures of the impact of a microburst on an aircraft's trajectory have been
defined, including both airspeed losses and altitude or climb rate deviations. Hazard
criteria were evaluated by calculating the linear correlation coefficient between values of
several hazard criteria and values of microburst impact parameters for a series of
simulation runs through an ensemble of microburst windfields.
A preliminary evaluation of a selected set of hazard criteria has been performed.
The results indicate that the total headwind change along the aircraft flight path ("delta-
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V", the criterion currently used by TDWR) does not correlate well with the flight path
degradation caused by microbursts. However, the "mean shear," computed by dividing
the "delta-V" by the distance over which it occurs, correlates well with microburst impact
for approach cases. It does not, however, correlate as well for the takeoff condition.
Averaging the "F-factor" hazard criterion (a measure of the aircraft total energy loss
caused by the windfield) over certain distances proved to be an effective predictor of
microburst impact for both approach and takeoff encounters. The F-factor criterion,
however, requires knowledge of both horizontal and vertical winds, which may be
difficult for some sensors. Finally, it was found that the correlation results obtained from
approach runs using two different autopilot models were not significantly different,
although the absolute levels of microburst impact did differ.
6.3 Determination of Hazard Threshold Values
6.3.1 Methodology
The work in Section 6.2 identified hazard criteria which correlate well with
aircraft trajectory degradation caused by microbursts. In this section, a technique for
establishing alerting thresholds based on a microburst hazard criterion is presented. The
case of jet transport aircraft encountering a microburst on approach is used as an
example. The procedure uses the following steps:
1) Select a good hazard criterion. Based on the results presented in Section 6.2,
F-factor averaged over 1 km (3281 feet) was chosen.
2) Define a trajectory degradation parameter. This measure is similar to the
microburst impact parameters used in Section 6.2, but is related more directly
to recommended crew procedures. For this case, landing approach, it is
based on criteria for aborting the approach.
3) Establish a multi-level alert structure based directly on values of the
traiectorv degradation. Threshold values of trajectory degradation can be
more directly related to recommended crew procedures than values of a
microburst hazard criterion.
4) Establish a worst-case microburst encounter scenario. This involves
positioning of the microburst relative to the aircraft's intended flight path.
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5) Establish nominal aircraft characteristics. This includes both aircraft
performance and flight control system characteristics.
6) Represent the microburst winds by a parametric analytical model. This
allows simulation of microbursts with arbitrary size and strength.
7) Simulate the encounter for a wide range of representative microburst sizes
and strengths. The microburst model parameters are varied to yield a large
range of hazard criterion values.
8) Determine the relationship between values of the hazard criterion and values
of the trajectory degradation parameter.
9) Select alert threshold values of the hazard criterion which correspond to the
desired alert threshold values of trajectory degradation.
The result of the final step is a set of alert thresholds, based on a measureable
microburst hazard criterion, for an alert structure based directly on a non-measureable
trajectory degradation parameter. In this way, a practical alerting scheme tied directly to
aircraft performance is developed. The above steps are further discussed below.
6.32 Selecting the Hazard Criterion
In Section 6.2, F-factor averaged over a distance was found to give good
correlation with hazard for all cases tested. Therefore, the hazard thresholds in this study
were based on F averaged over 1 km (approximately 3000 feet). The largest value
obtained during the simulated microburst penetrations was used to define the strength of
each microburst. This value will be henceforth referred to as Favy.
6.3.3 Trajectory Degradation Metric for Approach
For an approach under wind shear conditions, the primary flight crew decision is
whether or not to abort the approach. According to the Windshear Training Aid [FAA,
1987], the following conditions are indicative of hazardous wind shear and necessitate a
missed approach:
* + 15 knots from reference airspeed
* + 500 feet/minute deviation from nominal vertical speed
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* + 50 from nominal pitch attitude
* + 1 dot of glideslope angular displacement
* unusual throttle position for a "significant length of time"
To reflect these guidelines, an "abort parameter" was established, similar to the
approach degradation parameter used in the previous study:
AP = - + iVrof -V (6.17)V 0.350 15 knots (6.17)
where airspeed, V, is measured in knots. Angular glideslope deviation, TI, was
illustrated in Figure 6.1. One "dot" of deviation equals 0.350. The abort parameter was
based on glideslope and airspeed deviations in order to include both kinetic and potential
energy-related components. This decreases the sensitivity of the simulation results to the
nominal control strategy chosen. Also, it was not necessary to include the pitch, vertical
speed, and throttle conditions explicitly. These were not violated in the simulations
without also violating either the airspeed deviation or glideslope displacement conditions.
For a given simulated approach, the maximum value of AP induced indicates the level of
trajectory degradation due to the microburst, in terms of the need for initiation of a
missed approach. Note that the only differences between AP and AD (used in Section
6.2) are the values used to normalize the glideslope and airspeed deviations.
6.3.4 Alert Structure
A three-level alert structure, as used in the graphical microburst alert display
experiment (Section 5.4, "Display B") was assumed. In that experiment, the three-level
alert display was preferred by the flight crews and found to be a good decision-making
tool. A corresponding three-level alert structure, based directly on maximum values of
AP that would be experienced during a standard approach, is shown in Table 6.4.
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Table 6.4: Three-level alert structure based on the abort parameter, AP.
Alert Level max AP during approach Description
1 0.5 5 max AP < 1.0 "low intensity"
2 1.0 _ max AP < 1.41 "hazardous"
3 max AP 2 1.41 "critically hazardous"
The AP thresholds were chosen by the following rationale. As stated above, AP
is based on the principle that either (a) airspeed change of 15 knots, or (b) glideslope
error of 1 dot mandates a missed approach. When AP reaches 1.0 (the "hazardous"
threshold), this indicates the possibility of either of these events occurring. Which event,
if either, occurs depends on the control strategy employed, since airspeed can be traded
for altitude rate and vice versa. When AP reaches 1.41 (the square root of 2) it is
guaranteed that one of the missed approach criteria (a), (b) will be exceeded, and a
missed approach will be required. Therefore, this was chosen as the "critically
hazardous" threshold. The objective of this study is then to determine through simulation
the hazard criterion values (Fay) which produce the AP thresholds in Table 6.4.
6.3.5 Approach Scenario Definition
The study was designed to produce threshold values of Fav for jet transport
aircraft on final approach. Furthermore, the intent was to produce thresholds which were
independent of the microburst position along the approach. Therefore, the microburst
was placed to generate a "worst-case" scenario in which the aircraft encountered the
hazardous portion of the microburst in the last mile of the approach (Figure 6.11). The
microburst center was located 2.0 km from the runway threshold. This scenario is only
"worst-case" for microbursts which impact the aircraft before the flare point, when AP is
a sensible descriptor of trajectory degradation. It is clearly possible to place a microburst
directly at the touchdown point, in which case even a weak microburst could cause an
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accident. Therefore, the hazard thresholds which are produced in this analysis are limited
to microbursts which occur on the approach but not over the runway.
Microburst
Extent
Figure 6.11. Microburst placement on final approach
6.3.6 Nominal Aircraft Characteristics
The aircraft model was designed to represent the primary characteristics of two,
three, or four-engine commercial jet transport aircraft at maximum landing weight. The
control system was designed to represent a typical autothrottle and glideslope tracking
system for a modern transport aircraft. The aircraft model and controller are discussed in
greater detail below.
Generic Jet Transport Model. The basic aircraft model used in Section 6.2 was
extended to better represent jet transports in general. The same equations of motion and
aerodynamic model were used in a normalized form. The normalized form eliminated
specific aircraft characteristics (wing surface area, mass, thrust etc.) in favor of ratios
such as wing loading and thrust-to-weight fraction. General characteristics of two, three,
and four-engine transport aircraft at maximum landing weight were set as shown in Table
6.5.
Table 6.5. Generic jet transport model characteristics
No. of Wing Loading Approach Speed Excess Thrust-to-
Engines (lbf/sq. ft.) (KIAS) Weight Ratio
2 95.0 140 0.17
3 95.0 150 0.13
4 95.0 160 0.11
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The data for typical approach speeds and excess thrust-to-weight ratio (at the trim
condition) was provided by David Hinton of NASA Langley Research Center [1992]. A
review of modem transport aircraft wing loading data [Taylor (ed.), 1989] determined
that a wing loading of 95 lbf/sq. ft. is representative of all three aircraft classes at
maximum landing weight.
Nominal Controller. The selection of a controller for this study was important,
since controller characteristics (particularly bandwidth) can affect the magnitudes of
airspeed and glideslope deviations. For this reason, a more formal controller design
process was applied with the intent of reproducing realistic controller feedback structure
and characteristics. The result is illustrated in Figure 6.12.
Autothrottle
Compensator Engine Lag
5(s+1) 0.33 W MWO V
(s + 10) s + 0.33
Command AircraftLimits
+ 0.003 5.29 9 l d
+ s2 + 3.68 s + 5.29
Glideslope Augmented
Coupler Gain Pitch Dynamics
Figure 6.12. Airspeed and glideslope tracking system for the generic jet transport model. Transfer
functions in the above diagram are expressed in terms of the Laplace transform frequency variable, s.
The system was designed by successive loop closures, and follows glideslope
tracker design procedures as given by McRuer, et. al. [1973] and Stevens and Lewis
[1992]. Typically, a pitch attitude command system would be designed first. In both
references, the resulting closed loop systems have a second order pitch response with
damping ratio of 0.7 to 0.8 and a frequency of approximately 2.5 rad/sec. For the model
used here, which neglects pitching dynamics, this loop closure has been assumed and
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pitch angle is a control input. Therefore, a second order pitch response to pitch command
was added as effective actuator dynamics. Since the analytical model produces smooth
wind functions, and the pitching rates are not high, there is little fidelity lost by using a
point-mass longitudinal model for the simulations.
The second loop feeds back airspeed error to throttle. The thrust response
dynamics were modeled by a first-order lag, with a time constant of 3 sec. Lead
compensation was used to close this loop. The dominant mode of the speed loop had a
damping ratio of 0.77 and a natural frequency of 1.43 rad/sec.
The third loop feeds back glideslope altitude deviation, d, to pitch command. In
the examples given by McRuer, et. al. [ 1973] and Stevens and Lewis [1992], dynamic
compensation is used to close this loop. For the simplified dynamics used here, pure gain
feedback was sufficient. The dominant glideslope tracking mode had a damping ratio of
0.76 and a natural frequency of 0.41 rad/sec, which is consistent with the example cases
given in both references. The responses to an initial glideslope offset of +50 meters are
shown in Figure 6.13. Note that the airspeed variations are small, even for this large
initial error.
The thrust command was limited to the available maximum thrust-to-weight ratio
and pitch commands were limited by the stick-shaker angle-of-attack. Further details of
the aircraft/control system simulation are available in Appendix B.
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Figure 6.13. Responses to an initial glideslope error of +50 meters. These plots are for the 2-engine jet
transport at an approach speed of 140 knots.
6.3.7 Microburst Wind Modeling
Parametric Analytical Model. The analytical microburst model used in this work
was initially developed by Oseguera and Bowles [1988] and later improved by Vicroy
[1991]. The Oseguera-Bowles-Vicroy (OBV) model uses shaping functions to generate
an axisymmetric flowfield which satisfies the mass continuity equation and is
representative of the major characteristics of measured microbursts. The windfield is a
function of (x, y, h) position and three model parameters: maximum outflow velocity
(Um), microburst core radius (Rp) and the outflow height (Zm). These variables relate
directly to measureable microburst characteristics. The maximum horizontal velocity
change across the model microburst is 2 x Um, and the distance between the headwind
and tailwind peaks is 2 x Rp. The maximum horizontal velocities occur at an altitude of
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Zm. The wind equations are included in Appendix C, and a full set of plots
demonstrating the model windfield characteristics are given by Vicroy [1991].
Sample wind plots for a constant-altitude flight path through the microburst center
are included in Figure 6.14. The classic microburst signature is evident in the horizontal
wind plot, an increasing headwind followed by rapid shear to a tailwind. The downdraft
is strongest at the microburst center, and small updrafts are visible at the edges of the
outflow region.
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Figure 6.14. Oseguera-Bowles-Vicroy microburst model. Sample winds for a constant-altitude (80 m
AGL) flight path through the center of the model microbursL The model parameters for this plot were:
Um = 15 m/s, Rp = 1000 m, Zm = 80 m.
Microburst Parameter Test Matrix. The purpose of using a parametric model was
to produce a set of microbursts with a wide range of Fav. For the OBV model, Fay can be
increased either by increasing Um or by decreasing Rp. To resolve this ambiguity, Rp
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was set to a series of discrete values between 0.5 km and 2 km to represent reasonable
microburst sizes. This corresponds to microburst diameters from 1 km to 4 km. Field
studies have found that microbursts with diameters less than 1 km are rare [Hjelmfelt,
1988] and microbursts with diameters of greater than 4 km would have to be extremely
strong to produce significant F-factors. For each radius, Um was varied from 2 nm/s to 25
m/s. Since Um reflects one-half of the total delta-V, the delta-V range represented by this
set was 4 m/s to 50 m/s (7.8 knots to 97 knots). The 1 km-averaged F-factors achieved
ranged from 0.01 to.0.38. Since the outflow height parameter has little effect on Fav, Zm
was fixed at a representative value of 80 m AGL for all runs.
Implementation. As in the previous study, the simulation was mechanized on a
Sun 3/80 workstation using MATRIXx SYSTEM_BUILD software by Integrated
Systems, Inc.
6.3.8 Simulation Results and Discussion
Each set of microburst model parameters was used in one simulation run. For
each run, Fay and the maximum value of AP were computed. The simulation results
therefore consist of max AP vs. Fav curves, parameterized by microburst radius (Rp) and
aircraft type (2, 3, or 4-engine).
Effect of Microburst Model Radius. Simulation results for the 2-engine aircraft
parameterized by microburst radius are given in Figure 6.15. The 500-meter microburst
radius produces higher max AP for a given Fav, while the results for all other radii lie
essentially on the same curve. The 500-meter radius curves, therefore, will be used to set
the alert thresholds. Note that the relationship between Fav and AP is nearly linear. This
is consistent with the results in Section 6.2, which indicated a high linear correlation
coefficient between Fay and trajectory degradation (using much more complex
windfields).
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Figure 6.15. Abort Parameter vs. F-factor averaged over 1 km, 2-engine jet transport on approach.
The OBV microburst was centered 2.0 km from the touchdown point. The heavy horizontal lines indicate
l      lert r .
Effect of Aircraft Size. Simulation results for the 500-meter microburst radius,
parameterized by aircraft size, are shown in Figure 6.16. The maximum AP value for a
given Fav < 0.15 decreases with increasing aircraft size. This effect is due to the higher
approach speeds used by the larger aircraft. However, when the hazard value becomes
high enough that maximum thrust must be employed, the AP value increases rapidly for
the larger aircraft with smaller thrust-to-weight ratios. This effect is apparent from the
breakpoints on the plot at Fav = 0.135 for the three-engine aircraft (point A) and Fav =
0.12 for the four-engine aircraft (point B).
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Figure 6.16. Abort Parameter vs. F-factor averaged over 1 km, for 2, 3, 4-engine jet transports. The
OBV microburst was centered 2.0 km from the touchdown point, with a radius of 500m. The heavy
horizontal lines indicate AP threshold values for the three-level alert structure, and the heavy dots indicate
the intersection points used to select Fay threshold values.
6.3.9 Selection of Alert Thresholds
Since the 500-meter radius (1-kilometer diameter) microburst produced the
highest AP values, the curves in Figure 6.16 were used to determine Fav hazard threshold
values for the three-level alert structure (Table 6.6). This was done for each of the three
aircraft models, and the lowest value for each level was selected as the overall threshold
value (right hand column). The threshold was defined by the two-engine transport in all
cases, although the results for all three aircraft types are very close at the level 3
threshold. This table represents an alert structure which is both based on a measureable
hazard criterion and tied directly to aircraft performance., Note that these values are quite
close to those select d for the graphical alert display study (Section 5.4).
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Table 6.6. Three-level alert thresholds for jet transports on approach.
Alert AP value to Fay values to reach AP threshold Final Fav value for
Level trigger level 2-engine 3-engine 4-engine hazard threshold
1 0.50 0.050 0.055 0.060 0.050
2 1.00 0.104 0.113 0.124 0.104
3 1.41 0.148 0.151 0.152 0.148
6.3.10 Applicability Issues
The applicability of these results is constrained by the assumptions which were
used. One critical assumption was the definition of a nominal controller. The maximum
value of AP in a given microburst encounter is partially dependent on controller
characteristics. Recall that in Section 6.2, simulations using the high-bandwidth
approach controller resulted in less trajectory degradation than simulations with the low-
bandwidth controller for all 12 runs (see Figure 6.8). The approach controller used here
is intended to be representative of a "typical" automatic glideslope coupler for a transport
aircraft. Actual autopilot characteristics vary among different aircraft models and
manufacturers. In addition, many approaches are hand-flown by the pilot, and human
pilots vary in skill and response time.
Another important assumption was the choice of wind model. The OBV model
has been correlated with field studies and adjusted to produce generally representative
horizontal and vertical wind profiles. It is difficult to determine exactly how
representative it is for simulation purposes. However, since the windfield strength was
calibrated by distance-averaged F-factor, the details of the wind model will not strongly
affect the results. Ideally, a large number of field-measured microburst windfields with
varying Fav could be used to validate the results. Also, as with the correlation analysis in
Section 6.2, there was no attempt made at either simulating or evaluating the
contributions of turbulence and vortices to the aircraft hazard.
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The assumptions made in the aircraft dynamic model are less critical. The
threshold values of AP for the alert levels was reached in the simulations generally
without the aircraft reaching stick shaker or maximum thrust. Therefore, the assumptions
made on maximum available thrust-to-weight ratio had essentially no impact on the
analysis. Also, since the windfields were smooth, the approximation used for the
pitching dynamics did not significantly affect the analysis.
Finally, the results in Table 6.8 are for jet transports on approach to landing. With
minor modifications to the simulation procedure, a similar set of thresholds could be
computed for takeoff cases or for other classes of aircraft (such as general aviation).
6.3.11 Conclusion
A technique has been presented for determining microburst alert hazard thresholds
based on aircraft performance. In this method, alert levels are defined for specific levels
of aircraft trajectory degradation. Simulations are performed to determine the
relationship between measured values of a suitable hazard criterion and the aircraft
trajectory degradation. The resulting relationship is then used to select threshold values
of the measureable hazard criterion which correspond to the desired levels of aircraft
trajectory degradation.
The technique was applied to the particular case of jet transports on final
approach. A three-level alert structure was established, based on a trajectory degradation
criterion which indicated whether or not the approach should be aborted. Simulations
were run using a simple parametric microburst model to determine the values of a hazard
criterion (averaged F-factor) required to trigger the three alerting levels. Table 6.8 lists
these values. Finally, the applicability of the results was discussed.
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7. Multi-Sensor Measurement of Microburst Characteristics
7.1 Overview
The alert generation techniques described in the previous chapter are based on
values of a suitable microburst hazard criterion, which are computed from measured or
estimated microburst characteristics. The measurement of microburst characteristics is a
complex task. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, microburst data can come from a large
pool of sources. These include sensors of many different types located on several
different platforms, as shown in Figure 7.1. Accurate estimation of microburst
characteristics depends not only on the available data sources, but on the method used to
assimilate the available data.
TDWR Flight CrewObservations Passive IR
Collect Ground-Based Collect Airborne . Doppler
Sensor Data Sensor Data multiple Radar, Lid
atmospheric
measurements PIREPs
ASR-9 Reactive Sensor
Assimilate Data:
Detection, Characterization
I
Estimated microburst
characteristics
Figure 7.1. The Measurement and Assimilation Task
In this chapter, a computational technique for assimilating multi-sensor, multi-
platform atmospheric measurements to produce estimates of microburst characteristics
will be presented.
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7.2 The Multi-Sensor Data Assimilation Problem
Many microburst detection systems have geometrical observability problems. For
example, Doppler sensors can only measure wind velocities radial to the sensor, not
vertical winds. However, the microburst aviation hazard is partially due to vertical
winds. The F-factor based hazard criteria analyzed in the previous chapter require both
horizontal shear and downdraft information. Limits on sensor resolution and range also
complicate estimation of microburst characteristics.
However, as more and more of the sensor systems illustrated above become
operational, it will become increasingly likely that more than one sensor system will be
available in a given situation. Combining data from different systems with different
measurement characteristics can compensate for individual sensor deficiencies and
produce more accurate estimates. Another possible benefit of using multiple sensors is
that conflicting data from different sensor systems could be resolved, and faulty sensors
could be identified.
This "data fusion" process can be done on a number of levels. One approach is to
merge the final products of the sensor systems to produce improved alerts. For example,
product-level techniques have been used to integrate TDWR and LLWAS information
[Cornman and Mahoney, 1991] and to determine the probability of hazardous wind shear
given a wide range of evidence [Stratton and Stengel, 1992]. Another approach is to
integrate sensors on the data level. The data-level approach is more complex, due to the
large volumes of data produced by several of the wind shear sensor systems. However, if
successfully implemented, observability problems due to poor sensor geometry can be
alleviated. Data from multiple sources can be combined to form a "super sensor" with
improved sensing geometry. The technique presented here is a model-based data-level
approach which attempts to gain this observability benefit without prohibitively large
computational or data transmission requirements.
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7.3 Model-Based Approach
Basic Concept. In the model-based approach, the actual microburst windfield is
approximated by an analytical model. The model-based data assimilation process
involves selection of the model parameters which best make the model winds
approximate the actual winds. Once the best parameters have been estimated, microburst
characteristics for alert generation can be easily derived from the analytical windfield
model.
Why Use a Model-Based Approach? The model-based approach has several
desirable characteristics. If the model represents the true windfield well enough, then a
large number of atmospheric measurements can be encapsulated in a small set of "best-
fit" model parameters. This is useful if data is to be transmitted between sensors or
sensor platforms. Another important advantage is that the model-based approach allows
estimation of quantities which cannot be directly measured. For example, vertical
velocities can be inferred from model parameters which were computed based only on
Doppler-measured radial velocities. This is possible because analytical models can take
advantage of basic fluid dynamic relationships such as mass continuity, and can
incorporate knowledge and data from past microburst observational studies.
Analytical Microburst Model Description. The analytical microburst model used
in this work was initially developed by Oseguera and Bowles [1988] and later improved
by Vicroy [1991]. The Oseguera-Bowles-Vicroy (OBV) model uses shaping functions to
generate an axisymmetric flowfield which satisfies the mass continuity equation and is
representative of the major characteristics of measured microbursts. The same model was
used in the hazard threshold study (Section 6.3). Sample winds for a constant-altitude
path through the model windfield are shown in Figure 7.2. The horizontal winds exhibit
the classic microburst characteristic of a headwind increase followed by rapid shearing to
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a tailwind. The vertical wind plot shows a downdraft in the microburst center and
smaller updrafts at the edges.
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Figure 7.2. OBV Microburst Model Windfield. Sample winds for a constant-altitude (80 m AGL) flight
path through the microburst center. Model parameters for this plot: Um = 15 m/s, Rp = 1000 m,
Zm = 80 m, x0 = Y0 = UO = Uh = V0 = Vh = 0.
The microburst winds are uniquely defined by a set of five parameters and three
empirically-adjusted constants. For this study, a simple ambient wind (4 additional
parameters) was added to the microburst windfield. The model parameters are
summarized in Table 1. The total winds are given by non-linear, smooth, differentiable
functions of the parameters and a given (x,y,h) position as follows:
WxE= WxE, mb (x -X0, y - y, h, Um, Rp, Zm)+ UO + Uhh (7.1)
WyE = WyE, mb (X - XO, Y - Y, h, Um, Rp, Zm) + VO + Vhh (7.2)
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Wh = Wh, mb (X - XO, y - yo, h, Um, Rp, Zm)
WxE, WyE, and Wh are the earth-referenced eastward, northward, and vertical
wind velocities respectively, and h is the altitude above ground level (AGL). Quantities
with "mb" subscripts are functions of position and the first five parameters in Table 7.1.
These functions are summarized in Appendix C.
Table 7.1. Modified Oseguera-Bowles-Vicroy Microburst Model Parameters. The type column
indicates a microburst (MB) or ambient wind (AW) parameter.
Parameter Ty Description
xo  MB X-coordinate (East) of microburst center (m)
yo MB Y-coordinate (North) of microburst center (m)
Um  MB Maximum horizontal outflow speed (m/s)
Rp MB Radius of maximum outflow (meters)
Zm  MB Altitude AGL of maximum outflow (meters)
Uo  AW Eastward ambient wind constant component (m/s)
Uh  AW Eastward ambient wind altitude gradient (m/s/m)
V, AW Northward ambient wind const. component (m/s)
Vh AW Northward ambient wind altitude gradient (m/s/m)
The OBV model is axisymmetric, but naturally occurring microbursts are often
asymmetric [Hallowell, 1990]. In addition, multiple microbursts have been observed to
occur close together and interact. To handle these cases, the model was - tended to
allow multiple interacting microbursts. For each microburst, another set of five
microburst model parameters (the first five in Table 1) can be added. It is assumed that
the ambient wind will be roughly constant throughout the x-y space of interest, i.e. near
the airport, and so only one set of ambient wind parameters is required. The winds from
each model microburst are superimposed to get the overall model windfield. Mass
continuity is still preserved. In the simulation study described below, when a "two-
microburst" model is discussed it does not indicate that there are two microbursts being
detected. It indicates that two superimposed model microbursts are being used to
simulate a complex microburst windfield with more than one area of high downdraft
speed.
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(7.3)
7.4 Estimation Performance Metrics
The results in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 indicated that the important alerting quantities
are position, extent, and intensity as quantified by a microburst hazard criterion. The
"effectiveness" of the proposed algorithm is defined by its capability to produce these
quantities. Therefore, two figures of merit were defined.
The first concerns position and extent. Given a center point, an "extent polygon"
can be drawn for a microburst windfield [Hallowell, 1990]. An example is shown in
Figure 7.3. The vertices of the polygon correspond to the points of maximum radial
outflow speed, measured radially outward from the center point. This polygon encloses
the entire performance-decreasing portion of the microburst. The ability of the model-
based algorithm to define this hazardous region can then be evaluated by comparing the
extent polygon A of the truth windfield to the extent polygon B of the analytical model
windfield corresponding to the estimated parameters:
Mextent --A B (7.4)
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Figure 7.3. Microburst extent polygon. Horizontal wind vectors with the outflow extent polygon
superimposed.
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Figure 7.4. Extent Figure-of-Merit. Pictorial representation of Eqn. 7.4. The cross-hatched area is A n B
and the sum of the cross-hatched and striped areas is A u B. Note that the model "polygon" B is a circle for
the single-microburst axisymmetric OBV model.
This quantity has a maximum value of 1 (for an exact match) and falls off for both
underestimation and overestimation of the extent boundaries (Figure 7.4). Core position
errors are also reflected, since the model extent polygon is then laterally translated with
respect to the true extent polygon. This quantity is a function of altitude, but the
dependence was found to be very weak and only results for a single altitude are presented
in this report.
Microburst intensity was defined by the F-factor criterion:
F W Wh (7.5)
g V
W, in equation 7.5 indicates tailwind-positive horizontal windspeed along the
aircraft track direction, and is not to be confused with WxE, the eastbound horizontal
windspeed. The study documented in Section 6.2 concluded that F averaged over 3000
feet (approx. 1 km) of the aircraft flight path yields a good hazard estimate for several
different situations. This criterion was adopted in a modified form for this study.
Microburst hazard values were calculated as follows: (1) compute 1 km average F-factors
for a large number of parallel constant-altitude paths through the microburst, (2) average
the resulting values 500 m laterally across flight paths, and (3) pick the largest averaged
F-factor as the hazard value.
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This value still depends on the direction and altitude of the parallel flight paths
along which F is evaluated, because (1) microbursts can be asymmetrical in shear
strength, and (2) microburst winds vary with altitude. In the simulation results presented
below, averaged F-factors will be presented for either eastbound or northbound flight
paths. Results will also be presented for several altitudes.
7.5 Model Acceptability Evaluation
Before development of a real-time algorithm, the feasibility of matching
microburst winds with this analytical model was examined using a deterministic least-
squares technique. Note that the least-squares technique would not be a practical real-
time technique. Requirements for a real-time algorithm and a possible real-time
algorithm based on Kalman filtering will be presented in Section 7.6.
7.5.1 Least-Squares Wind Matching Technique
The technique was an improved version of that used by Schultz [1990] to develop
a vortex ring model of the Dallas-Fort Worth airport microburst [Fujita, 1986]. The
algorithm computes the values of the model parameters, x, which minimize the total
mean squared error between a set of "truth" winds and the analytical model winds:
N
Cost = e2 (x) ; e (x) = Wmodel (x)- Wtth (7.6)
j= 1
where N is the total number of wind data points and W is a column vector of all
east (WxE), north (WyE), and vertical (Wh) wind components at all (x, y, h) locations. e is
the vector of errors between the truth winds and the analytical model winds for the
current model parameters, x. The minimization algorithm was based on a non-linear
Gauss-Newton method with linear constraints. The technique is described in detail in
Appendix D.
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7.5.2 Simulated Truth Windfield
The windfield data used for algorithm testing was generated by the Terminal Area
Simulation System (TASS) developed by Proctor [1987]. It is a highly detailed
computational simulation of a complex multiple microburst event which occurred at
Denver-Stapelton airport on July 11, 1988. This event caused one near accident and a
total of five aircraft to make missed approaches (see Section 2.5.2). Windfield data from
five times during this event was available, with a horizontal spacing of 200m and a
vertical spacing of approximately 80m. For the following analyses the largest microburst
in the event was selected (Figure 7.5). The horizontal windfield has a classic microburst
outflow pattern. However, the vertical wind contours show a complex structure as
indicated by two separate regions of high downdraft, neither of which correspond to the
apparent horizontal windfield center (marked with an x). This rather complex event was
chosen to test the estimation algorithm in a challenging but realistic situation.
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Figure 7.5. TASS-simulated windfield for 11 July 1988 microburst event at DEN. At left is a vector
plot of horizontal winds: maximum velocity shown is 18.7 m/s. At right: vertical windspeed contours.
Data is shown for an altitude of 177m AGL.
128
7.5.3 Least-Squares Matching Results
The deterministic least-squares procedure was done with a single-microburst
model (9 parameters) and with a two-microburst model (14 parameters). The resulting
parameters for the single-microburst case are given in Table 7.2. Note that the
approximate radius of this microburst is 1700 meters, and the maximum outflow speed is
approximately 18 m/s. The ambient wind magnitude is small in this case.
Table 7.2. Single-microburst least-squares parameter fit results.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
x0 (m) 9528 UO (m/s) 0.9
yO (m) -5047 Uh (m/s/m) -0.001
Um (m/s) 17.8 V0 (m/s) 0.5
RD (m) 1717 Vh (m/s/m) -0.002
Zm (m) 68.2
Results for the two-microburst model are given in Table 7.3. The first microburst
(MB #1) has similar parameters to the one-microburst fit result. The second microburst is
positioned 2 km east of the first, and is smaller and weaker (outflow speed of 7 m/s). The
resulting windfield has two areas of high downdraft speed, similar to the TASS windfield.
The model microburst core positions have been marked by + symbols on the vertical
wind contour plot in Figure 7.5.
Table 73. Two-microburst least-squares parameter fit results.
Parameter. MB #1 MB #2 Parameter Value
xo (m) 9328 11161 UO (m/s) 1.3
0 (m) -5115 -4615 Uh (m/s/m) -0.001
Um (m/s) 17.5 6.71 Vo (m/s) 0.4
RD (m) 1665 1268 Vh (m/s/m) -0.002
Zm (m) 68.3 70.4
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Figure 7.6. Microburst intensity matching performance for least-squares fit.
The single-microburst fit produced an extent figure of merit of 0.92. The two-
microburst fit result was slightly lower, at 0.85. As seen in Figure 7.5, this microburst
was fairly axisymmetric in extent, so these good results are not surprising. However,
plots of area-averaged F-factor looking Eastward and Northward for three altitudes
(Figure 7.6) reveal that the microburst is not symmetric in intensity. As indicated by the
"TASS windfield" points in Figure 7.6, the F-factors are larger when looking northward
through the microburst than when looking eastward. This is due to the vertical wind
distribution (Figure 7.5, righthand plot) which has multiple regions of high vertical
windspeeds. For this reason, the single-microburst fit produces a single broad region of
somewhat weak vertical winds in an attempt to globally match the windfield, producing
intensity underestimates in both directions. The two-microburst fit, however, succeeds in
matching the vertical windfield well and duplicates the intensity of the TASS windfield
well in both directions.
For alerting purposes, both model windfields adequately represent the actual
extent. However, the single-microburst model underestimates the intensity somewhat.
Since the alert generation procedure (Section 6.3) classifies microbursts into relatively
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few intensity levels, very accurate intensity is probably not required. Based on these
results, and similar results obtained using a TASS windfield from another microburst
event, the model was judged to be acceptable for estimation purposes.
7.6 Real-Time Iterated Extended Kalman Filter Algorithm
7.6.1 Real-Time Algorithm Requirements
The real-time estimation algorithm must satisfy several constraints to be practical.
It must be recursive, to handle new measurements as they become available. It must also
account for time variation in the model parameters since microbursts are short-lived,
dynamic phenomena and sensor measurements will be taken at different times. In
addition, the algorithm should take advantage of microburst statistical characteristics
from past field studies. This implies a probabilistic approach. A Kalman filtering
technique was developed to satisfy these requirements.
7.6.2 Algorithm Description
Estimation Problem Structure. Kalman filtering techniques require a state-space
dynamic model of the system and a relationship between system parameters and
measured quantities. In this case, analytical model parameters which best describe the
microburst are to be estimated from measurements of the winds. The analytical
microburst model parameters were therefore used as the filter state variables x(t). It was
assumed that the time evolution of the microburst parameters can be adequately modeled
by a linear, time-invariant, continuous-time system:
i(t) = A x(t) + B u(t) + L w(t) (7.7)
Deterministic inputs to the system are represented by u(t), and w(t) is a white
Gaussian process noise input. The A, B, and L matrices define the dynamic model; they
will be discussed below. Since the state variables x(t) are the analytical model
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parameters, they are related to the wind measurements through the analytical model wind
equations. The resulting non-linear discrete-time measurement equation, at measurement
time tk, is:
Zk = hk(X(tk)) + Vk (7.8)
where the measurement equations h are the wind equations from the analytical
model, and vk represents measurement noise. The state vector, x, and error covariance
matrix, P, for a single downdraft case are defined as follows:
x =[xo Yo Um Rp Zm UO Uh VO Vh]T (7.9)
P = E [(x - X) (7.10)
where £" is the current parameter estimate. The microburst eastward core location,
xo, should not be confused with x, the state vector. Process noise, w(t), and measurement
noise, Vk, are white and gaussian with the following characteristics:
E [(L w(t)) (L W(c)) T] = L Q(t) LT  _ C) (7.11)
E[vk vT] = Rk (7.12)
The aim of the filter is to produce the state estimate 2 which minimizes the error
covariance P. Since the measurement equation is non-linear, this cannot be accomplished
with a standard Kalman filter algorithm. An extended Kalman filter (EKF) approach was
chosen. The structure and principal equations for the EKF are briefly described below,
based on the formulation given by Gelb [1974]. The filtering algorithm for discrete-time
measurements is a two step process: (1) apply the system dynamic model to propagate the
state estimate and state estimation error covariance between measurements, and (2)
update the estimate when new measurements arrive.
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Estimate Propagation: Microburst Dynamic Modeling. For linear, time-invariant,
continuous-time system dynamics the propagation of the state estimate and estimation
error covariance between measurements is governed by:
x(t) = A x(t)+ B u(t) (7.13)
P(t) = A P(t) + P(t) AT + L Q(t) LT (7.14)
The A, B, L, and Q matrices define the microburst time-evolution dynamics.
Since the analytical model is time-invariant, these parameters must come from another
source. Unfortunately, there is no simple time-varying analytical model currently
available. However, measured microburst statistics can be used to approximate some
dynamics. For example, microburst radial extent tends to increase steadily throughout
the microburst lifecycle. Analysis of data from Colorado microburst measurements
[Wilson, et. al., 1984; Hjelmfelt, 1988] indicates that the change in radial extent vs. time
can be approximated by a constant bias (a) with additive white zero-mean gaussian noise
(n):
Rp = a + n(t) (7.15)
where a = 0.102 km/min and the noise term has a standard deviation of 0.15
km/min. The constant bias is treated as a deterministic input, and the noise term leads to
an value for one element in the Q matrix. Similar modeling may be possible for some of
the other state variables. For example, motion of the microburst core (xo,)o) may be
related to the ambient wind parameters, which would produce non-zero entries in the A
matrix. No conclusive data on microburst motion has yet been published. In the
simulations discussed below, the A matrix was assumed to contain all zeros. The B and Q
matrix elements were set based on statistical information where possible, and from
engineering judgement when no statistical information was available.
133
Since the time behavior of the microburst parameters is not well modeled,
significant process noise is required. The use of process noise to compensate for
modeling deficiencies is similar to the well-known technique of applying a "forgetting
factor" to older data in a batch least-squares formulation. In any case, these simple
dynamics lead to sparse A, B, L, and Q matrices, and the propagation step in the filter
requires little computation.
Incorporating Measurements. When new measurements are taken, the estimate is
updated. The non-linear measurement equation, however, complicates the update
process. The formulation presented here is based on the extended Kalman filter update
with the addition of a local iteration procedure to reduce the effects of the measurement
non-linearities [Jazwinski, 1970; Gelb, 1974]. At the kth measurement time tk, a local
iteration (over i) is performed. The ith parameter estimate at time tk, Xk,i, is updated with
the following expression:
Xk,i+l = Xk + Kk,i [Zk - hk(xi) - Hk(,i k )( k,i)] (7.16)
Xk,o = Xk, i = 0,1,... (7.17)
The Kalman gain K is ordinarily computed from:
Kk,i = P- HT(xi) [Hk(X+i) P- Hk(~ji) + Rk -1(7.18)
and Hk is the locally linearized measurement matrix:
HkX)=[ hk (7.19)
Computation of Hk,i requires evaluation of the partial derivatives of the analytical
model wind equations with respect to the current parameter estimate vector Xk,i for each
of the measurements Zk. In the above expressions, ij and Pk indicate the propagated
estimate and error covariance at time tk (prior to updating), while i and P+ indicate the
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updated estimate and covariance based on the measurement Zk. The local iteration is
repeated until the scaled norm of the parameter estimate does not change significantly.
After the new estimate has been produced, the updated error covariance matrix is
computed using values from the final iteration step:
P = [I - Kk,i Hk (,i)] P (7.20)
Testing indicated that the iterated filter results in significantly better estimates
than the standard EKF. This is consistent with findings by other investigators [Wishner,
et. al., 1969]. A probabilistic interpretation of this iteration based on Bayesian maximum
likelihood estimation is given by Jazwinski [1970]. Jazwinski demonstrates that the
iteration process is actually a Newton-Raphson iteration for the conditional mode of the
(non-Gaussian) posterior state probability density. This is then used as the conditional
mean would be in a standard linear Kalman filter. Since the conditional mode is used
rather than the conditional mean, the resulting estimate is biased. The bias in the estimate
becomes small as the error covariance becomes small.
One difficulty with the above updating algorithm is that there may be large
numbers of measurements available at a single time step (as with TDWR data, for
example), and the computation of the Kalman gain requires inversion of an r-by-r matrix,
where r is the number of measurements. The number of computations required to do this
scales as r3 . In a linear filter, a large batch of measurements can be treated as a series of
sequential scalar measurements (occurring at infinitesmal time spacing) without loss of
information, thereby avoiding this problem. When the measurement equation is non-
linear, the measurements cannot be incorporated sequentially without losing a significant
amount of information. Therefore, an alternate form of the gain computation is required.
When the number of measurements is large, and the measurement noises are independent
(diagonal Rk) it is more efficient to use the "information form" of the gain computation:
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(p-l)+ = (pl)- + HT R' Hk (18)
Kk = (P)+HkT R-1 (19)
This form can be readily applied to the iterated EKF update described above.
Although the covariance update must now be done inside the loop, the required matrix
inversion is only n-by-n, where n is the number of states (model parameters). The
number of floating-point operations required now scales linearly with r and cubically
with n. Section 7.6.5 presents an analysis of the filter computational requirements.
Multiple-Microburst Form. As discussed above, several model microbursts can
be superimposed to simulate a more complex windfield. In this case, 5 new states are
added for each additional model microburst. For i microbursts, the full state vector, x, is
defined as:
x =[xTb, Xb,2 .. Xb,i UO Uh Vo Vh] (20)
where:
Xmb,i =[X,i y,i Um,i Rpi Zm,i]T  (21)
In the simulations discussed below, one- and two-microburst forms are used.
Initialization. This algorithm can incorporate multi-sensor data, given that the
microburst has previously been detected. The assumption is made that a single sensor has
detected the event and produced an initial parameter estimate with the associated error
covariance. The initialization algorithm therefore depends on the measurement
characteristics of the initial sensor. The general process, however, is the same for all
sensors. Quantities that can be directly measured are estimated from the initial data set,
and quantities which are unobservable are initialized using statistics derived from
microburst field studies.
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For example, if a TDWR initially detects a microburst, estimates of maximum
outflow speed (Um), outflow radius (Rp), and core position (xo,yo) can be derived from
the measured radial flowfield. The outflow depth Zm is an unobservable parameter, and
must be initialized from statistics. Outflow depth statistics have been tabulated by Biron
and Isaminger [1991] for 26 Colorado microbursts, and the mean altitude of maximum
outflow velocity was found to be 109 meters. This value was used to initialize the filter
for the simulations discussed below, in which TDWR was always assumed to make the
initial detection. The initial covariance matrix was diagonal, and values were chosen
based on sensor resolution criteria or statistics where possible.
7.6.3 IEKF Update Simulation
The first step in algorithm evaluation was to determine if the iterated EKF update
procedure was capable of incorporating sensor data (as modeled by small subsets of the
complete windfield) and producing reasonable extent and intensity estimates. The TASS
simulated winds were considered to be the "truth" winds, and simulated sensor data
subsets were taken from them. Assuming that the windfield was frozen in time (or
alternatively, no time has lapsed between measurement sets), different combinations of
sensor data were used sequentially to update the current estimate. Three sensors were
considered in this way: (1) TDWR data, (2) winds measured from the aircraft by
differencing inertial and air data measurements (referred to henceforth as INS data), and
(3) airborne Doppler radar (ABDR) data.
For TDWR and ABDR data, it was assumed that the sensor was far enough from
the microburst that radial wind measurements could be considered parallel to each other,
and that the antenna tilt angle was horizontal so that all data was taken at the same
altitude. For example, for an eastward-looking radar, the We components of the TASS
windfield at a single altitude comprised the working data set (Figure 7.7). TDWR
measurements were taken at an altitude of 82 m AGL (the lowest TASS data altitude) for
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both eastward- and northward-looking cases, and ABDR measurements were taken from
177 m and 283 m AGL TASS data. In all cases, gaussian zero-mean white noise with a
standard deviation of 1 m/s was added to the "truth" data to simulate measurement noise
based on TDWR accuracy specifications [Campbell, 1992]. All radar data sets were
taken at 400 m range and azimuth resolution. Note that the approximation of parallel
measurements was made for numerical simplicity here. The algorithm can be used with
radial measurements of arbitrary elevation and azimuth angles also (see Appendix C.2).
microburst region
N radial4 beams
Doppler
sensor
Figure 7.7. Measurement geometry for simulated Doppler measurements. Eastward-looking sensor
shown. Radial measurements are approximately parallel and constant-altitude inside the microburst region.
Aircraft winds (INS data sets) consisted of 3-component winds (WxE, WyE, Wh)
along a straight, constant-altitude flight path. Four 200m resolution INS data sets were
defined, including eastward and northward flight paths at 177 m and 283 m AGL. All
paths passed through the center of the windfield, as marked by the x on the left-hand plot
in Figure 7.5. The measurement noise standard deviation used for aircraft wind
measurements was 1.4 mrn/s.
For simulation purposes, it was assumed that TDWR made the initial microburst
detection. Therefore, the first step was to initialize the filter as previously described, and
then apply the iterated EKF update to incorporate the TDWR measurement. The resultant
parameter estimate and error covariance was saved. Then the estimate was updated by
incorporating either an INS data set or an ABDR data set, starting with the saved
parameter estimate and covariance matrix. Twelve total sensor fusion cases were tested
with both one-microburst and two-microburst versions of the filter.
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Single-Microburst Filter. For all cases tested, the iteration procedure used in the
update converged in 3 to 5 iterations. Results for four representative cases are presented
here:
(1) Initialization only: Eastward-looking TDWR measurements alone (denoted
TDWR-E)
(2) The results of (1) were updated using a sequence of eastbound aircraft-measured
winds taken at an altitude of 177 m AGL (denoted INS-E)
(3) The results of (1) were updated using a sequence of northbound aircraft-
measured winds taken at an altitude of 177 m AGL (denoted INS-N)
(4) The results of (1) were updated using northward-looking airborne Doppler radar
data at 177 m AGL (denoted ABDR-N)
The extent results are good (Table 7.4), and illustrate the effect of fusing data
from sensors with different measurement geometries. The extent figure-of-merit for
TDWR-East is 0.85, and does not improve when an eastward path of INS data is
incorporated. However, when northbound INS data or northward-looking airborne radar
data is incorporated, the extent figure-of-merit increases to the .91 to .92 range. Since the
microburst is not exactly symmetric in extent (it is slightly larger in the north-south
direction), incorporation of northward-looking data increases the radius parameter in the
OBV model to cover more area. This is equal to the performance achieved by the least-
squares fit computation.
Table 7.4. Extent figures-of-merit: 1-microburst time-invariant data fusion.
TDWR-E TDWR-E TDWR-E TDWR-E
alone + INS-E + INS-N + ABDR-N
0.853 0.853 0.911 0.917
The effect of multi-directional data is also visible in the intensity results (Figure
7.8). As with the least-squares results, it is clear that the single-microburst model cannot
match intensity with the complex windfield of this microburst. The TDWR-alone result
is low, and incorporating an eastbound path of INS data actually lowers the estimate; this
is because the path does not cross both regions of high vertical windspeed. Incorporating
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a northbound path of INS data or the ABDR data improves the estimate significantly at
the higher altitudes (at which the INS and ABDR measurements are taken). The low-
altitude intensity estimates remain low, probably due to two factors: (1) no further low-
altitude data has been incorporated, and (2) the one-microburst model does not have
enough degrees of freedom to fit the intensity well at all altitudes.
0.20
X
& 0.16
0.12
S0.08
0 TASS data
* TDWR-East (82m AGL)
0.04 - TDWR-E + INS-E @ 177m AGL
A TDWR-E + INS-N @ 177m AGL
x TDWR-E + ABDR-N @ 177m
S 0 .0 0  I
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Altitude AGL (m)
Figure 7.8. Intensity estimation - 1-microburst time-invariant data fusion
Two-Microburst Filter. The two-microburst version of the filter involved
significantly more computation, since in general more iterations were required than for
the single-microburst filter. Also, some cases did not converge consistently and required
adjustment of the initial parameters. However, when the two-microburst filter did
converge, the results were good. Extent figures-of-merit were between 0.85 and 0.90 for
all cases. Figure 7.9 shows eastward intensity values for the algorithm applied to three
cases:
(1) northward-looking TDWR data alone (TDWR-N)
(2) TDWR-N updated with eastward aircraft-measured winds taken at 177 m AGL
(INS-E)
(3) TDWR-N fused northward-looking airborne radar data at 283 m AGL (ABDR-N).
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Although the TDWR is looking north and the intensity values shown are for
eastbound paths, the results for TDWR data alone are fairly good. There is some
overestimation at high altitudes. Inclusion of ABDR data with the same look angle as the
TDWR (northward) improves the results slightly. As expected, inclusion of the
eastbound INS data provides a second measurement direction and produces the best
intensity estimates.
0.24
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IL M TASS data
0.04 * TDWR-N + INS-E @ 177m AGL
A TDWR-N + ABDR-N @ 283m AG'
m 0.0 0 1
0 100 200 300
Altitude AGL (m)
Figure 7.9. Intensity estimation - 2-microburst time-invariant data fusion
7.6.4 Full Iterated EKF Simulation
The third part of the algorithm evaluation was to include the microburst dynamic
model (the propagation part of the filter) and apply the technique to time-varying data.
For this analysis, data was taken from three different times in the evolution of the 7/11/88
microburst event. The three data sets were spaced two minutes apart, where the middle
data set corresponds to the time-invariant data set used in the previous section and
represents the time at which the microburst was strongest.
The time spacing for this data was larger than desired, since TDWR data is
updated at one minute intervals and airborne radar data would be available even more
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frequently. However, it was still possible to construct illustrative examples. The
following three sample cases assume that initial detection is made with northward-
looking TDWR. Two minutes later, three different events are postulated:
Case 1. A sequence of eastbound aircraft-measured winds is downlinked to the
ground and incorporated along with a second set of TDWR data.
Case 2. An aircraft traveling northbound receives the previous TDWR estimate and
updates using an airborne Doppler radar.
Case 3. An aircraft traveling eastbound receives the previous TDWR estimate and
updates using an airborne Doppler radar.
At the third time step (+4 minutes), the parameter set is passed to the ground and
an updated with another set of TDWR data. The data sets were derived in the same way
as for the time-invariant cases, and the estimate and error covariance were propagated
between measurements as described above. These cases were run for both one and two-
microburst versions of the filter.
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Figure 7.10. Extent figures-of-merit and eastbound intensity estimates for one-microburst filter
One-microburst filter. The extent figures-of-merit (Figure 7.10, left) are fairly
good (> 0.82) through the first two times, but are slightly lower (0.76) in the third time
step. This is due to the distorting effect of an adjacent, weaker microburst on the shape of
the primary microburst. The axisymmetric model used in the filter cannot represent this
situation very accurately. There is little difference between the three sample cases.
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The intensity results (Figure 7.10, right) are similar to those from the single-
microburst time-invariant runs, in that all of the estimates are low. As evident from the
"TASS data" curve, the actual microburst increases in strength in the first two minute
span and then decreases in the last two minutes. Only in case 3, in which northbound
TDWR measurements were combined with eastbound ABDR measurements, was the
filter able to follow this trend. The low estimates are most likely due to difficulties
matching this complex microburst with the single-microburst filter. However, the
intensity results were somewhat sensitive to the choice of process noise strength, which
indicates a need for further study of microburst time dynamics.
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Figure 7.11. Extent figures-of-merit and eastbound intensity estimates for two-microburst filter
Two-microburst filter. The two-microburst algorithm produced mixed results
(Figure 7.11). In the first time step (which was the same for all cases) the estimate was
good in both intensity and extent. At the second time step, the case 1 intensity estimate
was low as in the one-microburst case. The case 2 estimate, however, was significantly
better than for the one-microburst case, and this continued at the third time step. For both
cases, the extent estimates were roughly the same as for the one-microburst runs.
The case 3 data produced the best estimates for the one-microburst filter. When
processed with the two-microburst filter, the update iterations at the second time-step did
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not converge. Instead, the estimate cycled between two possible solutions. This is
indicative of numerical robustness problems in the two-microburst filter, and will be
further discussed later.
7.6.5 Computational Requirements
The computational requirements for the IEKF algorithm were tabulated in terms
of floating point operation count. Figures 7.12 and 7.13 demonstrate the advantage
gained by using the information form of the filter update rather than the standard form.
The floating point operation count is for one filter step (propagation and update) with 5
iterations. For the one-microburst filter (9 states), it requires less computation to use the
information form when the number of measurements (r) is 8 or greater. For the two-
microburst filter (14 states) the information form is better when r 2 11. For all of the
simulation cases, the number of measurements was sufficiently large that the information
form was used.
One-microburst filter, 5 iterations
200000
175000
150000 ----
125000 - - - - --000 standard form
100000S10000 information form
7 5 0 0 0 - -------.. .. . .. ... .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. ... .. ... .. . .. .. .
S 75000
25000 -
0-
0 5 10 15 20
No. of Measurements
Figure 7.12. Computational burden for the standard and information forms of the IEKF update,
applied to the one-microburst (9-state) filter.
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Two-microburst filter, 5 iterations
300000
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S 200000
t standard form
* 150000150000 information form
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0-0
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No. of Measurements
Figure 7.13. Computational burden for the standard and information forms of the IEKF update,
applied to the two-microburst (14-state) filter.
The total computational burden scales approximately linearly with the number of
measurements when the information form is used. In either form, the burden also
increases linearly with the number of iterations. Figures 7.14 and 7.15 are plots of the
floating point operations (FLOPS) count for large numbers of measurements. For 100
measurements, the counts range from 142,000 FLOPS for a one-microburst, three
iteration filter up to 764,000 for a two-microburst, seven-iteration filter.
One-microburst filter (9 states)
2000-
1600
5N 3 iterationsS 1200- 5 iterations
7 iterations
400 - - --------------- ------------
J~~~~~ ~~~ --------- -- .... ...; ""
[- 0
0 50 100 150 200 250
No. of Measurements
Figure 7.14. Computational burden for large numbers of measurements - one-microburst filter.
Floating point operation counts for 3, 5, and 7 iteration update procedures are shown. The information
form of the update is used.
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Two-microburst filter (14 states)
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Figure 7.15. Computational burden for large numbers of measurements - two-microburst filter.
Floating point operation counts for 3, 5, and 7 iteration update procedures are shown. The information
form of the update is used.
7.6.6 Computation of Alerting Parameters
The model-based algorithm is well suited for producing the graphical iconic
multi-level displays that were found effective in the part-task simulator experiments
(Chapter 5). The extent polygons used here to evaluate estimation efficiency would be
used directly as icon shapes. For the one-microburst filter, this is especially
straightforward as the extent "polygon" is actually a circle centered on (xo, Yo) with
radius Rp.
For intensity, the averaged F factor is an effective hazard criterion (Section 6.2).
Although F-factors for several altitude and directions were tabulated to look at estimation
accuracy, it would be necessary to assign a single hazard value to a given microburst. A
practical approach would be to select the largest hazard value, over all directions and
altitudes, below a specified maximum altitude.
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7.6.7 Discussion of Algorithm Characteristics
The simulations demonstrate the potential usefulness of the IEKF technique,
particularly for estimating the size and position of the microburst hazard region. Several
other characteristics of the algorithm were also observed during the simulation runs,
although it should be noted that the use of computational data for a single historical
microburst event limits the scope of the conclusions that can be drawn.
The single-microburst algorithm appeared to be numerically robust. Errors in
initial conditions and reasonable variations in choice of filter parameters did not produce
filter instability in either the time-invariant or the time-varying simulations. The two-
microburst form, however, was numerically sensitive. In several cases the filter diverged
during the update iteration, and choice of parameters such as the initial covariance matrix
appeared to have a large impact on the convergence properties of the filter. In cases
where convergence was reached the results tended to be dependent on the actual
windfield shape. When the windfield had two clear downdraft centers, the convergence
was steady and the results for both intensity and extent were good. In cases where there
was only one region of high downdraft (such as the first time-step of TASS model data)
then the two sets of microburst parameters either became coincident, or one microburst
became very weak. In addition, the covariance matrix elements corresponding to the
unnecessary microburst parameters grew very large.
Possible solutions to this problem include more intelligent initialization based on
recognized windfield features, or running multiple filters of different types in parallel. In
any case, the improved intensity estimation possible with the two-microburst filter must
be weighed against the associated numerical difficulties. It should also be noted that the
wind data used to evaluate the algorithm was more widely spaced in time than for any
planned or operational sensor system, which had an adverse effect on estimation
accuracy.
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Aside from numerical robustness, there are other implementation issues to be
considered. The computational requirements of the filter were assessed, and can be quite
large when large numbers of measurements are incorporated. Computational load can be
decreased by thinning large data sets, at the expense of estimation accuracy. Also,
datalink bandwidth needs to be considered. A model parameter list of 9 elements, for
example, has an associated 81 element covariance matrix (of which only 45 are unique).
It is likely that the entire covariance matrix is not necessary to initialize the next update
step, and that some elements could be omitted without appreciable loss of performance.
Although the algorithm has been presented in the context of multi-sensor data
assimilation, it does not require multiple sensors. Benefits would still be gained if it were
used with a single sensor due to the additional information incorporated in the analytical
model (correct fluid dynamics, empirical microburst data). A possible single sensor
application would be estimation of vertical winds from Doppler sensor data.
7.6.8 Adapting the Algorithm to Other Measurement Problems
Although the IEKF algorithm was implemented for measurement of microburst
characteristics, it can be readily generalized to other atmospheric phenomena. The
fundamental estimation procedure is unchanged. The system model equations (7.7),
(7.8), and (7.9) must be rewritten for the new problem. The following elements are
required:
* A parametric analytical model of the phenomenon of interest, which satisfies
essential physical relationships (such as fluid dynamic mass continuity). The
model must include once-differentiable equations relating the available
measurements to the model parameters:
-> used to determine x, u, A, B, hk, Hk
* Statistical data on characteristics of the phenomenon which can be used to
establish process noise parameters and initial conditions:
-> used to determine L, Q, u, x(to), P(to)
* Statistical characteristics of the measurement process:
-> used to determine Rk
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From this point forward, the equations in Section 7.6.2 can be applied in the same
fashion as for microburst estimation. The choice of filter computation form (i.e. standard
gain computation vs. information form) would have to be reevaluated for the specific
application.
7.7 Conclusions
A recursive model-based data assimilation technique for multi-sensor microburst
hazard assessment was presented. A simple analytical microburst model is used to
approximate the actual windfield, and a "best" set of model parameters are estimated
from measured winds using an extended Kalman filtering technique. The resulting
parameter estimate and associated error covariance encapsulate the current state of
knowledge about the actual windfield, and can be used to compute estimates of
microburst position, extent, and intensity for alert generation. The technique takes
advantage of fluid dynamic relationships and statistical data from past microburst field
studies to aid the estimation process.
Simulated measurements for three types of sensors were derived from a time-
varying computational model of a historical microburst event. Two forms of the data
assimilation algorithm were then tested, one using a single-microburst model and one
using superposition of two model microbursts to represent the windfield. It was found
through both time-invariant and time-varying simulations that both forms of the
algorithm were able to estimate the position and extent of the simulated microburst well.
The single-microburst model tended to underestimate microburst intensities. The two-
microburst model produced better intensity estimates, but suffered from numerical
robustness problems. Computational requirements for the algorithm were also assessed
as functions of filter complexity and number of wind measurements.
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8. System-Level Implementation Issues
8.1 Overview
In this work, the microburst alerting process was examined as three major
subtasks: Measurement, Alert Generation, and Alert Application (Figure 8.1). A user-
centered approach was taken to identify and study critical system design issues for each
of these subtasks.
Alert
Application
Alert
Generation
Measurement
User Action
Present to User
Format + Disseminate
Alert
Information
Alert Production
Hazard Assessment
Estimated Microburst
Characteristics
Data Assimilation
Data Collection
Chapter 4:
* Terminal Area Windshear
Survey
Chater 5:
* Comparison of Cockpit
Presentation Modes
* Evaluation of Graphical
Microburst Alert Displays
Cha Selectioner 6:
* Selection of Hazard Criteria
Selection of Hazard
Thresholds
Chater 7:
Model-Based Multi-Sensor
Data Assimilation
Figure 8.1. Microburst alerting task and research breakdown. The studies related to each subtask are
listed at right.
Section 8.2 reviews the user-centered research approach, and examines the
relationship between user-centered design and overall system performance. The
implications of the research in this report for existing and future systems is then
examined on a system-by-system basis in Sections 8.3, 8.4, and 8.5.
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8.2 User-Centered Application of the Research
8.2.1 Requirements Flow-down between Design Studies
The end users for microburst alerts are flight crews and ATC personnel; in this
work, flight crew alerting was emphasized. In keeping with a user-centered, top-down
approach, the alert application task was addressed first. The results of the alert generation
work produced functional requirements and objectives for the alert generation studies,
and the multi-sensor data assimilation study was driven by results from both the alert
application and the alert generation studies. In this way, the decision-making needs of
the flight crew, at the logical end of the alerting process, ultimately affected the
requirements for all of the microburst alerting subtasks.
The result of this research approach, therefore, is to provide useful design data for
the alerting subtasks with the overall goal of optimizing crew decision-making efficiency.
This result is directly related to microburst alerting system operational performance, and
will be discussed below.
8.22 Relationship of User-Centered Design to Operational Efficiency
A critical design tradeoff for microburst alerting systems is the conflict between
airport operational efficiency and safety. At one extreme, a microburst alerting system
can be designed to maximize safety by halting all airport operations whenever
microbursts are detected in the airport vicinity. For a busy airport with high incidence of
microburst activity, this would have an unacceptably large impact on operational
efficiency. For example, during the 1989 TDWR Operational Evaluation at Denver's
Stapleton Airport, wind shear events were detected within 5 nm of the airport during 19
of the 32 days of TDWR operation [Weber, et. al., 1991]. Clearly, the potential safety
improvements provided by a microburst alerting system must be balanced against
operational needs and constraints.
151
This can be stated as a system goal; the system should be designed to achieve the
best airport operational efficiency possible while maintaining a high level of safety.
Operational efficiency is improved for a given level of safety by improving alerting
efficiency, which can be defined as the capability of the alerting system to usefully
convey the required alert information to end users. When end users, either ATC or flight
crews, are alerted inefficiently, then decision-making performance is poor. This limits
the achievable airport operational efficiency for a given level of safety, since a large
degree of conservatism must be built into alert response procedures, and unnecessary
missed approaches or delayed takeoffs will occur. Good alerting efficiency, therefore, is
directly related to achievable operational efficiency. Good alerting efficiency is also a
direct consequence of the user-centered design approach, which is based on enhancing
user decision-making performance.
8.2.3 Applying the Research
Application of the research results to real alerting systems should therefore be
done with the intent of improving the usefulness and timeliness of the information given
to users, in order to improve alerting efficiency and hence operational efficiency. For
existing systems, where the system architecture is fixed, modifications must be made on
the subtask level with an eye toward improving user decision-making performance and
thus alerting efficiency. For new microburst alerting systems, however, the user-centered
design approach can be applied from the start. In this case, the desired alerting system
operational efficiency can be specified in terms of requirements for alerting accuracy,
presentation, and timeliness. Subsystems can then be designed in top-down fashion, in
which the requirements flow down task-by-task from alert application to measurement.
In the following three sections, the implications of the research are discussed for
an existing system (TDWR/LLWAS), a near-term system (Airborne predictive) and
future integrated microburst alerting systems.
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8.3 Implications of the Research for the TDWR/LLWAS Alerting System
The development of Terminal Doppler Weather Radar and enhanced LLWAS has
greatly improved ground-based microburst detection capabilities. Both of these systems
have demonstrated good performance in detecting microbursts. However, field
experiences and other studies have indicated a number of system implementation
problems including overwarning and inefficient alert dissemination (see Section 2.5.2).
Application of the research documented in this report could help alleviate these problems.
8.3.1 Potential TDWR/LLWAS Improvements
Graphical Cockpit Presentation of Microburst Alerts. The ground-based TDWR
and LLWAS systems currently rely on verbal flight crew alerting (although ATC is
alerted with multi-level graphic displays). The work in this report indicates that there
would be several potential benefits to changing to graphical flight crew alerting. The
presentation mode simulator experiment (Section 5.3) indicated that graphical alerts are
preferred by pilots, and lead to better decision-making and lower workload than verbal or
textual alert presentations. The windshear survey and part-task simulator experiments
also provided recommendations about graphical alert content and format to aid the alert
design process.
Furthermore, graphical alerts could help alleviate the overwarning problem due to
laterally offset microbursts (see Figure 2.7). The position of the alert icon would inform
the crew when microbursts are actually displaced from the flight path, and therefore
eliminate the perception of these situations as false alarms. Finally, graphical alerts
which have been disseminated by datalink would be less likely to be missed or
misinterpreted, as were the verbal alerts issued during the July 11, 1988 microburst event
(see Section 2.5.2).
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F-Factor Based Alert Generation. The work in Chapter 6 indicates that changing
to an F-factor based alerting strategy would improve alerting efficiency. The hazard
criterion for current ground-based systems is "delta-V," the peak measured headwind-to-
tailwind change through the microburst. This quantity was shown in Chapter 6 to be a
poor predictor of aircraft performance degradation and may therefore be partly
responsible for the TDWR perceived overwarning problem. Averaged F-factor was best
correlated with aircraft performance, and would be a better choice. However, F is not
directly measureable since TDWR and LLWAS do not measure vertical winds. In
addition, the airspeed (required for computation of the horizontal component of F-factor)
of a given aircraft is not necessarily known by ground-based systems and must be
assumed. This could be overcome either by inferring downdraft speed from shear
measurements [Vicroy, 1992], advanced data assimilation techniques (such as the one
proposed in Chapter 7), or simply by using mean shear as the hazard criterion. Although
mean shear was not as effective as averaged F-factor, it showed significantly better
performance than "delta-V" and can be directly computed from TDWR radial wind
measurements.
Redefinition of the Alert Structure. The TDWR alert structure has two primary
levels (see Section 2.5.2), "wind shear with loss" for low-intensity microbursts and
"microburst alert" for hazardous microbursts. In addition, the measured "delta-V" is
directly reported as a numerical value, rounded to the nearest 5 knots. The two primary
levels can be interpreted in terms of recommended procedures. On approach to landing,
for example, the primary decision is whether or not to abort the approach. A less drastic
response to reported wind shear is to make the approach with increased airspeed. In the
TDWR alert structure, "wind shear with loss" is an advisory alert (increase airspeed, stay
alert), and a "microburst alert" should force a missed approach.
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Recall that a three-level structure was found useful for decision-making purposes
in the second part-task simulator experiment (Section 5.4). Although the three different
levels did not necessarily correspond to different recommended response procedures, the
implicit intensity trends available from the changing alert levels were found useful by the
subjects. Some subjects wanted more than three levels due to this effect. The horizontal
wind change ("delta-V") numbers would appear to accomplish this, but are ineffective
because "delta-V" correlates poorly with aircraft trajectory degradation (see Section 6.2)
and therefore is not very useful for comparing relative strengths of microbursts as aircraft
hazards.
The alert structure could therefore be improved by using a better hazard criterion
and defining an alert structure, including three (or possibly more) levels, which is related
better to aircraft performance and thus provides good intensity trends. Also, the two-
level procedural structure currently used could be preserved by grouping alert levels into
"advisory" levels indicating that caution is required, and "executive" levels which require
evasive actions. The technique developed in Section 6.3 for threshold evaluation could
be applied to establish this structure, and gain the accuracy benefits of basing alert
thresholds directly on aircraft performance.
Model-Based Data Assimilation. If the TDWR hazard criterion was changed to
F-factor, vertical wind velocities would need to be estimated. In theory, the model-based
data assimilation technique (Chapter 7) could be used accomplish this. The technique
could also be used for TDWR/LLWAS data fusion, to take advantage of the improved
measurement geometry produced by combining the radial TDWR measurements with the
two-dimensional LLWAS wind measurements. However, the TDWR system is currently
in the deployment phase, and the amount of work required to develop a robust, proven
model-based data assimilation algorithm is clearly prohibitive. The model-based
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technique will therefore be discussed later in the context of future integrated microburst
alerting systems (Section 8.5).
8.3.2 TDWR/LLWAS Implementation Issues
The possible improvements discussed above are subject to technical and
economic constraints. Implementation issues associated with each of these possible
improvements are considered below.
Equipment Issues for Graphical Alerting. Implementation of graphical microburst
alerting is dependent primarily on the availability of a digital datalink and suitable
electronic displays in the cockpit. Digital datalink technology advances are being driven
by several factors in addition to microburst alerting (see Section 2.3) and will continue to
rapidly develop. New generations of transport aircraft will almost certainly have
electronic flight instrumentation. However, many currently flying transport aircraft do
not have EFIS and will not be retro-fitted for economic reasons. Alerts for these aircraft
must either continue to be verbally delivered or displayed by dedicated datalink
hardware. Even on currently operational EFIS-equipped aircraft, significant software
modifications would be required to allow display of datalinked alerts on an installed
EHSI. While technically feasible, this may be prohibitively expensive for some aircraft
types.
Impact of Graphical Alerting on Procedures. In addition, the procedural
implications of graphical alerting observed in the part-task simulator experiments
(Section 5.4) indicate that current microburst alert procedures would need to be
reevaluated in order to use graphical alerting. Currently, TDWR alerts are only issued for
microbursts which are less than one-half mile from the approach or takeoff courses. If
pilots are given a graphical microburst display, and refuse to pass within several miles of
any icon, then this procedure would have to be reevaluated. Microbursts which lie more
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than one-half mile from the approach or takeoff courses would begin to cause additional
missed approaches and delayed takeoffs, degrading airport operational efficiency.
Similarly, it was found that pilots were unwilling to pass through a microburst icon even
while climbing out on the missed approach. This may place a difficult burden on ATC to
maintain safe separation when microbursts occur, since aircraft will be more likely to
initiate lateral avoidance maneuvers.
This problem may be reduced by improved training and experience. At altitudes
of more than 2000 feet, especially if the aircraft is climbing in a go-around configuration,
microbursts are not a strong threat. Therefore, when a missed approach is initiated
several miles prior to microburst penetration, the aircraft can cross the microburst region
with little difficulty. Guidelines for when a straight-ahead missed approach is acceptable
should be clearly defined and justified to flight crews. Guidelines for when a lateral
maneuver is acceptable should also be defined, and rules for initiation of lateral
microburst avoidance maneuvers should be part of both ATC and flight crew procedures
and training.
F-Factor Based Alerting Issues. The barrier to changing the TDWR/LLWAS
system to an F-factor based hazard criterion is primarily economic. TDWR systems are
currently in the production phase, and major software changes would be expensive.
Improving hazard assessment, however, could produce significant benefits. More
accurate hazard assessment would enhance airport operational efficiency, since it would
allow a finer line to be drawn between hazardous and non-hazardous microbursts. Poor
hazard assessment requires a larger safety margin since insignificant microbursts will be
misidentified as hazardous ones, and unnecessarily interfere with flight operations. A
cost-benefit analysis of conversion to F-based alerting is required to resolve this issue.
Establishing Alerting Thresholds. If a new alerting structure based on a better
hazard criterion were adopted, the alert threshold determination technique developed in
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Section 6.3 could be directly applied. Ground-based systems do not have complete
knowledge of the aircraft characteristics, so alert thresholds would have to be defined by
aircraft class. This implies a conservative alerting strategy, since the lowest-performance
aircraft of a given class will define the alert thresholds. The design tradeoff is in
segmenting aircraft into classes. Choosing fewer aircraft classes implies a simpler, but
more conservative alerting process. A reasonable approach would be to define three
major classes: (1) jet transports, (2) commuter-class aircraft (multi-engine turboprop) and
(3) general aviation aircraft. Note that the hazard threshold computation technique would
also work for "delta-V", but the results would be less useful due to the poor correlation of
"delta-V" with aircraft performance.
8.4 Implications of the Research for Airborne Predictive Alerting Systems
Airborne microburst alerting systems based on forward-look (predictive) sensors
will be feasible in the next few years, as these sensors complete the FAA certification
process. Since alerting systems based on these sensors are still under development,
implementation of the research presented here would be easier than for ground-based
systems.
8.4.1 Research Applications
The benefits of applying the research to airborne predictive alerting systems are
mostly identical to the ones cited in Section 8.3.1 for TDWR and LLWAS, since the
research was not done in the context of a specific sensor system. Graphical multi-level
alerting is also recommended for airborne predictive systems, and the procedural and
training issues discussed in Section 8.3.2 also apply. The alert threshold computation
procedure can be used to produce an alert structure tied closely to aircraft performance.
The model-based data assimilation technique could potentially be used for multi-sensor
fusion and to infer vertical windspeeds for Doppler sensors, although, as for TDWR,
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near-term implementation is unlikely. Although the research applications are similar, the
implementation issues for airborne systems are different than for TDWR and LLWAS.
8.4.2 Airborne Predictive System Implementation Issues
Graphical Alerting Displays. Graphical alerting is a natural choice for airborne
systems, since alerts are generated onboard the aircraft and can be routed directly to
electronic cockpit instrumentation without resorting to a datalink. Standard airborne
weather radar systems, for example, already include a plan view color electronic display
for precipitation information. These could be adapted to display Doppler wind shear
information, and NASA and several manufacturers are currently exploring graphical
display options. The advantages of graphical alert presentation discussed for
TDWR/LLWAS systems (Section 8.3.1) are equally applicable to airborne predictive
systems, especially the desirability of alerting with multiple intensity levels. Airborne
sensors can update faster than TDWR, and therefore should produce better intensity trend
information.
F-Factor Based Hazard Assessment. Airborne Doppler forward-look sensors, like
TDWR, are unable to measure vertical winds. Current plans, however, are to compute F-
factor by inferring the vertical winds from horizontal shear measurements [Bowles, 1990;
Vicroy, 1992]. This technique is undergoing field evaluation. Also, airborne systems can
obtain the current airspeed and use it for F-factor computation.
Alert Structure. Again, the research in this report indicates that multiple-level
alerts are desirable. Establishing alert thresholds for airborne systems based on the
procedure presented in Section 6.3 is simpler than for ground systems, since the aircraft
type and even the immediate configuration and performance characteristics are known.
In addition, the accuracy of the results would be increased since the autopilot
characteristics of specific aircraft could be taken into account when simulating. Defining
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different threshold values for every aircraft type, however, may be excessively complex,
since aircraft dynamic characteristics also change with weight, configuration, and pilot
skill.
8.5 Implications of the Research for Advanced Integrated Microburst
Alerting Systems
8.5.1 The Need for Integrated Microburst Alerting
The demand for air travel worldwide is increasing, and the number of operational
jet transport aircraft flying will increase as well. Air Traffic Management (ATM)
systems of the future will handle larger numbers of aircraft, including higher aircraft
densities in terminal area airspace. The cost of issuing false microburst alerts will also
increase, since more aircraft will be affected. Also, effective alert dissemination,
presentation and response procedures will be even more important, since higher aircraft
densities will place a limit on the evasive actions which can be taken. In summary, there
will be strong motivation for improvements in microburst alerting.
Along with airspace crowding will come technological improvements in sensors,
ground-air datalinks, computational capabilities, and cockpit instrumentation. The
combination of technological improvements with the need for improved alerting leads to
the possibility of developing a truly integrated microburst alerting system, in which data
is continuously exchanged between airborne and ground-based systems in order to
optimize performance. Possible advanced microburst alerting system elements and routes
of information flow are illustrated in Figure 8.2.
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Figure 8.2. Advanced microburst detection and alerting system elements
8.5.2 Applicability of the Research
Since many of the technologies depicted in Figure 8.2 are not yet operational, the
configuration of future integrated alerting systems is still flexible. In fact, it is almost
certain that different subsets of sensor and datalink technologies will be available at
different airports, so the operational configuration of future systems should remain
flexible to take advantage of available measurement, computational, and dissemination
capabilities.
The research presented here is directly applicable to this configuration design
problem. Most of the work documented in the previous four chapters was in fact done
based on the assumption that the capabilities illustrated in Figure 8.2 would become
available. Results from these studies which are applicable to future integrated system
design are listed below:
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* A graphical, multi-level, iconic alert presentation was found to be an effective
decision-making tool for flight crews.
* Implications of graphical alerting for crew response procedures and training
were identified.
* The averaged F-factor hazard criterion correlates best with aircraft trajectory
degradation, and therefore should be the basis for multi-level alerting.
* A technique for establishing alerting hazard thresholds based on aircraft
performance was developed.
* A model-based estimation technique for multi-sensor, multi-platform data
assimilation was developed.
For design of an operational microburst alerting system, these results would be
applied with consideration of the capabilities and limitations of the sensors, data
communication systems, computers, and cockpit instrumentation available.
8.5.3 Integrated Alerting System Features
The exact configuration of future systems will depend heavily on the availability
and capabilities of new datalink and sensor technologies. However, it is possible to
identify in advance some areas in which there are potentially large gains in alerting
efficiency to be made.
Multi-Sensor. Multi-Platform Data Fusion. The hazard assessment accuracy of
TDWR, LLWAS, and planned airborne Doppler forward-look systems is fundamentally
limited by their inability to observe vertical winds. As demonstrated in Chapter 7, this
deficiency can be compensated by combining data from multiple sensors with
complementary measurement geometries. This may require frequent exchange of data
across between platforms, most likely between aircraft and ground-based sensors.
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The model-based data assimilation algorithm presented here would facilitate this
process, since it effectively encapsulates large amounts of data in a much shorter list of
model parameters. This is a strong advantage for information exchange between
platforms. Another advantage of the model-based technique is its ability to fit microburst
shapes (extent polygons) to measurements, which allows direct generation of iconic
graphical alerts.
The most important consideration for implementation of the data assimilation
technique is that the algorithm simulation results in Chapter 7 are not sufficient to
establish the performance and numerical robustness characteristics of the algorithm for
implementation on real systems. A significant amount of parameter adjustment and
simulations using real sensor data would be required. Before such a complex algorithm
could be approved for field use, its robustness would have to be conclusively
demonstrated.
The relatively high computational requirement of the algorithm is another
consideration. This would not be a critical issue for ground-based systems. The TDWR
system, for example, already uses several advanced computer workstations for data
processing, and the computation power of commercially available equipment continues to
rapidly increase. The computational requirements issue is more important for airborne
systems, since airborne computational capabilities are limited by volume and electrical
power constraints and are currently inferior to ground capabilities. It is reasonable,
however, to assume that future generations of aircraft will have significantly more
advanced computational hardware and that model-based data assimilation will become a
practical possibility.
Automated PIREPs. Pilot comments from the survey and during the part-task
simulations indicated that PIREPs are very important. With current equipment and
procedures, there are significant delays in the PIREP process. Pilots may not issue a
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report until after the completion of evasive action or wind shear recovery procedures, and
there is an additional delay incurred as the controller receives and verbally disseminates
the PIREP. With the advent of airborne microburst sensors and digital datalinks, it would
become possible for airborne systems to automatically broadcast a report when a
hazardous microburst is detected. These messages could be relayed to trailing aircraft
through a ground station (as in the Mode-S system) or broadcast directly to other aircraft.
Such a system would produce more timely PIREPs that could be displayed on the same
cockpit instrumentation as other sensor-based microburst alerts.
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9. Conclusion
9.1 User-Centered Microburst Alerting System Design
Microbursts have been a major cause of fatal air carrier accidents in the United
States. New developments in microburst sensing, ground-air digital data transmission, and
electronic cockpit instrumentation provide a plethora of options for design of an effective
microburst alerting system. The goal of a microburst alerting system is to prevent
microburst-related accidents while having a minimal effect on airport operational efficiency
and on flight crew and air traffic controller workload. In this work, a user-centered
approach was applied to identify and analyze critical system design issues in a series of
multidisciplinary studies.
The primary end users of microburst alerts are flight crews. Therefore, the first
task was to determine which information is required by the crew for effective microburst
alerting and the most effective presentation techniques for this information. This was done
with the Terminal Area Windshear Survey (Chapter 4) and with two piloted part-task
simulator experiments (Chapter 5). In Chapter 6, the issue of producing this required alert
information - the alert generation task - was addressed, given that microbursts could be
detected and their characteristics accurately measured. Next, a data assimilation technique
for estimating microburst characteristics from multi-sensor measurements was developed
(Chapter 7). Note that in this user-centered, top-down approach, the results of each study
formed objectives for following studies. Finally, application of the results of these studies
to current and future microburst alerting systems was discussed in Chapter 8.
The major results of this work are summarized in section 9.2. In addition, several
of the methods and techniques which were developed in the context of microburst alerting
also have potential applications to other problems. These methods are highlighted in
Section 9.3.
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9.2 Summary of Major Results
9.2.1 Cockpit Presentation of Microburst Alerts
The results from the Terminal Area Windshear Survey and the two piloted part-task
simulator studies relate to the alert application task, and can be categorized into several
groups. The first group concerns microburst alert presentation format:
* Iconic graphical presentation of alerts is more effective than either alphanumeric
or verbal presentation. Alphanumeric alert presentation, in particular, is to
be avoided. The EHSI was found to be an effective display for graphical
alerts.
* Microburst alerts must contain at a minimum intensity and position information.
Microburst motion and intensity trends may also be useful.
* Display of multiple microburst intensity levels appears to aid crew decision-
making, and contains implicit intensity trend information.
Several procedural implications of using graphical microburst alerts in the cockpit
were observed during the piloted simulations:
* The positional information contained in graphical alerts allowed crews to plan
and request lateral avoidance maneuvers for missed approaches in advance.
* When faced with an iconic graphical microburst alert on the approach course,
pilots made their decision to execute a missed approach approximately 4 nm
from the identified microburst region.
* Pilots appear to be unwilling to penetrate or pass within several miles of an
identified microburst region of any strength, and may make emergency
deviations to avoid such regions. This may complicate ATC's task of
maintaining safe aircraft separation.
One final point was apparent from survey results and pilot comments during
simulator runs, andhlas been reinforced by operational experiences:
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PIREPs of wind shear are critically important. A reliable system for PIREP
collection and distribution would improve alerting effectiveness.
It should be noted that ATC personnel did not take part in any of the studies, so the
above conclusions apply only to flight crew alerting.
9.2.2 Microburst Alert Generation
Two studies were related to the alert generation task. The goal of these studies was
to provide multi-level alert information which can be formatted, disseminated, and
presented as iconic graphical microburst alerts.
Comparison of Microburst Hazard Criteria. As described in Chapter 3, the alert
generation process requires a microburst "hazard criterion," a measureable quantity which
provides an indication of the microburst aviation hazard. A good hazard criterion should
correlate well with the impact of a microburst on an aircraft trajectory. A batch simulation
technique was developed to compare several candidate hazard criteria, with the following
results:
* Total headwind-to-tailwind change ("delta-V'"), used by the TDWR and
LLWAS systems, was not the best hazard criterion since it correlated poorly
with aircraft trajectory degradation.
* The "F-factor" hazard criterion, when averaged over 3000 feet (approx. 1 km)
along the flight path, is a good indication of microburst hazard and the best
overall criterion of those considered.
* "Mean shear", the total headwind-to-tailwind change divided by the distance
over which it occurs, is better than "delta-V" for the approach and landing
phase fo flight, but did not correlate as well with aircraft trajectory
degradation for the takeoff phase of flight.
A Technique for Establishing Multi-Level Alert Thresholds. Once a suitable hazard
criterion has been selected, an alert structure must be defined which is based on threshold
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values of the hazard criterion. A technique has been developed for determining microburst
alert hazard thresholds based on predicted aircraft performance loss. In this method, alert
levels are defined for specific levels of aircraft trajectory degradation. The relationship
between measured values of the hazard criterion and the level of aircraft trajectory
degradation is determined through flight simulation. The resulting relationship is then used
to select threshold values of the measureable hazard criterion which correspond to the
desired levels of aircraft trajectory degradation. The technique was demonstrated for the
specific case of jet transports on final approach. A three-level alert structure was
established, based on a trajectory degradation parameter which indicated whether or not the
approach should be aborted.
9.2.3 Model-Based Estimation of Microburst Characteristics
The above techniques for alert generation require good information about the
microburst windfield. A recursive model-based data fusion algorithm for multi-sensor
estimation of microburst hazard characteristics was developed to accomplish this. Its
capabilities were demonstrated via simulation. The algorithm approximates the actual
windfield with a simple analytical microburst model, and a "best" set of model parameters
are estimated from measured winds using an extended Kalman filtering technique. The
resulting parameter estimate and associated error covariance encapsulate the current state of
knowledge about the actual windfield, and can be used to compute estimates of microburst
position, extent, and intensity (hazard criterion values) for alert generation. The algorithm
takes advantage of fluid dynamic relationships and statistical data from past microburst field
studies to aid the estimation process. The technique has the following advantages:
* Quantities which cannot be directly measured can be inferred from the fluid
dynamic and statistical information in the model.
* Data from multiple sensors can be "fused" to alleviate problems due to poor
sensor geometry.
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* Large amounts of information are encapsulated by a small number of model
parameters, which is desirable for data transmission.
* Microburst extent and hazard criteria for iconic graphical alerts can be easily
computed from the estimated model parameters.
9.3 Extension of Methods and Techniques
Two techniques developed in the course of this microburst alerting research have
useful applications to other problems.
9.3.1 Evaluating Prototype Cockpit Systems Via Piloted Part-Task Simulation
The part-task piloted flight simulation approach developed to evaluate candidate
microburst alert formats has also been successfully used to study several other prototype
advanced cockpit information systems. The main features of the approach are summarized
below:
* The area of interest is the impact of advanced cockpit information systems on
pilot decision-making performance, workload, and situational awareness.
This allows a part-task approach in which outer-loop command and
guidance tasks are accurately simulated at the expense of realism in the
inner-loop flying task.
* The part-task approach brings a simplicity which greatly reduces experiment
development and setup time.
* The use of a workstation-class computer with advanced graphics capabilities
allows rapid prototyping of new systems and displays.
Other advanced cockpit information system concepts which have been studied using
this simulator include electronic instrument approach plates [Mykityshyn and Hansman,
1990], terrain awareness and alerting displays [Kuchar and Hansman, 1991], and ATC
routing amendment delivery via digital datalinks [Hahn and Hansman, 1992].
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9.3.2 Applying the Data Assimilation Algorithm to Other Measurement Problems
The model-based data assimilation algorithm discussed in Chapter 7 is a novel
application of estimation theory to meteorological measurement problems. Although it was
implemented for measurement of microburst characteristics, the essential structure of the
algorithm is quite general and can easily be adapted to other multi-sensor measurement
problems. The following elements are required:
* A parametric analytical model of the phenomenon of interest, which satisfies
essential physical relationships (such as fluid dynamic mass continuity).
The model must include once-differentiable equations relating the available
measurements to the model parameters.
* Statistical data on characteristics of the phenomenon which can be used to
establish filter initial conditions and process noise parameters.
* Statistical characteristics of the measurement process.
The advantages of the model-based technique, notably the benefits of sensor
fusion, the ability to infer quantities that cannot be directly measured, and the encapsulation
of large amounts of data in a short parameter list, are also general and would apply to the
new application also.
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Appendix A. Terminal Area Windshear Survey
The Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology is
currently doing research in low-level windshear detection and warning procedures, specifically the
transmission of windshear data from ground sensors to the flight crew. The first step in this
research is to conduct a survey of pilot opinions regarding current and possible future terminal
area windshear alert procedures.
Participation in this survey is completely voluntary. It is not necessary to give your name at any
point, and you may decline to answer any of the questions. All information obtained from any
individual survey will remain confidential. If you have any questions, feel free to contact :
Prof. R. John Hansman
Aeronautical Systems Laboratory
MIT Rm. 33-115
77 Massachusetts Ave.
Cambridge, MA 02139
(617) 253-2271
Please return this survey in the enclosed stamped envelope. Thank you for your time and
cooperation.
Transport Category Aircraft Flight Experience
Aircraft Type Position Apprx. Flight Hours
Approximate Total Flight Hours Over the Last Year
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A. Current Procedures
1) Terminal area windshear/microburst events pose a major safety hazard to transport category
aircraft.
1
disagree
strongly
disagree neither agree
nor disagree
4
agree
5
agree
strongly
2) How much confidence do you have in current ATIS-distributed microburst cautions and
forecasts?
no
confidence
3
moderate
confidence
5
total
confidence
3) Listed below are four currently available sources of information about windshear in the
terminal area. Please rank them in order of usefulness, from 1 (most useful) to 4 (least useful).
Low Level Windshear Alert System (LLWAS)
Pilot Reports (PIREPS)
Airborne Weather Radar
Visual Clues (Thunderstorms, Virga etc.)
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4) Here is a sample Low Level Windshear Alert (LLWAS) alert message:
Windshear alert. Centerfield wind 270 at 10. East boundary
wind 180 at 25.
a) How useful to you is the data content of LLWAS messages?
useless moderately
useful
b) Is the data presented in a clear and understandable format?
1 2 3 4
very confusing
c) How often does the data get to you in time to be of use?
5
very
useful
5
very clear
never about half of the time
d) LLWAS is an effective method of preventing hazardous
terminal area.
1 2 3 4
disagree disagree neither agree agree
strongly nor disagree
5
always
windshear encounters in the
5
agree
strongly
5) a) How effective is airborne weather radar for detection and avoidance of microbursts?
1 2 3 4 5
ineffective very effective
b) How often do you use your weather radar in the terminal area?
1 2 3 4 5
never about half of the time always
c) What are your reasons for using or not using weather radar in the terminal area?
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6) How much confidence do you have in pilot reports (PIREPS) of windshear?
1 2 3 4 5
no moderate total
confidence confidence confidence
7) Currently available windshear alert data is sufficient for safe operation in the terminal area.
1 2 3 4 5
disagree disagree neither agree agree agree
strongly nor disagree strongly
8) Given that new ground-based doppler weather radars can produce reliable windshear
information, a system to provide aircrews with better and more timely windshear alerts is
necessary.
1 2 3 4 5
disagree disagree neither agree agree agree
strongly nor disagree strongly
B. Future Windshear Warning Systems
1) Assuming windshear is detected by reliable ground-based sensors, how should this
information be relayed to the flight deck? Please rank in order of preference. (1 = most preferable,
5 = least preferable)
Voice (ATIS)
Voice (ATC)
Alphanumeric/Text uplink (similar to ACARS)
Graphical display of windshear location on EFIS display
Graphical display of windshear location on separate graphic device
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2) Assume a microburst has been detected which conflicts with your flight path in the vicinity of
the runway threshold. When should you be alerted? Please rank the following in order of
preference. (1 = most preferable, 5 = least preferable)
On ATIS
When entering terminal area (approx. 10000 ft. AGL)
When cleared for approach
At outer marker (approx. 2000 ft. AGL)
As soon as detected, whatever the aircraft location
3) Listed below are possible microburst locations. How important is it to be alerted for each
condition? Please rate each condition individually (i.e. don't rank them) on a scale of 1 to 4, where
1 indicates unimportant and 4 indicates critically important.
Anywhere within 5 nm of destination airport
Anywhere within 10 nm of destination airport
Anywhere within 25 nm of destination airport
Within 2 nm laterally of final approach path (inside marker) and runway
Within 2 nm laterally of final approach path (inside marker) and runway and on
published missed approach path
4) For the equipment that you most often fly (Type: ), what do you consider to
be the minimum head-to-tailwind component (i.e. airspeed loss) which requires a windshear
advisory? kts. What minimum component is required for a windshear warning?
kts.
5) A windshear alert could contain the following items of information. Please rank them in order
of importance. (1 = most important, 6 = least important)
Location Shape
Intensity Intensity Trends
Size Movement
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6) Improved ground-based systems can reliably detect windshear events and provide useful real-
time data. The responsibility for judging the threat due to a particular windshear event from the
available data should lie with; (choose one)
a) the controller
b) the pilot
Please comment briefly on your decision.
7) Have you ever had a potentially hazardous windshear encounter? If so, please describe it
briefly.
8) Please add any comments or suggestions you have.
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Appendix B. Jet Transport Simulation Model
B.1 Longitudinal Point-Mass Aircraft Model
The aircraft model used in the Chapter 6 simulation work was based on data
provided by David Hinton of NASA Langley Research Center. The model is for a
Boeing 737-100 aircraft. Since short-scale aircraft motions were not of interest in this
work, a two degree-of-freedom point-mass aircraft dynamic model was used in which
pitching motions were neglected. The equations of motion (see Nomenclature for symbol
definitions) were written as follows:
V = cos a - g sin a - Wx C osa - h sin y (B.1)
m m
Ya =l[ T sin a + - g cos a + W, sin a - Wh cos Ya (B.2)
x = V cos Ya + Wx (B.3)
h = V sin ya + Wh (B.4)
a =0 - Ya (B.5)
Lift and drag coefficients were given as functions of angle of attack, flap position,
and gear position. CL and CD for a given flap position were given by:
CL = Ao + Al a + A2 a 2  (B.6)
CD = Bo + B1 a + B2 a 2 + B3 a 3  (B.7)
where the angle of attack, a, is given in degrees. The A and B coefficients were
tabulated for the possible flap positions. For the lift coefficient, two sets of values were
given; one for a below a breakpoint value, and one for a above that value. This data is
given in Table B.1.
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Table B.1. Lift and drag coefficient data, Boeing 737-100 aircraft. Provided by David Hinton of
NASA Langley Research Center. AOA = angle of attack. Note that B values hold for all AOA. Flap
settings are in degrees.
Flaps AOA range Ag Al A, B0  B1  B2  B3
1 0.06 0.1121 -0.0001 0.03648 0.0006548 9.2532E-5 2.2186E-5
> 150 -2.03 0.4 -0.01
5 <14 0.19 0.1136 -0.0001 0.039 0.0028167 4.1667E-5 2.5E-5
> 140 0.50 0.09 0
10 0.1170 0.00009 0.05194 -0.00149 7.6563E-4 -2.6042E-6
> 140 -2.32 0.4867 -0.01333
15 <120 0.384 0.135 -0.0010 0.0516 0.006135 -1.5625E-5 2.8646E-5
> 120 -1.02 0.36 -0.01
25 < 9  0.50 0.1518 -0.00156 0.075 0.001764 9.01E-3 -7.3718E-62> 90 0.5025 0.16 -0.0025
< 110 0.9064 0.1452 -0.001630 0.119 0.00759 4.57E-4 5.075E-6If_ 110 0.275 0.2675 -0.0075
If the landing gear is extended, the following incremental drag coefficient is
added:
if f < 25,
CDGEAR = 0.0349 - 0.0006986 - 0.0006a
else,
CDGEAR = 0.059 - 0.00128f - 0.00126a
(B.8)
(B.9)
where 5f is the flap position. The "stick-shaker" angle-of-attack was given by the
following relation:
if 6f < 2,
ass = 12.0 + 4.9568f - 1.556f 2
else if 5f < 25,
else,
ass = 16.12 - 0. 2 18 6 6 f + 0.004725f 2
ass = 2 8 .8 5 -0. 9 3 56 f +0.0138f 2
(B.10)
(B.11)
(B.12)
For final approach simulation, the glideslope altitude deviation, d, was computed
from:
d = Vsin(Yi 
- YGS) where YGs = 30
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(B.13)
B.2 Control Laws for Correlation Studies
For the correlation studies, control laws were designed for both final approach and
takeoff/climbout.
Approach Tracking. The final approach controller was a two-loop system. The
inner loop was a two-input, two-output controller with proportional-plus-integral (PI)
compensation for direct airspeed and flight path angle command-following. The inner
loop structure is shown in Figure B.1. First-order lags were used to simulate the throttle
and pitch command responses.
Limited
Integrators
V error Gains K s + 0.5
Y error (2 x 2)
Command Actuator
Limits Dynamics
Prop.
Gains Kp 0.75K(2 x 2) 1 + 0.75
Figure B.1. Inner loop airspeed and flight path angle controller.
The gains for this loop were selected by an eigenstructure assignment technique.
The equations of motion B.1 and B.2 were linearized about a stabilized 30 glideslope
approach condition. Note that this linearization requires a non-linear iteration to compute
the trim conditions, oo and To, for a specified reference airspeed, Vo, and flight path
angle, Yo. For control design, winds are neglected and the wind-relative flight path angle,
Ya, is identically equal to the inertial flight path angle, yi. The linearized aircraft system
was written in state space form:
[v = A[]+ B[/] (B.14)
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-pSVoCDo pSVOCDa _ g
m 2m (B.15)
= -Too pSCLo gcosyo -To pSVoCL+  +
mV2 2m V2 mVo 2m
[ -PSV2CDa
B = 2m (B.16)
aog To pSVoCLa
Vo  mVo  2m
Note that the polynomial expressions for CD and CL were also linearized about the
trim angle of attack, such that:
CL - CLo + CLaa (B.17)
CD CDo +CDI (B.18)
The linearized aircraft model (B. 10) was augmented by the integrator channels in
the compensator to form a 4-state linear system for design:
y1 A I0 I %W] (B.19)
L'2  Z2J
The actuator dynamics were neglected in the design process. A full-state
feedback eigenstructure assignment technique as described by Andry, et. al. [1983] was
applied to compute the feedback gains. When full-state feedback is used on a system
with n states and m inputs: (1) all n poles can be arbitrarily specified, and (2) m entries of
each eigenvector can be arbitrarily chosen. For the system in B.18, all four poles can be
placed, and two elements of each eigenvector can be specified. This latter property was
used to decouple the airspeed and flight path angle channels, such that an airspeed change
command would not change the flight path angle and vice-versa. The dominant airspeed
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pole was chosen at (s = -0.2), and the dominant flight path pole was chosen at (s = -0.3).
The values in the feedback gain matrix were computed by solving a generalized
eigenvalue problem [Andry, et. al., 1983]. The final control law is shown below, with
definitions as used in Figure B. 1:
[(TWC = K + Kp Verror (B.20)
Oc'~:, Lz2 L Yerror
[ 0.0020 0.0881 [ 0.018 -0.5251
K -3.45 x 105  0.1831 Kp 0.0010 -0.012 (B.21)
An outer loop was then designed which fed back glideslope deviations to
commanded flight path angle (Figure B.2). Two different glideslope autopilots were
designed. Autopilot A used pure gain feedback, and autopilot B used a dynamic
compensator. The closed-loop characteristics for both autopilots are summarized in
Table B.2.
(Fig B.1)
V + V error Inner Loop T V
V,,f~A~CAII~ (_ A; . nI
Figure B.2. Glideslope tracking controller for hazard correlation study.
Table B.2. Glideslope tracking controller characteristics.
Autopilot Glideslope Compensator Dominant mode characteristics
(see Fig. B.2) Damping Ratio Frequency, rad/sec
A 0.1 0.65 0.16
B 1.35(s + 0. 3)(s + 0.5) 0.78 0.38
(s+ 1)2
Takeoff Control Strategy. In the takeoff and climbout runs, the aircraft was under
open-loop control. Maximum available thrust was applied at all times. During takeoff
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roll, the pitch angle was set to 80. The equation for airspeed (B. 1) was augmented by a
friction term, and with zero flight path angle during the takeoff roll becomes:
V= T cosa- D - g- L) (B.22)
m m m
where p. = 0.02 for rolling tires on a concrete runway [Layton, 1988]. When
rotation airspeed Vr was reached, the climbout trim pitch angle was commanded. The
trim pitch angle was chosen to achieve an airspeed of Vr + 15 knots. This pitch angle
was maintained during the climbout, unless the angle-of-attack fell to the stick shaker
angle-of-attack. In this case, the pitch angle was lowered to prevent stick shaker onset.
Rotation airspeed was given by the following table as a function of takeoff weight and
flaps:
Table B.3. Rotation airspeeds (KIAS) for Boeing 737-100 aircraft.
Takeoff Weight thousands of pounds)
Flaps 70 80 90 100 110
1 116 125 133 142 151
5 110 119 128 138 147
15 104 114 123 132 140
B.3 Generalized Equations of Motion
For the hazard threshold study (Section 6.3) the primary equations of motion were
rewritten as follows:
=g cosa - - sin -y cosy - W h in y. (B.23)
T pV 2CL9' = sin a + 2 - Cos T + , siny,- Wh COS Ya (B.24)V W 2 (W S)
In this form the aircraft wing loading (W/S) is specified rather than aircraft mass.
The linearized equations (B. 14 - B. 16) were also converted to this form. The
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approximate characteristics of 2, 3, and 4 engine jet transport aircraft, given in Table B.4,
were used with the above equations. Note that the wing loading at maximum landing
weight was assumed to be the same for all three aircraft types.
Table B.4. Generic jet transport model characteristics
No. of Wing Loading Approach Speed Excess Thrust-to-
Engines (lbf/sq. ft.) (KIAS) Weight Ratio
2 95.0 140 0.17
3 95.0 150 0.13
4 95.0 160 0.11
B.4 Approach Controller for Hazard Threshold Study
For computation of hazard threshold values, a more "typical" transport aircraft
controller was designed by classical multiloop techniques as described by Stevens and
Lewis [1992] and McRuer, Ashkenas, and Graham [1973]. The model equations were
linearized about a 30 glideslope approach, as before, and transfer functions were
computed from the control inputs (thrust-to-weight ratio, pitch angle) to the desired
controlled variables (airspeed, glideslope altitude error). The 3-engine transport approach
speed (150 knots) was used to trim the model for controller design.
Actuator dynamics were assumed to be first order for thrust and second order for
pitch angle. The pitch angle dynamics were chosen to be representative of a pitch angle
command system for a transport aircraft as described in the references [Stevens and
Lewis, 1992; McRuer, et. al., 1973]. The overall control structure is shown in Figure B.3.
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-- + 0.003 d
+ 3s2 + 3.68 s + 5.29
Glideslope Augmented
Coupler Gain Pitch Dynamics
Figure B.3. Airspeed and glideslope tracking system for the generic jet transport model.
The command limits for the autothrottle channel were the idle thrust-to-weight
ratio (lower limit) and the max thrust-to-weight ratio (upper limit). Max thrust-to-weight
ratio was computed from the excess thrust-to-weight ratio given in Table B.4 using the
drag-to-weight ratio at the approach trim condition. The upper pitch command limit was
set by the stick shaker angle of attack, and there was no need to enforce a lower limit.
The autothrottle (airspeed control loop) was designed first. A lead-lag
compensator was required to achieve a reasonable bandwidth. The closed loop airspeed
response had a dominant mode natural frequency of 1.43 rad/sec with a damping ratio of
0.77. Next, the new transfer function from pitch command to glideslope error was
computed and the glideslope tracking loop was closed. Acceptable characteristics were
achieved with a pure gain closure; dominant mode natural frequency was 0.41 rad/sec
with a damping ratio of 0.76. Time responses to an initial glideslope altitude error of 50
meters were presented in Figure 6.13.
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B.5 Simulated Microburst Winds
TASS Winds. In the hazard criterion correlation study, several vertical slices
were taken from a numerically-modeled microburst. Each vertical slice included two-
axis winds (Wx, Wh) indexed by groundtrack distance and altitude. In the aircraft
simulation, winds were computed from these slices by 2-D linear interpolation, and time
derivatives in the aircraft frame of the 2-D earth-referenced winds (Wx, Wh) were
computed as follows:
x aW aw
WL = x +h h (B.25)
ax ah
Wh Wh + h (B.26)
ax ah
where the spatial derivatives of Wx and Wh were computed by two-dimensional
central differencing. Note that the winds were time-invariant, so no actual time
derivatives appear in the above equations. The wind gradients are due only to aircraft
motion through a non-uniform wind field.
OBV Winds. For the hazard threshold study, the Oseguera-Bowles-Vicroy
parametric microburst model was used. The analytical expressions for winds and spatial
gradients in Appendix C were directly computed during the simulation runs, and
equations B.25 and B.26 were used to evaluate Wx and Wh.
190
Appendix C. Oseguera-Bowles-Vicroy Microburst Model Equations
C.1 Model Equations
This analytical microburst model was first proposed by Oseguera and Bowles
[1988] and improved by Vicroy [1991]. It is an axisymmetric steady-flow model which
employs radial and altitude-dependent shaping functions to satisfy the mass continuity
equation. The WxE, WyE, and Wh microburst wind components are functions of relative
position (x, y, h) and four model parameters:
Um Maximum horizontal outflow velocity
Rp Microburst core radius
Zm Altitude (AGL) of maximum horizontal wind velocity
a Shaping parameter (set to 2.0 for all of the work presented here)
WE = -e (C.1)2
WYE L [eC (h/Zm) eC2(h/Zm) ]e [ 2a (C.2)E= -e e ( . )
Wh C [eCi(hZm) i] Zm (hfZm)
2-( +2 )a/R2a (C.3)
2R2aP
where, if the microburst center is located at (xo, YO), the position offsets are given by:
x = x - xo (C.4)
y=y-yo • . (C.5)
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and the radial scale factor X is:
2Um
- R(eC, - eC2 )e(1/2a)
C1 and C2 are empirically-adjusted constants with the following values:
C1 =-0.15
C2 = -3.2175
To compute wind gradients, equations for spatial derivatives of the winds are
needed. These are:
X C (h/Zm)
2
-eC2(h/Zm) ti
(2 + 2)a-1
2R2P
C1 e(h/Zm)2 [Z_
(h/Zm) C 2 (h/Zm)
-e
C2 e
ZM
C 2 (h/Zm) e,
aWxE
ay
awyE 
_ [ e C l (h/Zm)
- eC2(h/Zm) 2 (
2 + 2 )a-1
RaP
aWyE 
_ -Cl C(h/Zm) C 2 (hZm)]
ah 2 Zm Zm
2-(i 2 +2)a/Ra
2a
(C.14)
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(C.6)
(C.7)
(C.8)
aWxE 
_
ax
aWxE 
_
ay
aWxE
ah
aWyE
ax
(C.9)
(C.10)
(C. 11)
(C.12)
(C.13)
2-it' +2 )a/R2a
2a
Wh 2 )a- m [e (h/Zm) ] Z [eC2(h/Zm) 1
ax R2a  C1 C2
[ (l-2+2) 2](i2+2)/Ra 1 (C.15)
P
aWh - ( 2 2 ) a- Z Zm (hZm)
ay Ra c, C2
2- 2R2)a/R2a (C.16)
-2 
-22 
2a2
ah 2R a
C.2 Projection to Spherical Coordinates
Doppler radars or lidars measure the wind component radial to the sensor. At a
given point, this component is the projection of the three-dimensional wind vector onto
the one-dimensional subspace radial to the sensor. To use these measurements in either
the least-squares technique or the IEKF algorithm, the relationship between the OBV
winds (in Cartesian coordinates) and the radial component is needed. This relationship is
the radial element of a transformation from Cartesian to spherical coordinates, where the
coordinate axes are defined as shown in Table C. 1.
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Table C.1. Coordinate frames for wind component tranformations
Cartesian coordinates [ Spherical coordinates
x East r Radial to sensor
WxE = wind velocity Wr = wind velocity
y North V Azimuth angle
WvE = wind velocity North = 0
Positive clockwise
h Up 0 Elevation angle
from x-y plane
Wh = wind velocity Positive upward
The radial velocity Wr is a function of WxE, WyE, Wh, V, and 0 as follows:
Wr = (WxE cosV + WyE sin V)cos0 + Wh sin0 (C.18)
Similarly, the partial derivatives needed for the Jacobean, J, in the least-squares
technique and for the measurement matrix, Hk, in the IEKF algorithm are:
_W_ W (___WyE 
_____ aWhr = cos + siny cos0+ sineax ax ax ax (C.19)
where x is the parameter vector for the analytical microburst model, not to be
confused with the east coordinate x. The derivatives in the preceding expression are quite
complex, and were computed by repeated application of the derivative chain rule.
194
Appendix D. Microburst Model Matching Least-Squares Algorithm
An algorithm was developed to match a parametric microburst model to a set of
wind measurements. The technique was an improved version of that used by Schultz
[1990] to develop a vortex ring model of the Dallas-Fort Worth airport microburst
[Fujita, 1986]. The algorithm computes the values of the n model parameters, x, which
minimize the total mean squared error between a set of "truth" winds and the analytical
model winds:
F(x) = - i (zmodel,i(X) - Zactual,i 2 b i  (D.1)
m
where m is the total number of measurement data points. Zatual is a column
vector of all measurements at all (x, y, h) locations, which can include wind and/or spatial
shear data. For the work in Chapter 7, three-axis winds (WxE, WyE, Wh) were used, so
Zactual had 3 elements for each (x, y, h) measurement position. Zmodel is the vector of wind
or shear values predicted by the analytical model at the appropriate measurement
locations, using the current parameter set x. The weights bi can be set to reflect
confidence in particular measurements; a typical choice is to use the reciprocal of the
measurement noise variances. The weights were identically 1 for the analysis in Chapter
7. Note that F(x) here is the scalar objective function for minimization, and should not be
confused with F-factor.
The objective function F was minimized using a constrained version of the Gauss-
Newton minimization technique for non-linear sum-of-squares functions [Scales, 1985].
When the objective function can be expressed as a sum of squares:
F(x)= ffi(x) (D.2)
i=l
or in vector form,
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F(x) = fT (x)f(x) (D.3)
f(x) = [fl f 2 f 3  "- fm]T  (D.4)
then a search direction at the kth iteration, Pk, can be computed by solving the
following matrix equation:
JkJkPk = fk (D.5)
where Jk is the Jacobean matrix:
afl/ax . . . fl//axn
(D.6)
afm/ax . . fm/aXn-
Equation D.5 is solved by LU factorization to yield the search direction. Pk is
used to update the parameter estimate as follows:
Xk+1 = Xk + akPk (D.7)
In the simplest implementation, ak = 1 for all k. However, the convergence
properties of the algorithm are enhanced when ak is computed from a linear search. This
search need not be very accurate. The procedure used here [Fletcher, 1970] ensures that a
reasonable decrease in the objective function is achieved at each step. Initially, ak = 1.
The new value of the objective function, Fk+1, is computed. A reasonable decrease in the
objective function has been achieved if:
ifFk+1 -Fk <Pk(p gk) (D.8)
gk = VF(Xk) (D.9)
196
in which case the search is terminated. Note that gk is the gradient of F(Xk). If
the test D.8 fails, the step ok is multiplied by co (where 0 5 co < 1), xk+1 and Fk+1 are
reevaluated, and the test is reapplied. The procedure ends either when D.8 is satisfied, in
which case k is incremented and a new search direction is computed, or when ak is
reduced below a specified minimum value, in which case the minimization procedure is
finished. For the work presented in Chapter 7, [t = 0.001, co = 0.5, and the minimum
value of (k = 0.0001.
The Gauss-Newton method (characterized by the search direction computation,
D.5) is a simplification of Newton's minimization method. The full form of Newton's
method requires evaluation of the Hessian matrix (V 2 F). As a result, the Gauss-Newton
algorithm requires much less computation. The Gauss-Newton method will converge
correctly and at comparable rates to Newton's method for "small residual" problems in
which the final minimum value of the objective function is small. It was found to
converge quickly and for a wide range of initial conditions when used to match
microburst winds with the OBV microburst model as in Chapter 7.
The above algorithm description is completely general; it is not limited to the
OBV microburst model. The OBV model equations (Appendix C) are used to compute
the objective function, Fk, and to compute the Jacobean, J. Other microburst models can
be used, provided that the wind equations are once-differentiable with respect to the
model parameters to allow computation of J. The algebraic derivative expressions used
to compute J are complex, and evaluation of J (at least for the OBV model) is the most
computationally-intensive part of the procedure.
The procedure could be further extended in several ways. A model which
included a temperature equation, for example, could be used to match IR temperature
measurements. Alternately, spatial gradients could be used as the measurements to
generate a windfield which more closely matches wind shear rather than winds. Finally,
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it would be straightforward to adapt the algorithm to other atmospheric phenomena for
which parameters of an appropriate analytical model can be related to measured
quantities by algebraic once-differentiable equations.
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